W v X

The reference to the defendant's conviction in this matter should not therefore be struck out and the plaintiff is entitled to adduce evidence of that conviction before the Royal Court. It will be for the Royal Court to decide what weight to adduce to that conviction. What evidence the defendant might be permitted to adduce in response to it is also a matter for another day because at this stage the defendant has not yet filed an answer. It is only when an answer is filed and the defendant articulates what grounds he disputes the conviction, can consideration be given about what evidence might then be permitted.

In relation to this part of the defendant's application, there is no dispute between the parties on the applicable principles as to when the maxim applies which were considered in Glazebrook v Housing Committee of The States of Jersey [2000] JLR 301 and in Jersey Financial Services Commission v W [2015] (1) JLR 412. The JFSC decision was an appeal against a decision of mine where I had summarised the principles at paragraphs 16 to 17 as follows, and which summary the Royal Court endorsed: -

"At present, the defendant has retained legal advisers to review whether there are grounds to approach the Lieutenant Governor to invite the Court of Appeal to reconsider the defendant's conviction. I was also informed by Advocate Austin that further enquiries have been made of the police because the defendant's advisers were of the view that full disclosure had not been made. If the police have not made full disclosure, I accepted that such a situation might lead the Lieutenant Governor to refer matters back to the Court of Appeal, if such non-disclosure was significant in relation to the current conviction.

However, at this stage, I was not persuaded that it was appropriate to exercise my discretion to stay the civil proceedings. As matters stand there may or may not be an application to the Lieutenant Governor which may or may not lead to a referral back to the Court of Appeal. The outcome of the enquiries with the police are also unknown. I was not therefore satisfied that allowing the civil proceedings to proceed by requiring the defendant to file an answer in the context of the possibility of the various steps I have referred to above met the threshold of there being a real risk of serious prejudice which might lead to injustice.

To put matters in another way I was not satisfied there was a manifest risk of injustice in allowing the civil proceedings to progress by requiring the filing of pleadings, leading to a directions hearing in due course which would require the filing of discovery and the filing of evidence as well as addressing the issues I have referred to above about what evidence might be admissible.

The conclusion I have reached does not mean however that the defendant might not make a further application for a stay should circumstances change. My decision was therefore that no grounds existed as at the date of the application which justified a stay as matters currently stand.

Finally, I ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff's costs on the standard basis, such costs to be summarily assessed if not agreed. I reached this view as the defendant had both sought to strike out part of the order of justice and to stay the proceedings both of which applications have been unsuccessful. The orders sought were more than case management issues which therefore justified a costs order in the plaintiff's favour. Enforcement of these costs' orders was stayed however until expiry of any time limit for the defendant to appeal against this decision and if an appeal is filed until determination of the said appeal.