E. Other relevant facts
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
III. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL MATERIAL
A. The Council of Europe
B. The European Union
C. The United Nations Organisation
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION IN THE EVENT OF ENFORCEMENT OF THE ORDER OF 17 SEPTEMBER 2005
A. The parties’ submissions
1. The applicants
2. The Government
B. The Court’s assessment
1. Article 8 of the Convention
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home ...
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
(a) Whether the enforcement of the removal order would interfere with rights protected by Article 8
(b) Lawfulness
(c) Legitimate aim
(d) Necessity in a democratic society
i. General principles
(i) In spheres involving the application of social or economic policies, including as regards housing, there is authority that the margin of appreciation is wide, as in the urban or rural planning context where the Court has found that “[i]n so far as the exercise of discretion involving a multitude of local factors is inherent in the choice and implementation of planning policies, the national authorities in principle enjoy a wide margin of appreciation” (see, for example, Buckley, cited above, p. 1292, § 75 in fine, and Ćosić, cited above, § 20);
(ii) On the other hand, the margin of appreciation left to the authorities will tend to be narrower where the right at stake is crucial to the individual’s effective enjoyment of intimate or key rights. Since Article 8 concerns rights of central importance to the individual’s identity, self-determination, physical and moral integrity, maintenance of relationships with others and a settled and secure place in the community, where general social and economic policy considerations have arisen in the context of Article 8 itself, the scope of the margin of appreciation depends on the context of the case, with particular significance attaching to the extent of the intrusion into the personal sphere of the applicant (see, among many others, Connors, cited above, § 82);
(iii) The procedural safeguards available to the individual will be especially material in determining whether the respondent State has remained within its margin of appreciation. In particular, the Court must examine whether the decision-making process leading to measures of interference was fair and such as to afford due respect to the interests safeguarded to the individual by Article 8 (see Buckley, cited above, pp. 1292-93, § 76, and Chapman, cited above, § 92). The “necessary in a democratic society” requirement under Article 8 § 2 raises a question of procedure as well of substance (see McCann, cited above, § 26);
(iv) Since the loss of one’s home is a most extreme form of interference with the right under Article 8 to respect for one’s home, any person at risk of an interference of this magnitude should in principle be able to have the proportionality and reasonableness of the measure determined by an independent tribunal in the light of the relevant principles under Article 8, notwithstanding that, under domestic law, he has no right of occupation (see Kay and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 37341/06, § 67-8 and 74, 21 September 2010 and Orlić v. Croatia, no. 48833/07, § 65, 21 June 2011). This means, among other things, that where relevant arguments concerning the proportionality of the interference have been raised by the applicant in domestic judicial proceedings, the domestic courts should examine them in detail and provide adequate reasons (ibid., §§ 67-69);
(v) Where the national authorities, in their decisions ordering and upholding the applicant’s eviction, have not given any explanation or put forward any arguments demonstrating that the applicant’s eviction was necessary, the Court may draw the inference that the State’s legitimate interest in being able to control its property should come second to the applicant’s right to respect for his home (ibid).
ii. Application of those principles to the facts of the case
α) The Court’s approach in the present case
β) Whether the order of 17 September 2005 was justified under Article 8 § 2
γ) Whether events since 2005-2006 would render the enforcement justified
(e) Conclusion as regards Article 8
2. Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8
3. Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
II. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 46 OF THE CONVENTION
“1. The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties.
2. The final judgment of the Court shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise its execution.”
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
B. Costs and expenses
C. Default interest
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
4 Holds that no separate issue arises in respect of the applicants’ complaints under Articles 3, 8, 13 and 14 of the Convention about the authorities’ past actions and statements in relation to Batalova Vodenitsa;
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicants, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 4,000 (four thousand euros) in respect of costs and expenses, to be converted into Bulgarian levs at the rate applicable at the date of settlement, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
Done in English, and notified in writing on 24 April 2012, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Fatoş Aracı Lech Garlicki
Deputy Registrar President