It is important to remember in this respect that under the Convention system the establishment and verification of the facts are primarily a matter for the Commission (see Articles 28 § 1 and 31 of the Convention). Only in exceptional circumstances will the Court exercise its own powers in this area. However, the Court is not bound by the Commission’s findings of fact and remains free to make its own assessment in the light of all the material before it (see the McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom judgment of 27 September 1995, Series A no. 324, p. 50, § 169, and the Kaya judgment cited above, p. 321, § 75).
In the instant case, the Commission was unable to conclude that the allegation that the attacks had been perpetrated by the security forces had been proved beyond all reasonable doubt (see, among other authorities, the Aydın v. Turkey judgment of 25 September 1997, Reports 1997-VI, p. 1889, § 72, and the Kaya judgment cited above, p. 322, § 76). However, the applicant pleaded before the Court that new evidence that had not been before the Commission militated in favour of his version (see paragraph 83 above). In that connection, he referred to the Susurluk report (see paragraph 46 above), the evidential value of which was, however, firmly contested at the hearing by the representative of the Government (see paragraph 87 above).
The Court reiterates that in determining whether substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the respondent State has not complied with its responsibilities under the Convention, the Court must examine the issues raised before it in the light of the material provided by those appearing before it and, if necessary, of material obtained proprio motu (see, mutatis mutandis , the Ireland v. the United Kingdom judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A no. 25, p. 64, § 160, and the Cruz Varas and Others v. Sweden judgment of 20 March 1991, Series A no. 201, p. 29, § 75). Although the Court must refer primarily to the circumstances existing at the time of the incidents complained of, it is not precluded from having regard to information coming to light subsequently (see, mutatis mutandis , the Cruz Varas and Others judgment cited above, p. 30, § 76).
The Court notes that the Susurluk report – which was prepared at the Prime Minister’s request – relates to a series of disturbing events that occurred in the south-eastern region of Turkey (see paragraph 46 above). The fate of certain newspaper-publishing companies, in particular the company which published the Özgür Gündem , is particularly alarming in that regard. According to the author of the report, the cause of that general situation, which has considerably troubled public opinion, has been the Kurdish problem and the means used to combat the PKK in that part of the country.
While it is true that the attainment of the required evidentiary standard (see paragraphs 34 and 91 above) may follow from the co‑existence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or unrebutted presumptions (see the Aydın judgment cited above, p. 1888, § 70, and the Kaya judgment cited above, p. 322, § 77), their evidential value must be considered in the light of the circumstances of the individual case and the seriousness and nature of the charge to which they give rise against the respondent State.
In the present case, the Court considers that notwithstanding the serious concerns to which it gives rise, the Susurluk report does not contain material enabling the presumed perpetrators of the attacks on the applicant and his uncle to be identified with sufficient precision. Indeed, the applicant admits as much in his memorial (see paragraph 83 above).
Consequently, the Court does not consider that it should depart from the Commission’s conclusions regarding this complaint. It accordingly holds that the material on the case file does not enable it to conclude beyond all reasonable doubt that Mr Eşref Yaşa and his uncle were respectively attacked and killed by the security forces.
It follows that there has been no violation of Article 2 on that account.
Alleged inadequacy of the investigations
The Court recalls that the obligation to protect the right to life under Article 2 of the Convention, read in conjunction with the State’s general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to “secure to everyone within [its] jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in [the] Convention”, requires by implication that there should be some form of effective official investigation when individuals have been killed as a result of the use of force (see, mutatis mutandis , the McCann and Others judgment cited above, p. 48, § 161, and the Kaya judgment cited above, p. 324, § 86).
In the instant case, the Government maintained that there was no evidence that State agents had been implicated in the commission of the alleged acts (see paragraph 84 above). Furthermore, the applicant had at no stage made any explicit accusation to that effect, either in his own name, or on behalf of his uncle (see paragraphs 67 and 76 above).
In that connection, the Court emphasises that, contrary to what is asserted by the Government, the obligation is not confined to cases where it has been established that the killing was caused by an agent of the State. Nor is the issue of whether members of the deceased’s family or others have lodged a formal complaint about the killing with the competent investigatory authorities decisive. In the case under consideration, the mere fact that the authorities were informed of the murder of the applicant’s uncle gave rise ipso facto to an obligation under Article 2 to carry out an effective investigation (see, mutatis mutandis , the Ergi v. Turkey judgment of 28 July 1998, Reports 1998-IV, p. 1778, § 82). The same applies to the attack on the applicant which, because eight shots were fired at him, amounted to attempted murder (see paragraph 36 above).
In the present case, there is no dispute as to what steps the authorities in charge of the preliminary investigation and the competent public prosecutor’s office took following the events in issue (see paragraphs 35–45 above).
Following an armed assault on the applicant, a police investigation started that same day, namely on 15 January 1993. At the end of that initial stage, which lasted only two days, Mardinkapı security directorate concluded, in its report of 17 January 1993, that it had not been possible to find those responsible for the attack, or even to identify them. Consequently, on 20 January the Diyarbakır public prosecutor instructed the directorate to pursue its investigation and to arrest the suspects or, if it was unable to do so, to inform him of progress every three months. On 14 April the public prosecutor issued a second set of similar instructions in which he renewed his request to be informed every three months of the results of the police investigations until such time as prosecution of the offence became statute-barred. According to a note in the instructions, that would have been on 15 January 1998 (see paragraph 39 above). Before the Convention institutions, however, the Government did not produce copies of the quarterly reports the police had been instructed to draw up (see paragraph 45 above).
The preliminary inquiry into the murder of Mr Haşim Yaşa also began on the day of that incident, namely 14 June 1993. By 21 June the authorities had among other things carried out an autopsy, obtained an expert ballistics report and heard three witnesses, including the deceased’s son. The Court has no information on subsequent developments in that investigation (ibid.).
Yet the Government were aware of Mr Yaşa’s application by 11 October 1993 (see paragraph 6 of the Commission’s report) and the Commission invited the Government to provide it with more precise details concerning the investigative measures that had been taken following the attacks on the applicant, his uncle and other persons connected with certain radical periodicals (see paragraphs 34 and 90 above).
Despite those requests, the Government provided no concrete information on the state of progress of the investigations (see paragraph 90 above and paragraph 105 of the Commission’s report) which, more than five years after the events, do not appear to have produced any tangible result. Admittedly, the Government said that the investigations were still pending, but they did not provide anything to show that they were actually progressing (see paragraphs 29, 35–45 and 86 above). In that regard, the last investigative step of which the Court is aware dates back to 21 June 1993, when the expert ballistics report in the investigation into the murder of Haşim Yaşa was prepared (see paragraph 44 above), whereas the Diyarbakır public prosecutor had on 14 April 1993 requested the police to inform him every three months of progress in the investigation (see paragraph 101 above). The only explanation given by the Government is that the investigations were taking place in the context of the fight against terrorism and that in such circumstances the police and judicial authorities were constrained to “proceed with caution and to wait until the results of the various investigations had been cross-checked, thus enabling the perpetrators of earlier crimes and acts of violence to be identified” (see paragraph 86 above).
The Court is prepared to take into account the fact that the prevailing climate at the time in that region of Turkey, marked by violent action by the PKK and measures taken in reaction thereto by the authorities, may have impeded the search for conclusive evidence in the domestic criminal proceedings. Nonetheless, circumstances of that nature cannot relieve the authorities of their obligations under Article 2 to carry out an investigation, as otherwise that would exacerbate still further the climate of impunity and insecurity in the region and thus create a vicious circle (see mutatis mutandis , the Kaya judgment cited above, p. 326, § 91).
In addition, the Court is struck by the fact that the investigatory authorities appear to have excluded from the outset the possibility that State agents might have been implicated in the attacks. Thus, the public prosecutor at the Diyarbakır National Security Court considered the incidents in question to have been merely “a settling of scores between armed organisations” (see paragraph 45 above and paragraph 61 of the Commission’s report), whereas the Government considered that all responsibility for the attacks lay with “terrorists”, even though the investigations are not over and no concrete evidence capable of confirming that to be a valid hypothesis has been brought to the attention of the Court (see paragraphs 85 and 86 above).
That approach has to be assessed in the light of the fact that the Commission found that there were a number of attacks involving killings in south-east Turkey on journalists, newspaper kiosks and distributors of the Özgür Gündem and that some of those incidents had even formed the subject matter of applications to it (nos. 22492/93, 22496/93, 23144/93 and 25301/94 – see paragraphs 52–59 of the Commission’s report). The Government have not disputed that the attacks occurred or that they were serious. The Commission also noted that many complaints and requests for protection had been made to the authorities by a journalist, Mr Y. Kaya, who at the time was the proprietor of the newspaper.
After considering all the facts of the case, the Commission did not consider that in the case before it “the authorities [were] or [could] have been unaware that those involved in the publication and distribution of the Özgür Gündem feared that they were falling victim to a concerted campaign tolerated, if not approved, by State officials” (see paragraphs 34 and 89 above).
Having carried out its own assessment of this aspect of the case, in the light in particular of the findings of the Susurluk report (see paragraph 46 above), the Court considers that observation to be well-founded. In the instant case, it was therefore incumbent on the authorities to have regard, in their investigations, to the fact that State agents may have been implicated in the attacks. In that connection, whether or not the applicant had formally identified the security forces as being the assailants was of little relevance (see paragraphs 30, 37, 76 and 85 above).
In short, because the investigations carried out in the instant case did not allow of the possibility that given the circumstances of the case the security forces might have been implicated in the attacks and because, up till now, more than five years after the events, no concrete and credible progress has been made, the investigations cannot be considered to have been effective as required by Article 2.
In consequence, the applicant has satisfied the obligation to exhaust domestic remedies. It follows that the Court dismisses the criminal-proceedings limb of the Government’s preliminary objection and holds that there has been a violation of Article 2.
IV. alleged violation of article 13 of the convention
The applicant complained that he had not had an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 13 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
The Government contested that argument. The Commission considered that it was unnecessary to examine it separately as no separate issue arose under Article 13.
A. Arguments of the parties
The applicant, who disagreed with the Commission’s conclusion, submitted that an independent examination from the one carried out under Article 2 of the Convention was merited in respect of this complaint. He asserted that the legal order and practice in south-east Turkey, which was subject to the state of emergency, had been changed in order deliberately to make the exercise of remedies against the State more difficult. The special legislation in force in that region had established a system which ensured impunity for the security forces, based on the authorities’ strategy of denying the facts and any liability, in order to prevent effective access to domestic remedies.
Referring to their observations on the question of the exhaustion of domestic remedies (see paragraph 67 above), the Government confined themselves to saying that the applicant could not complain of a violation of Article 13.
B. The Court’s assessment
The Court observes that Article 13 of the Convention guarantees the availability at a national level of a remedy to enforce the Convention rights and freedoms, as secured in the domestic legal order. The effect of this Article is thus to require the provision of a domestic remedy allowing the competent national authority both to deal with the substance of an “arguable complaint” under the Convention and to grant appropriate relief, although Contracting States are afforded some discretion as to the manner in which they conform to their obligations under this provision. Nevertheless, the remedy required by Article 13 must be “effective” in practice as well as in law, in particular in the sense that its exercise must not be unjustifiably hindered by the acts or omissions of the authorities of the respondent State (see the Aksoy judgment cited above, p. 2286, § 95; the Aydın judgment cited above, p. 1895, § 103; and the Kaya judgment cited above, pp. 329‑30, § 106).
In the instant case, the Court has concluded that it has not been proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the attacks on the applicant and his uncle were carried out by State agents (see paragraph 97 above). That fact, however, does not necessarily mean that the complaint under Article 2 is not arguable (see, among other authorities, the Boyle and Rice v. the United Kingdom judgment of 27 April 1988, Series A no. 131, p. 23, § 52, and the Kaya judgment cited above, pp. 330–31, § 107). The Court’s conclusion as to the merits does not relieve the State of the obligation to carry out an effective investigation into the substance of the complaint, which, for the reasons mentioned above (see paragraph 106), was arguable.
It is also necessary to reiterate that the nature of the right that is alleged to have been infringed has implications on the extent of the obligations under Article 13. Given the fundamental importance of the right to protection of life, Article 13 imposes, without prejudice to any other remedy available under the domestic system including the payment of compensation where appropriate, an obligation on States to carry out a thorough and effective investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible and in which the complainant has effective access to the investigatory procedure (see, mutatis mutandis , the Kaya, Aksoy and Aydın judgments cited above, § 107, § 98, and § 103 respectively).
The Court reiterates that the authorities had an obligation to carry out an effective investigation into the circumstances of the attacks (see paragraph 107 above). However, five years after those attacks took place, the investigations have still not produced any results. For the reasons set out above (see paragraphs 98–108 above), the respondent State cannot be considered to have conducted an effective criminal investigation as required by Article 13, the requirements of which are stricter still than the investigatory obligation under Article 2 (see the Kaya judgment cited above, pp. 330–31, § 107 – see paragraphs 98, 112 and 114 above).
Consequently, there has been a violation of Article 13.
v. alleged practice by the authorities of infringing articles 2 and 13 of the convention
Referring in particular to the Susurluk report, the applicant maintained that there existed in Turkey an officially tolerated practice of violating Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention that had aggravated the breaches of which he and his uncle had been victims. In south-east Turkey, criminal proceedings were bound to fail and were incapable of preventing unlawful acts and abuse of power by the authorities. By systematically denying any breaches of the Convention, the authorities were safe from any proceedings brought against them.
The Court considers that the material on the file is not sufficient to enable it to determine whether the authorities have adopted a practice of violating any of the Articles relied on by the applicant.
VI. alleged violation of articles 10, 14 and 18 of the convention
Relying on Article 10 of the Convention, the applicant submitted that the attacks on him and his uncle constituted an aggravated violation of their right to freedom of expression, since they had been carried out because they sold the Özgür Gündem and were part of a campaign of violence tolerated by the State. He also said that both in his and his uncle’s cases there had been a violation of Article 14, taken together with Articles 2, 10 and 13, through discrimination on grounds of ethnic origin and political opinion. Lastly, the applicant complained of a violation of Article 18 in that the facts of the case revealed clear abuses of power by the State.
The Government contested the applicant’s arguments. The Commission concluded that there had been no violation of Article 10 and considered that the complaints made under Articles 14 and 18 were unfounded.
The Court notes that those complaints arise out of the same facts as those considered under Articles 2 and 13. In the light of its conclusion with respect to those Articles (see paragraphs 107 and 115 above), the Court does not consider it necessary to examine those complaints separately.
vii. application of article 50 of the convention
The applicant sought just satisfaction under Article 50 of the Convention, which provides:
“If the Court finds that a decision or a measure taken by a legal authority or any other authority of a High Contracting Party is completely or partially in conflict with the obligations arising from the ... Convention, and if the internal law of the said Party allows only partial reparation to be made for the consequences of this decision or measure, the decision of the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
The Government contested the applicant’s claims in several respects. The Delegate of the Commission had no specific comments.
A. Pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage
The applicant requested the Court to award him 54,000 Deutschmarks (DEM) in total, by way of pecuniary damage: DEM 4,000 for his treatment in hospital and DEM 50,000 for loss of earnings following the attack on him. He also claimed on behalf of Haşim Yaşa’s family a sum of DEM 50,000 for loss of earnings and costs entailed by his death.
The applicant claimed a total sum of 150,000 pounds sterling (GBP) for non-pecuniary damage, which he justified as follows:
(i) GBP 70,000 for himself as damages for the attack (GBP 50,000), the failure to protect his right to life (GBP 10,000) and the failure to provide an effective remedy (GBP 10,000);
(ii) GBP 70,000 for the family of the deceased in respect of the latter’s murder (GBP 50,000), the failure to protect his right to life (GBP 10,000) and the failure to provide him an effective remedy (GBP 10,000);
(iii) GBP 10,000 for himself and for the deceased as victims of a practice of violations of Article 13 of the Convention.
As their main submission, the Government maintained that no redress was necessary in the present case. In the alternative, they invited the Court to dismiss the claims for compensation made by the applicant as being exorbitant and unjustified. As regards the non-pecuniary damage, the Government firstly argued that the claims should not have been split up. They also submitted that there was no causal link between the complaints and the alleged damage. The Government firmly opposed the deceased’s family being awarded compensation on the ground that it had not taken part in the proceedings before the Strasbourg institutions.
More generally, the Government maintained that the sums sought had been put forward without regard to the social conditions in south-east Turkey, or to the minimum wage levels in force in the country. On that point, they said that compensation for non-pecuniary damage should not constitute a source of enrichment.
The Court observes that it has not been established that the applicant was attacked or his uncle killed by members of the security forces (see paragraph 97 above). It cannot therefore accede to the claims made in that connection for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. Secondly, as it has not been established either that there has been a practice of violations of the Convention (see paragraph 117 above), no compensation can be paid under that head.
Like the Government, the Court observes further that the application was lodged by Mr Haşim Yaşa’s nephew only (see paragraph 63 above).
In these circumstances, the Court considers that only Mr Eşref Yaşa is entitled to just satisfaction for the non-pecuniary damage suffered as a result of the violations of Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention (see paragraphs 107 and 115 above). Ruling on an equitable basis, the Court decides to award the applicant the sum of GBP 6,000, to be converted into Turkish liras at the rate applicable at the date of payment.
B. Costs and expenses
The applicant claimed GBP 16,426.42 in reimbursement of the costs and expenses incurred in the preparation and presentation of his case before the Convention institutions. In his schedule of costs, he set out his claim as follows, after deducting the sums received by way of legal aid from the Council of Europe:
(i) fees of the British representatives GBP 13,190.70
(ii) fees of the Turkish advisers GBP 725.00
(iii) various administrative expenses GBP 985.72
(iv) administrative costs incurred in Turkey GBP 250.00
(v) interpretation and translation costs GBP 1,440.00
The applicant’s counsel requested that any sums awarded in respect of costs and expenses be paid to their bank account in the United Kingdom.
The Government opposed reimbursing the costs incurred by the fact that foreign lawyers had been instructed, as the sole result had been that the costs of the case had been inflated. In addition, the amount claimed for costs and expenses was excessive and not supported by documentary evidence.
The Court reiterates that, as applicants are free to select legal representatives of their choice, Mr Ya şa’s recourse to United Kingdom-based lawyers specialising in the international protection of human rights cannot be criticised (see, mutatis mutandis , the Kurt v. Turkey judgment of 25 May 1998, Reports 1998-III, p. 1212, § 179). The Court, deciding on an equitable basis and having regard to the details of the claims submitted by the applicant, awards him the sum of GBP 12,000 together with any value‑added tax that may be chargeable, less the 8,045 French francs which the applicant has received by way of legal aid from the Council of Europe in respect of the fees and expenses claimed.
C. Default interest
The Court considers it appropriate to adopt the statutory rate of interest applicable in the United Kingdom at the date of adoption of the present judgment, namely 7.5% per annum.
for these reasons the court
Dismisses by eight votes to one the Government’s preliminary objections;
Holds unanimously that it has not been established that the applicant was attacked and his uncle killed in violation of Article 2 of the Convention;
Holds by eight votes to one that there has been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention in that the authorities of the respondent State did not conduct an adequate and effective investigation into the circumstances of the said incidents;
Holds by eight votes to one that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention;
Holds unanimously that it is unnecessary to examine whether there has been a violation of Articles 10, 14 or 18 of the Convention;
Holds by eight votes to one
(a) that the respondent State is to pay to the applicant, within three months, the following sums:
(i) 6,000 (six thousand) pounds sterling for non-pecuniary damage to be converted into Turkish liras at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(ii) 12,000 (twelve thousand) pounds sterling for costs and expenses together with any sum due by way of value-added tax, less 8,045 (eight thousand and forty-five) French francs to be converted into pounds sterling at the rate applicable at the date of this judgment;
(b) that simple interest at an annual rate of 7.5% shall be payable from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement;
Dismisses unanimously the remainder of the claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public hearing in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 2 September 1998.
Signed : Rudolf Bernhardt
President
Signed : Herbert Petzold
Registrar
In accordance with Article 51 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 53 § 2 of Rules of Court A, the partly dissenting opinion of Mr Gölcüklü is annexed to this judgment.
Initialled : R. B. Initialled : H. P.
partly DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE Gölcüklü
( Translation )
To my great regret, I am unable to share the opinion of the majority on the following points.
There have been cases in which distant relatives, such as cousins or nephews, claiming to be victims within the meaning of Article 25, have lodged applications with the Commission, which has held that that provision had been complied with. Although Article 25 enables certain blood ties to be taken into account in construing the concept of who is a “victim”, it is however necessary to ask oneself how far that approach can be taken without a risk of converting the right of individual petition into a sort of actio popularis . In the instant case, no one more closely related to the deceased (such as his wife or children) than the applicant, who was only his nephew, took part in the proceedings before the Convention institutions (see paragraph 123 of the judgment). It must not be forgotten that behind all these cases, which are similar and come from south-east Turkey, are to be found the Diyarbakır Human Rights Association and the Kurdish Human Rights Project from London, which bodies pursue political ends rather than defending the rights of alleged victims. In my opinion, it is therefore going too far to hold that the applicant was also a “victim” of his uncle’s death and that the application included that claim too.
Likewise the applicant has not in this case exhausted the domestic remedies, that are both effective and efficient, provided by Turkish law. On this point I refer to my dissenting opinions in the following judgments: Akdivar and Others v. Turkey of 16 September 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-IV, Aydın v. Turkey of 25 September 1997, Reports 1997‑VI, Menteş and Others v. Turkey of 28 November 1997, Reports 1997‑VIII, and Selçuk and Asker v. Turkey of 24 April 1998, Reports 1998‑II. Consequently, I consider that this conclusion makes it unnecessary for me to decide the issues raised on the merits in the present case.
Furthermore, with regard to the conclusion that Article 2 has been infringed because of the lack of an effective and efficient investigation into the circumstances of the death, I consider, like the Commission, that no separate issue arises under Article 13. On this point I refer to my dissenting opinions in the Kaya v. Turkey judgment of 19 February 1998, Reports 1998-I, and in the Kurt v. Turkey judgment of 25 May 1998, Reports 1998‑III.
Lastly, given the particular and specific features of this case, I find the sums awarded to the applicant by the majority to be excessive, as regards both non-pecuniary damage and costs and expenses. To my mind, it was neither absolutely necessary nor helpful for three British lawyers to act in this case, as it did not give rise to any special difficulty.
[1] . This summary by the registry does not bind the Court.
Notes by the Registrar
[2] . The case is numbered 63/1997/847/1054. The first number is the case’s position on the list of cases referred to the Court in the relevant year (second number). The last two numbers indicate the case’s position on the list of cases referred to the Court since its creation and on the list of the corresponding originating applications to the Commission.
[3] . Rules of Court A apply to all cases referred to the Court before the entry into force of Protocol No. 9 (1 October 1994) and thereafter only to cases concerning States not bound by that Protocol. They correspond to the Rules that came into force on 1 January 1983, as amended several times subsequently.
[4] . Susurluk was the scene of a road accident in November1996 involving a car in which a member of parliament, a former deputy director of the Istanbul security services, a notorious far-right extremist, a drug trafficker wanted by Interpol and his girlfriend had been travelling. The latter three were all killed. The fact that they had all been travelling in the same car had so shocked public opinion that it had been necessary to start more than sixteen judicial investigations at different levels and a parliamentary inquiry.
[5] . One of the pseudonyms of a former member of the PKK turned informant who was known by the name “Green Code” and had supplied information to several State authorities since 1973.
[6] . An infamous drug trafficker strongly suspected of supporting the PKK (see paragraph 25 above).
[7] . Mr Anter, a pro-Kurdish political figure, was one of the founding members of the People’s Labour Party (“the HEP”), director of the Kurdish Institute in Istanbul, a writer and leader writer for, inter alia , the weekly review Yeni Ülke and the daily newspaper Özgür Gündem (see paragraph 22 above). He was killed at Diyarbakır on 30 September 1992 (see paragraph 24 above). Responsibility for the murder was claimed by an unknown clandestine group “ Boz-Ok ”.
[8] . See paragraph 26 above.
[9] . The appendix is missing from the report.
[10] . Ibid. for the page following this last sentence.
[11] . Note by the Registrar . For practical reasons this annex will appear only with the printed version of the judgment (in Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998), but a copy of the Commission’s report is obtainable from the registry.