D. (B.) v. D. (J.)

Accordingly, if I am satisfied on the balance of probability that any of the said grounds have been established, then in accordance with section 3 (1) of the Act "the court shall, subject to subsection (2) of this section and sections 5 and 6 of this Act, grant a decree of judicial separation in respect of the spouses concerned."

Mr. D.. on the other hand heavily disputes the extent of this working claim: he says that she did a sales course for one week and then spent no more than three to six months, at most, working as a representative with that company. She was long gone he recalls when the U.K. directors left, and she never worked for that company in 1988 or 1989 and never had any managerial role, function or input. Furthermore he asserts that emigration was principally her focus with his concentration being on his job.

I therefore do not accept that there was any agreement involving Mr. D.. and the applicant's brother, a conclusion which I feel is borne out by the absence of any enforcement proceedings against the respondent, as well as by the evidence of Mr. K.H.

This conclusion as to the source of the �50,000 is also doubted by Mr. K.H. who believes that Mr. J.D. got money from the old companies through the restructuring process. This possibly could have been so but I am satisfied that at least to the extent of �30,000 the same came from A.I.B. The end result therefore of this refinancing was that the legal ownership in W.G.S. was as follows:

With this money the old assets of the previous companies were acquired with a substantial sum also being available as working capital. Mr. J.F. became chairman, Mr. K.H. became company secretary. Mr. J.D. became managing director, and Mr. W.P. sales director, with the latter two being executive as to function.