VTB Bank PJSC v Kuanyshev & Anor

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES
COMMERCIAL COURT

Peter MacDonald Eggers KC :

Introduction

1. On 9th February 2026, upon the without notice application of the Claimant ("VTB"), Bright J made a worldwide freezing order ("the WFO") over the assets of the Respondents, Mr Kuanyshev and Mrs Askar, who are husband and wife, resident within England and Wales, and are said to have substantial connection with this jurisdiction.
2. The WFO was made in respect of legal proceedings commenced by VTB against Mr Kuanyshev and Mr Evgeny Shlenskikh in Russia on 2nd December 2025 claiming relief in the sum of RUB7,191,396,362.56 (approximately US$90 million) in respect of Facility Agreement No. 4686 dated 4th April 2019 ("the Facility Agreement") for the advance of funds to a Russian oil extracting company called Pechoraneftegaz JSC ("PNG").
3. In July 2024, Mr Kuanyshev and Mr Shlenskikh acquired 25% of the shares in PNG's parent company (with the remaining shares in PNG's parent company being indirectly acquired on or around 16th September 2025) and, as a condition precedent to VTB approving the share transaction, Mr Kuanyshev and Mr Shlenskikh entered into two guarantee agreements with VTB dated 15th July 2024, guaranteeing the entirety of the amounts owed by PNG to VTB under the Facility Agreement.
4. VTB's claim is based on the fact that, in April 2025, PNG defaulted on its payment obligations under the Facility Agreement. Mr Kuanyshev and Mr Shlenskikh negotiated several extensions of the payment schedule with VTB but, with two minor exceptions, they failed to procure timely payments from PNG.
5. VTB alleges that Mr Kuanyshev and Mr Shlenskikh made a series of false and misleading promises in the course of their correspondence with VTB concerning the Facility Agreement and guarantees and used forged documents.
6. On 25th December 2025, on VTB's application, the Russian Court granted a freezing order in Russia against the assets of Mr Kuanyshev and Mr Shlenskikh.
7. In addition, on 19th December 2025, on VTB's application, the Courts for the Dubai International Financial Centre ("DIFC") granted a worldwide freezing order against Mr and Mrs Askar, Mr Shlenskikh, Shev Energy LLC-FZ (a company wholly owned and controlled by Mr Shlenskikh), and Munira Orhayevna Baymenova (Mr Shlenskikh's wife).
8. At the return date hearing of the WFO granted by Bright J, the parties have agreed to an order for the continuation of the WFO pending an application by the Respondents to set aside the WFO, for which purpose they have stated that they intend to file the application by 16th March 2026. At the return date hearing, I approved that order.
9. There are three contested issues for determination at the return date hearing:

(1) Whether the WFO should be varied to increase the financial value threshold for the disclosure of assets required by the WFO.

(2) Whether the fortification of the cross-undertaking given by VTB should be amended by increasing the amount fortified and by requiring a payment into Court.

(3) Whether references in the WFO to Mr Christopher Clayton, entities controlled by Mr Clayton, including Alpha Wealth Group (collectively, "AWG"), and the property at St Theodore, North Drive, Virginia Water, England GU25 4NQ ("St Theodore") should be removed from the WFO.

10. The first two of these issues arise upon an application by the Respondents and the third upon an application by Mr Clayton. I heard the parties' oral argument on these three issues on Friday 27th February 2026. I then reserved judgment on these three issues because there was insufficient time in the half day hearing to give judgment and, further, I invited additional written submissions on the third of the above issues to be provided after the hearing.
11. VTB was represented by Mr Robin Barclay KC and Ms Nathalie Koh. The Respondents were represented by Mr Michael Bools KC and Ms Georgina Petrova. Mr Clayton and AWG were represented by Mr Joseph Howard.
12. This is my judgment on the applications giving rise to the above issues.

The threshold for disclosure

13. Paragraph 12 of the WFO provides that the Respondents must inform VTB's legal representatives of all the Respondents' assets worldwide exceeding �5,000 in market value (ignoring charges or other security) whether in each of the Respondents' own name or not and whether solely or jointly owned, giving the value, location and details of all such assets.
14. The order was varied on 20th February 2026 to restrict the disclosure of assets with a value exceeding �25,000, pending the resolution of the Respondents' application to amend paragraph 12 of the WFO in accordance with the terms of the order of 20th February 2026, that is to increase the reporting threshold of assets from �5,000 to �25,000.
15. Mr Bools KC submitted on behalf of the Respondents that the amendment should be made increasing the threshold for asset disclosure from �5,000 to �25,000, for the following reasons:

(1) It is onerous and oppressive to require the Respondents to list assets worth less than �25,000. The Respondents' evidence is that:

(a) They have a number of personal items that have been purchased for more than �5,000 and less than �25,000. Assets with a value between �5,000 and �25,000 include a wide array of items of property.

(b) In the years since, some or all of those items will have reduced in value due to ordinary wear and tear.

(c) It will take the Respondents a considerable time and effort to identify all of their assets potentially worth between �5,000 and �25,000 and to estimate their current market value.

(2) It is unnecessary and disproportionate to require the Respondents to undertake this exercise. Given that VTB's claim against Mr Kuanyshev in Russia is for the equivalent of more than US$90 million, it is inherently improbable that VTB would seek to enforce any judgment in its favour against assets worth less than �25,000.

(3) The purpose of the threshold is to ensure all significant assets that could be used to satisfy a judgment are disclosed while avoiding minor and burdensome disclosures. In a very high value commercial claim against an individual, as here, the appropriate and fair threshold should take into account that (a) assets with a proportionately much lower value than the claim are unlikely to be used to satisfy a judgment of that order of magnitude; and (b) requiring high net-worth individuals to disclose such assets can make compliance with the order oppressive as it may require them to value and disclose numerous personal chattels.

(4) The Respondents have complied with the WFO and disclosed their assets worth over �25,000. In light of that disclosure, it cannot reasonably be said that VTB does not now have a "meaningful and workable picture" of their assets by which to monitor the WFO. The Respondents' most valuable assets are Mr Kuanyshev's 50% interest in Andoro Trading Corp (Belize) and PMG Holding GmbH (Austria), which together hold assets with an estimated value of US$200 million. At their current estimated value, those assets alone would suffice to satisfy a judgment in VTB's favour. The Respondents' next most valuable assets are immoveable: they are the Blandings Plot (estimated worth �5-9 million) and freehold real estate in Kazakhstan (worth �9.5 million).

16. Mr Barclay KC submitted on behalf of VTB that the threshold of �5,000 for disclosure should be maintained, because:

(1) A threshold sum of �5,000 is commonly applied in other English worldwide freezing orders as a proportionate threshold and there is no good or compelling reason for this threshold sum to be altered in this case.

(2) There are strong grounds to doubt the accuracy, completeness and reliability of the Lists of Assets provided by the Respondents to date. For example, despite both Respondents expressly confirming that this was an "up to date and accurate list of [his or her] assets with an estimated value of approximately �25,000 or more", the "Updated First List" omits a number of assets referred to in the WFO, namely (a) the funds held in bank accounts in Kazakhstan pursuant to paragraph 8(8) of the WFO; and (b) the Respondents' shares/interests in the Kazakh registered companies listed at paragraphs 8(7) and 8(9)-(18) of the WFO. There is solid evidence that the Respondents have an interest in each of those assets (para. 28-30 and 46-47 of the first affidavit of Mr Mark Hastings of Quillon Law LLP, VTB's solicitors). The Respondents have not provided any proper or adequate explanation for these omissions. Mr Bools KC's answer to this is that the relevant assets may not be owned by the Respondents and/or fall below the value of �25,000.

(3) Furthermore, there is a notable and unexplained discrepancy between the lifestyle evidently enjoyed by the Respondents and the assets they have disclosed so far. Taking the Lists of Assets disclosed by the Respondents at face value, the only assets above �25,000 owned by Mr Kuanyshev in the United Kingdom are three motor vehicles and a plot of land that is jointly owned with Mrs Askar. Yet it is known that Mr Kuanyshev enjoys a lavish lifestyle.

(4) The Respondents have not provided any adequate reason (or evidence) for their refusal to provide disclosure of assets exceeding �5,000. They state in their Application Notice that such an order would be "unreasonably burdensome". No proper explanation of this burden is provided in Mr Kuanyshev's affidavit or Mr Abulkhair's affidavit with the Respondents stating that the exercise of identifying assets would "take considerable time and effort". Any burden on the Respondents should be weighed against the importance of asset disclosure.

(5) The Respondents have breached the freezing order and directions made by the DIFC Courts, which have led VTB to make an application for committal. This conduct betrays a pattern of obfuscation on the part of the Respondents.

(6) Notwithstanding any alleged burden imposed by the disclosure order, the Respondents' solicitors in a letter dated 18th February 2026 informed VTB's solicitors that they "will continue, pending the Return Date, to identify and list details of their assets valued at �5,000-�25,000 �".

17. The purpose of asset disclosure orders is well-known and summarised in Gee on Commercial Injunctions (7th ed., 2022) at para. 23-005 - 23-006:

"An order can be made if the purpose is to make an injunction effective, including identifying and preserving assets of the defendant which might otherwise be dissipated notwithstanding the injunction and policing the injunction �

The disclosure order will reveal and evidence the existence of assets, and therefore encourage compliance with the injunction for fear of contempt proceedings. It is essential in enabling policing of the injunction.�It enables the claimant to consider whether further steps should be taken to preserve or safeguard�the assets which are within the scope of the injunction, and whether there are other assets which should be made the subject of an application for freezing relief, whether in England or abroad,�or brought specifically within the terms of the existing relief, for example, assets recently acquired or receivables.

If there is good reason to suppose that particular assets would be available to satisfy a judgment then those assets can be frozen by injunction. In those circumstances a freezing injunction can be granted and a disclosure order can be made in respect of those assets �"

18. In JSC BTA Bank v Solodchenko [2010] EWCA Civ 1436; [2011] 1 WLR 888, Longmore LJ said at para. 55:

"It is, by no means, uncommon for defendants in cases such as the present, to wish to avoid the consequences of any court order and to be reticent in saying what assets they have and what their interest in them is. An important part of the freezing order is, therefore, a requirement that the defendant identify what his assets are so that the claimant can know whether there will be assets (and, if so, what assets) available to meet a judgment."

19. One of the submissions made by the Respondents was that the assets disclosed to date are more than enough to satisfy any judgment which might be obtained against Mr Kuanyshev by VTB. However, it has been said that the Court will not limit a respondent's asset disclosure to the maximum sum covered by the freezing order.
20. In PJSC Tatneft v Bogolyubov [2018] EWHC 1314 (Comm); [2018] 1 WLR 5705, the applicant sought to vary the freezing order such that he was only obliged to give disclosure of assets of an amount just above the value of the freezing injunction. The Court dismissed this argument. Cockerill J said at para. 71-76:

71.� The first problem is that this approach is a cherry picker's charter. Just as an initial limitation would, a limitation at a later stage would enable a defendant to deliberately disclose only his most difficult assets to enforce against and then sidestep the rest of the obligation. This would plainly subvert the purpose of the orders, both as to freezing and as to policing the freezing order by disclosure.

72.� Also, as Mr McGrath noted, it means that the original disclosure order becomes almost meaningless for contempt purposes. If a defendant need, as a matter of principle, only disclose up to the amount frozen, he can ignore the order in substance without being subject to the sanction of contempt. That would be a surprising conclusion.

73.� It also puts the order effectively in the control of the defendant. If the argument advanced on behalf of the applicant is correct, he can properly decide what to disclose and what not, and this is of course exactly what Tatneft says is happening here. Having disclosed partially - that is only assets which the defendant has chosen to disclose - he is now seeking to vary the order to rubber stamp that choice �

76.� This links also to the point regarding the lack of ringfencing. The two orders, the main freezing order and the ancillary disclosure order, are not aimed at securing a sum for judgment, but putting in place a regime where attempts to dissipate assets in order to frustrate any future judgment is prevented so far as possible. An order is in place, but meanwhile, life goes on. Things may happen to particular assets which render them unavailable � Without disclosure above the limit a claimant has no visibility of the rest of the assets where this happens."

21. Therefore, the purpose of an ancillary order for the disclosure of the respondent's assets is not to identify sufficient assets to be available in the event that the applicant ultimately succeeds in its claim against the respondent. It is to ensure that the applicant and the Court is adequately aware of the existence and extent of the respondent's assets, in order to allow the freezing order to function in accordance with its purpose. The asset disclosure order is therefore ancillary to the freezing order. Accordingly, in my judgment, this despatches one of the Respondents' principal arguments in favour of increasing the asset disclosure threshold.
22. However, as with the current WFO, not every individual asset need be disclosed regardless of value, no matter how inconsequential. It is for this reason that freezing orders commonly include a financial value threshold below which no assets need be disclosed (Gee on Commercial Injunctions (7th ed., 2022), para. 23-019). The threshold is to be selected at a level to balance on the one hand giving effect to the purpose of the freezing order and its ancillary disclosure order and on the other hand the prejudice to the respondents.
23. In the present case, the threshold was set by Bright J on VTB's application made without notice at �5,000. I consider that the Court should be prepared to increase that threshold if good reasons were demonstrated, for example if such a threshold were truly oppressive and if the increased threshold would not prejudice the effective operation and policing of the freezing order.
24. On the present application, the Respondents contend that the order requiring disclosure of assets above �5,000 is oppressive and burdensome.
25. I have considered the affidavits sworn on 23rd February 2026 made by Mr and Mrs Askar. At para. 11 of Mr Kuanyshev's affidavit, he stated that:

"I consider it unduly onerous for my wife and I to be required to list assets worth less than �25,000. We have personal items in our home or in our personal possession that may have been purchased for more than �5,000, but in the years since will have reduced in value due to ordinary wear and tear, and I have no way of knowing their current market value. I expect it will take considerable time and effort to identify chattels potentially worth between �5,000 and �25,000 and to estimate their current market value."

26. Mrs Askar made a similar statement at para. 11 of her affidavit.
27. In my judgment, the Respondents have made no attempt to explain the number or nature of the assets which fall within values of �5,000 and �25,000, what difficulties exist in valuing the assets, what logistical demands are made in complying with the current order, or to provide any evidence as to how the alleged burden manifests itself. Indeed, it appears to be at odds with the Respondents' letter sent shortly before the return date hearing stating that the Respondents "will continue, pending the Return Date, to identify and list details of their assets valued at �5,000-�25,000".
28. In those circumstances, I do not accede to the Respondents' application to increase the financial value threshold of �5,000 for the disclosure of assets, because I am not satisfied that the current order imposes an unfair burden on the Respondents. In reaching this conclusion, I do not rely on the remainder of Mr Barclay KC's submissions regarding the Respondents' alleged failure to comply with the asset disclosure order in respect of assets above �25,000 and any stated failure to comply with the order of the DIFC Courts.
29. Accordingly, the Respondents' application to increase the threshold of the asset disclosure order above �5,000 is dismissed.

Fortification of the cross-undertaking

30. In the usual way, VTB as an applicant for a freezing order offered a cross-undertaking in damages which is recorded in the WFO.
31. In this context, it is relevant to note that, on 24th February 2022, VTB was designated under regulation 5 of the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (para. 49 of the first affidavit dated 30th January 2026 sworn by Mr Alexey Zolotukhin, the Head of the Distressed Assets Department of VTB). In addition, I understand that VTB was likewise designated on the same date under equivalent US sanctions legislation (Mr Hastings' second affidavit dated 6th February 2026, para. 10). This is no impingement upon VTB's right to access the Court for the purposes of obtaining a freezing order or other relief (PJSC National Bank Trust v Mints [2023] EWCA Civ 1132; [2024] KB 559).
32. However, VTB is not permitted to deal with its assets, for example in order to pay moneys due in accordance with its cross-undertaking, without an appropriate licence from the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation ("OFSI") in respect of assets in the United Kingdom or from the Office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC") in respect of assets in the United States or held by US persons (Mr Hastings' second affidavit dated 6th February 2026, para. 5, 10). It is relevant to note that VTB holds �242,941.23 in its account at Barclays Bank plc in London and approximately US$81 million in its account at JP Morgan Chase Bank NA, London Branch (Mr Hastings' second affidavit, para. 5, 9-20).
33. Schedule B to the WFO sets out VTB's cross-undertaking given in support of the WFO. Paragraph 1 sets out the undertaking: "If the court later finds that this Order has caused loss to the Respondent, and decides that the Respondent should be compensated for that loss, the Applicant will comply with any order the Court may make".
34. Paragraphs 3 and 4 provide for fortification of the undertaking in the following terms:

"3. The Applicant undertakes to retain �100,000 in Account number 20325303075052 at Barclays Bank plc, with such amount to be held to the order of the Court, as fortification for the cross-undertaking in damages set out at (1) and (2) above until such time as the Freezing Order is discharged and/or further order of the court.

4. In respect of any order to be made pursuant to paragraphs 1 and/or 2 of this Schedule for payment of sums from the Applicant (the "Payment"):

(1) Upon receipt of any order for Payment, the Applicant shall take all necessary steps to submit an application to the Office for Financial Sanctions Implementation ("OFSI") [and/or any other applicable financial sanctions licensing authority] for a licence for permission for the Applicant to make the Payment.

(2) The Applicant shall only be obliged to make the Payment no later than 28 days after the earlier of:

(i) The receipt of the licence from OFSI [and/or any other applicable financial sanctions licensing authority] granting the permission referred to at paragraph 4(1) above; or

(ii) The Applicant ceasing to be prohibited by the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 [and/or any applicable sanctions laws or regulations] from paying such sum without any licence."

35. The Respondents submit that the undertaking should be varied so that the amount of the undertaking that is fortified be increased from �100,000 to �500,000 and that VTB be required to pay that amount of money into Court.
36. Mr Bools KC submitted on behalf of the Respondents that:

(1) There are two problems with VTB's undertaking:

(a) The first fundamental problem is that, as a designated person, VTB cannot meet any order for payment on the cross-undertaking unless and until it applies for and obtains a specific licence from OFSI (and any other relevant applicable financial sanctions licensing authority, as required). This is not disputed. The time it would take OFSI to grant the licence, if it is granted at all, could be from 6 weeks to 18 months, as explained by VTB's counsel to Bright J during the hearing of the application without notice for the WFO.

(b) The second and related problem is that the cross-undertaking does not provide security for costs. VTB's inability to make any payment means that it cannot meet any adverse costs order, which warrants security for costs on the basis that the conditions in CPR rule 25.27 are satisfied.

(2) The so-called fortification in paragraph 3 of the Schedule to the WFO does not serve the purpose that Bright J identified at the hearing: "I do feel that, in the circumstances, if the respondents are going to contest any aspect of the order -- and I feel, like you do, that it's highly likely that they will. Above all, if a third party may be drawn into it -- and it seems to me really not unlikely that that will happen -- I think they need to be sure that if they do that and if they succeed and a costs order is made in their favour, then it will be honoured reasonably swiftly". Bright J also said "� if your client does in fact � have funds that it could use, if necessarily instantly, in order to satisfy any court order, obviously subject to a limit, then that gives me the comfort that I need, and I prepare to make the order on the basis that an undertaking is given �".

(3) The so-called fortification has little, if any, value for the Respondents or any third party.

(4) Ordering VTB to make the fortification payment into Court secures the Respondents' position by requiring VTB to apply for a licence now so that the fortification can take effect as soon as possible. The variation sought also takes into account the submissions made on VTB's behalf at the hearing before Bright J that - at least in relation to OFSI - an order for a payment to be made "often is the trigger to expedite a decision on the licence application".

(5) The increase in the amount of the fortification from �100,000 to �500,000 is justified having regard to the Respondents' costs budget which sets out the Respondents' incurred costs to be �123,276 (plus VAT) and estimated costs up to and including the application to set aside the WFO to be �393,030, giving a total of �516,306.

(6) The variation in the cross-undertaking would pose no prejudice to VTB, given that their assets are frozen in any event.

37. Mr Clayton supported the Respondents' application in this respect. Mr Howard on behalf of Mr Clayton submitted that:

(1) The WFO should not have been granted in circumstances where funds are not "instantly" available to discharge liability for damages and / or costs in circumstances where the injunction was later found to have been incorrectly made.

(2) A cross-undertaking in damages must be of real and practical value, as it serves as the indispensable safeguard that justifies the grant of freezing relief. Without such a safeguard, the purpose of the freezing order is undermined, leaving the risk of unjust deprivation of assets unaddressed.

(3) VTB does not have freely accessible funds within the jurisdiction, as its assets are frozen by operation of regulation 11 of the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019. Any attempt to satisfy the undertaking would therefore require a licence from OFSI, the grant of which is discretionary and not guaranteed.

38. Mr Barclay KC on behalf of VTB submitted that there is no reason to depart from the fortified undertaking required by Bright J and as recorded in the Schedule to the WFO:

(1) The Respondents have not suggested that VTB failed to bring any material aspect of its cross-undertaking to the Court's attention when it applied for the WFO. The application relies only on VTB being sanctioned by the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, something which the Court fully appreciated and which was fully acknowledged and addressed by VTB's counsel during the hearing.

(2) In addition, the means by which any payment into Court is effectuated merely replicates the current requirement in respect of the fortification payment for a sanctions licence to be obtained and, by involving the Court Funds Office to whom any payment into Court would be made, unduly and unnecessarily over-complicates the undertaking required by the WFO which has the benefit of both simplicity and practicality.

(3) There is therefore no sound justification to depart from Bright J's order, bearing in mind that the burden is on the Respondents to show a "good arguable case" that it will suffer loss in consequence of the making of the freezing order so as to require fortification (Energy Venture Partners Ltd v Malabu Oil and Gas Limited [2014] EWCA Civ 1295; [2015] 1 WLR 2309, para. 52-53).

(4) The Respondents' position is secure. They have not provided any proper reason justifying a departure from Bright J's order. Justice does not require an order for security for costs beyond the fortification undertaking already ordered.

(5) The orders sought compelling VTB to (a) take steps to apply for a sanctions licence(s) now and (b) provide an update to the Court and parties in the event any such payment into Court has not been made by 27th March 2026 are unnecessary and disproportionate, because the amount fortified is already secure. In this respect, the Respondents conflate a payment for fortification and a payment for security for costs.

(6) If the money were ordered to be paid into Court now, VTB would have to apply for an appropriate licence from OFSI and/or, if the amount of the fortification were increased to �500,000, OFAC. This is because �242,941.23 is held in VTB's account at Barclays Bank plc in London and approximately US$81 million is held in VTB's account at JP Morgan Chase Bank NA, London Branch. In addition, a second licence is required for payment out from the Court Funds Office.

(7) Although Bright J was informed during the without notice hearing that the delay involved in obtaining a licence would be between 6 weeks and 18 months, the likelihood is that a licence could be obtained within 6-8 weeks.

39. In considering the Respondents' application, I should begin by addressing a submission made by Mr Howard on behalf of Mr Clayton that VTB breached its duty of disclosure during the hearing before Bright J in that, it was said, that he was operating under a misapprehension that the funds which the Schedule to the WFO required to be "ring-fenced" at Barclays Bank plc were instantly accessible to VTB because of a prior licence. In this respect, the transcript of the hearing before Bright J records that:

"MR JUSTICE BRIGHT: � Right, now we come to really the thing that's been troubling me most, which is licences. So Mr Hastings says in his affidavit at paragraph 82 � He makes the point in the abstract that designated persons can avail themselves of the right to access the courts, subject to licences being granted. Given that your clients are availing themselves of the right to access the courts, do I infer from that as a licence has been granted?

MR BARCLAY: No, not yet �

MR JUSTICE BRIGHT: -- at the moment, that would mean -- have I got this right -- that they can't pay your fees or their solicitors fees?

MR BARCLAY: No, that would be a misconception. The reason for that is that there is the general licence, which obviously has issued, which covers legal fees in this country. So both my solicitors and I are able to be paid under the general licence that obviously is issued.

MR JUSTICE BRIGHT: Does it cover the payment of the costs of other parties, if ordered to pay them?

MR BARCLAY: No, I don't think it does actually. So you would have to go back and I'd have to apply for a specific licence.

MR JUSTICE BRIGHT: Right. There's a cross undertaking in damages being offered, but what does it mean in practice if, at the moment, your clients would not be able to pay even an adverse costs order, or I assume an order in damages?

MR JUSTICE BRIGHT: I bow to you when it comes to the depth of experience, but what you're saying doesn't surprise me. What I have no feel for, though, is how long that process takes. I don't know whether you can help me on that?

MR BARCLAY: Again, experience says it can vary enormously. My rule of thumb ranges from six weeks to 18 months.

MR JUSTICE BRIGHT: Wow.

MR BARCLAY: Yes.

19 MR JUSTICE BRIGHT: Well, 18 months is deeply unattractive � I'm reluctant to make an order in circumstances where, although I appreciate that your client has plenty of assets, it can't use them in order to satisfy any order that the court may make, except possibly after some months have passed. What can you do about this?

MR BARCLAY: Ask for, the order to take effect from 14 days of such a licence being obtained by my client. I understand from those instructing me that that is what happened in another case that they were involved in �

9 MR JUSTICE BRIGHT: � I do feel that, in the circumstances, if the respondents are going to contest any aspect of the order -- and I feel, like you do, that it's highly likely that they will. Above all, if a third party may be drawn into it -- and it seems to me really not unlikely that that will happen -- I think they need to be sure that if they do that and if they succeed and a costs order is made in their favour, then it will be honoured reasonably swiftly. So I'm thinking at the moment of something like �100,000 and if they want to come back and say it's not enough, they can do that. But presumably, your licence would encompass a greater amount, if necessary.

MR BARCLAY: Thank you very much. Could I ask the court to adjourn for perhaps 10 minutes whilst I take instructions on that point? �

MR BARCLAY: The cleanest way to do this, in my submission -- because my client has funds in the UK and in fact with JP Morgan in London, at the London branch -- is for �100,000 to be ring-fenced in one of the accounts that it holds with JP Morgan here, and that that is then held and, as I say, ring-fenced. In the event that it is required to be paid, at that point an application is made to OFSI for a licence in order for those funds to be released and paid. That is undoubtedly the cleanest way to do it.

19 MR JUSTICE BRIGHT: Have I got this right? You're telling me on instructions that, although sanctioned, presumably because of existing licences not related to this litigation, your client has funds that are held to its account by -- I think you said JP Morgan. Is that more or less right?

MR BARCLAY: Yes.

MR JUSTICE BRIGHT: Okay. In that case, if your client does in fact -- you haven't told me how much, but it's obviously more than �100,000 -- have funds that it could use, if necessarily instantly, in order to satisfy any court order, obviously subject to a limit, then that gives me the comfort that I need, and I prepare to make the order on the basis that an undertaking is given that there will be a further affidavit -- I think it should be made by Mr Hastings -- explaining the position in relation to the funds held by JP Morgan."

40. I do not consider that VTB acted contrary to its duty to the Court during this hearing. The position was clearly stated in Mr Hastings' affidavits that a licence would be required to disburse the funds in accordance with the cross-undertaking, and that no such licence had yet been obtained. However, I am prepared to accept that it is at least possible that Bright J and VTB's counsel were speaking at cross-purposes.
41. In any event, whether or not I accede to the Respondents' application is a matter for me having heard the parties' submissions and not whether or not Bright J would have decided the application in a particular way upon a without notice application.
42. There are two aspects of the Respondents' application: the first to increase the amount represented by the fortified cross-undertaking from �100,000 to �500,000; the second to require VTB to pay the relevant sums into Court.
43. In approaching this application, I have in mind the purpose of the cross-undertaking, namely to protect the position of the respondent against loss if the interlocutory injunction, in this case the freezing order, should not have been made.
44. In Energy Venture Partners Ltd v Malabu Oil and Gas Limited [2014] EWCA Civ 1295; [2015] 1 WLR 2309, para. 52-53, Tomlinson LJ said:

"52. In my judgment the approach adopted by the judges of first instance in these cases has been entirely appropriate and in accordance with principle. I agree with Hamblen J's resort to symmetry�since the claimant has obtained a freezing order preserving assets over which it may be able to enforce on the basis of having shown the court that it has a good arguable case, it is only appropriate that if the defendant can show that it too has a good arguable case that it will suffer loss in consequence of the making of the order, it should equally be protected. It may be said that what the defendant in such circumstances obtains is security whereas the claimant obtains something less, but in many cases, of which the present is probably one, a freezing order has the practical if not theoretical effect of giving security to the claimant for its claim.

53. It is completely contrary to principle to require proof on the balance of probabilities on such an application and so to do would encourage wasteful satellite litigation. In my judgment Briggs J was correct in Jirehouse Capital v Beller [2008] EWHC 725 (Ch) to summarise the principles as he did at para 25:

"Broadly speaking, they require an intelligent estimate to be made of the likely amount of any loss which may be suffered by the applicant for fortification (here the defendants) by reason of the making of an interim order. They require the court to ascertain whether there is a sufficient level of risk of loss to require fortification. They require that the loss has been or is likely to be caused by the granting of the injunction."

The three requirements are of course inextricably linked. The principles could equally be summarised, as Hamblen J did at para 31 of his judgment, as a requirement that the applicant for fortification show a good arguable case for it. In this interlocutory context, showing a sufficient level of risk of loss to require fortification is synonymous with showing a good arguable case to that effect. In some cases the assessment of loss may at the interlocutory stage be difficult. It is in such cases that an intelligent estimate is required. An intelligent estimate will be informed and realistic although it may not be entirely scientific."

45. With these principles in mind, given the costs budget prepared on behalf of the Respondents, I consider that it is appropriate to increase the amount of the fortification to �500,000.
46. As to the second aspect of the Respondents' application, namely whether there should be a payment into Court, I have decided that the amount represented by the fortification, namely �500,000, should be paid into Court for the following reasons:

(1) The payment of funds into Court will, as I understand it, require a licence at from OFSI and/or OFAC, depending on from where the funds are to be drawn in order to meet this requirement. That application would have to be made now as opposed to later if the Court were to require the payment of damages in accordance with the cross-undertaking. Given the delay associated with the making and grant of an application for a licence - said to be between 6 weeks and 18 months at the hearing before Bright J at least in respect of an OFSI licence - it seems to me that it would be preferable if any delay which might otherwise be sustained can be minimised from the Respondents' and any third party's perspective by the making of an application for the appropriate licence now, rather than later. I have in mind Mr Barclay KC's submission that the usual delay in obtaining a licence from OFSI is 6-8 weeks. There was no evidence before the Court in support of this submission. Even if Mr Barclay KC were correct in this submission, such a substantial period of delay is better eroded now, rather than later. There is the additional consideration that there was no evidence before the Court as to the period of delay in obtaining a relevant licence from OFAC.

(2) Whilst the cross-undertaking requires VTB to "retain" the funds in its account at Barclays Bank plc, given the increase in the amount fortified, there would have to be, at the least, a further order that the relevant funds be retained in VTB's account at JP Morgan Chase Bank NV. However, I do not understand how such funds could be treated as being "ring-fenced" without a relevant confirmation by the bank(s) in question that the funds will not be disbursed without the parties' agreement or the Court's order. A payment into Court would allow the Court to have control over the funds.

(3) I do not consider that VTB would be substantially prejudiced by the payment into Court, given that the funds are intended to be retained or ring-fenced in any event. I do not accept that VTB would be disproportionately burdened by this order or by any order requiring VTB to update the Court and the parties as to the progress of the licence application. There was no evidence before the Court which explained why any burden associated with this order would be disproportionate. The cross-undertaking represents a small price to pay on the part of VTB for the WFO.

47. Mr Barclay KC submitted that even if the funds have to be paid into Court, not only would a licence be required to permit the payment of the �500,000 into Court, but there would be an additional requirement to obtain a further licence in order to allow a payment out of Court. There was no evidence before the Court that this would be so. If this is not the case, there is no reason not to grant the Respondents' application. Even if Mr Barclay KC's submission were correct, I am still minded to require a payment into Court. If the licence were obtained to pay the funds into Court, then any delay associated with that application would be eroded earlier rather than later. Further, if a licence is granted to allow payment into Court, it may well be that any licence required for a payment out of Court should be granted without excessive delay.

Should reference to Mr Clayton, AWG and St Theodore be removed from the WFO?

48. Paragraph 7 of the WFO provides that paragraph 5 of the order which restrains the Respondents from removing assets from the jurisdiction or from dealing with or disposing of the assets,

"� applies to all the Respondent's assets whether or not they are in the name of the Respondent, whether they are solely or jointly owned and whether the Respondent is interested in them legally, beneficially or otherwise. For the purpose of this order the Respondent's assets include any asset which the Respondent has the power, directly or indirectly, to dispose of or deal with as if it were the Respondent's own. The Respondent is to be regarded as having such power if a third party holds or controls the asset in accordance with the Respondent's direct or indirect instructions."

49. Paragraph 8(1) and (2) provides that the prohibition applies to St Theodore and "Any assets held by Mr Christopher Andrew Clayton and/or Alpha Wealth Group and/or other legal entities controlled by Mr Christopher Andrew Clayton for and on behalf of the Respondents".
50. The Respondents and Mr Clayton submitted that the Respondents currently reside at St Theodore but have no direct or indirect legal or beneficial rights of any kind in relation to St Theodore. In support of this position, reliance is placed on:

(1) The affidavit dated 23rd February 2026 of Mr James Wyatt (who is said to have "overall management and oversight" of the property).

(2) The affidavit dated 23rd February 2026 of Mr Clayton, who states that "Through a UK company of which I am also a director, St Fyodor Ltd (part of the Adwell & Greene Group), I have control of the legal title of the property located at St Theodore".

(3) The affidavit dated 26th February 2026 of Mrs Askar.

51. On 12th February 2026, the WFO was served on Mr Clayton. On 13th February 2026, Chancery Court Tax Chambers ("CCTC") responded on behalf of Mr Clayton by way of a letter stating that:

"Mr Clayton, AWG, SFL Nevis and SFL UK, and the UBOs have no connection whatsoever with the Respondents (or any entities associated with the Respondents), save for the Respondents are known to reside in the property at St Theodore pursuant to a market rate tenancy agreement which terminates 15 April 2026.

As Mr Clayton and AWG have no business or personal connection to the Respondents, there is no risk of their assisting in any such dissipation of the assets of the Respondents. We confirm that Mr Clayton and / or Alpha Wealth Group and / or other legal entities controlled by Mr Clayton do not hold / control or deal with any assets for / on behalf of / or at the instruction of the Respondents."

52. In his affidavit sworn on 27th February 2026, Mr Clayton stated at paragraph 13:

"I have no connection whatsoever to the Respondents, whom I have never met or interacted with in any capacity. I spoke with the beneficiaries of St Theodore, in addition to reviewing all KYC documents held in respect of the trust structure, the very substantial legal history provided by previous advisors as to the origin and purposes and funding of the predecessor structure1 and based on significant ongoing dealings with my client I confirm and have no doubt whatsoever that the Respondents have no connection with the beneficial owners of St Theodore in any capacity whatsoever, other than the fact they reside in the property at St Theodore pursuant to a lease between St Fyodor Ltd and a third party company, having been introduced by the estate agent which manages the letting of the property."

53. In his affidavit sworn on 24th February 2026, at para. 11-12, Mr Wyatt who is a real estate agent and responsible for the management and oversight of St Theodore, stated that:

(1) Mr Wyatt and his office have been in charge of managing St Theodore since its acquisition by the present ultimate beneficial owners in 2015.

(2) The Respondents were introduced to the ultimate beneficial owners of St Theodore by the estate management company Barton Wyatt who were approached by the Respondents in 2017 when they were looking for property to let.

(3) The tenancy agreement was entered into by a third party company, initially KAT Holdings Limited ("KAT"), and then Bossanova Enterprises Ltd ("Bossanova"), that would permit the Respondents to stay at the St Theodore as guest / occupier pursuant to, what would appear to be an oral licence at will.

(4) A schedule of all relevant tenancy agreements is provided by Mr Wyatt at para. 19 of his affidavit.

(5) Extensive KYC (Know Your Customer) searches were conducted by Barton Wyatt in respect of KAT and Bossanova.

(6) Payment was received into the Barton Wyatt Client Account from an account in the name of the present tenant, Bossanova.

54. The evidence of Mrs Askar, at para. 11-14 of her first witness statement dated 26th February 2026, is that the ultimate beneficial owner of KAT and Bossanova was Mr Talgat Kuanyshev, Mr Kuanyshev's brother, who is a successful businessman with significant resources and who is paying the rent on St Theodore allowing the Respondents to live there as a gift to his brother (my husband) and his family pending completion of the development of Blandings (apparently in gratitude for the Respondents having assisted Mr Talgat Kuanyshev financially in the past).
55. Mr Howard on behalf of Mr Clayton submitted that:

(1) There is substantial and highly plausible affidavit evidence from respected individuals to the effect that the Respondents were introduced by a lettings agent to reside in St Theodore pursuant to a third party company's tenancy agreement, and that there is otherwise no connection between the Respondents on the one hand and St Theodore, Mr Clayton or AWG on the other hand.

(2) The balance of evidence clearly weighs on the side that Mr Clayton, St Theodore and AWG are not connected to the Respondents. VTB has been able to produce no evidence at all linking the Respondents to St Theodore, Mr Clayton or AWG.

(3) It is clear that it is not just and convenient to maintain a Court order which refers to the parties and freezes assets, which represents a substantial infringement of Mr Clayton's civil liberties, in the absence of any evidence to support the position that there is a connection between the parties.

(4) In making the WFO at the without notice hearing, Bright J was influenced by the fact that the Respondents were residing at St Theodore and there was no lease or their paying rent to reside at the premises. The evidence adduced by Mr Clayton demonstrates that the Respondents' residence at the property can be explained consistently with Mr Clayton's or AWG's ownership or control of St Theodore.

(5) VTB has produced no witness evidence and no documentary evidence substantiating any allegation that the Respondents own or control the property. Indeed, Mr Hastings' first affidavit indicated that there was a history of the property being owned by ultimate beneficial owners who were not the Respondents.

(6) There is no longer any good reason to suppose the property is the Respondents' asset.

(7) Moreover, VTB failed in its duty of disclosure to the Court at the time of the without notice hearing by failing to draw Bright J's attention to the fact that there were independent people who were not the Respondents who clearly had some evidence of purchase and beneficial ownership of St Theodore derived from their limited liability partnership, which acquired the property.

56. Mr Barclay KC on behalf of VTB submitted that:

(1) The Respondents are resident at St Theodore. The ample evidence to that effect is set out at para. 40-43 of Mr Hastings' first affidavit and is further supported by the fact that the Respondents were personally served with the WFO at St Theodore. Mr Wyatt's evidence confirms that the Respondents reside at St Theodore, apparently pursuant to tenancies entered into between 2017 and 2026 with KAT and then Bossanova.

(2) There appears to be no dispute that Mr Clayton and/or AWG are involved in the management and holding of the interest in St Theodore.

(3) VTB relies on the evidence set out at para. 37.5 to 38 of Mr Hastings's first affidavit, which demonstrates that (i) Mr Clayton is a director of St Fyodor Ltd, which acquired St Theodore in 2024 and (ii) he is also the ultimate person with significant control of the corporate structure of UK companies which hold St Theodore via St Fyodor Ltd (including A&G Nominees Ltd holding 100% of the shareholding in St Fyodor Ltd). At para. 2 of his affidavit, Mr Clayton confirms that he has control of the legal title to St Theodore. CCTC's letter dated 13th February 2026 further stated that Mr Clayton is a director of A&G Nominees Ltd, a company which acquired legal title to the shares of St Fyodor Ltd. St Fyodor Ltd in turn holds bare legal title to St Theodore, and that Mr Clayton operates St Fyodor Ltd as professional trustee.

(4) It is incorrect that there is no connection between Mr Clayton and/or AWG and the Respondents. It appears to be common ground that Mr Clayton and/or AWG are involved in managing and/or holding the interest in St Theodore, a property which the Respondents reside in and which has been linked to them from 2017 at the latest.

(5) It remains reasonable to infer at this stage that the interest in St Theodore is arranged and managed by Mr Clayton for the ultimate benefit of either or both of the Respondents, under a trust structure. None of the points raised by Mr Clayton have materially impacted the Court's determination to include those references to Mr Clayton, AWG, and St Theodore in the WFO. Neither have Mr Clayton or AWG been forthcoming in providing responses to queries raised by Quillon Law LLP, VTB's solicitors, in order to clarify the position in respect of St Theodore (para. 39 to 46 of Mr Hastings' third affidavit dated 23rd February 2026).

(6) VTB's further investigations led to the discovery of notable discrepancies in the position adopted by Mr Clayton and AWG. In particular, CCTC's letter dated 13th February 2026 states that St Theodore was let to a BVI-registered entity called Bossanova, which currently holds a periodic tenancy for the period from 16th January 2026 to 15th April 2026. This is confirmed in Mr Wyatt's first affidavit, para. 15 and 19. This raises questions as to the nature of the Respondents' connection to Bossanova.

(7) VTB's investigations have also revealed that Bossanova was in fact dissolved in November 2025 (para. 43 of Mr Hastings' third affidavit). That discovery led to requests for information as to how Bossanova has been able to rent St Theodore when it was dissolved in November 2025. These questions have gone unanswered. Mr Clayton admitted that Bossanova was dissolved. This raises serious questions as to how Mr Clayton and AWG can continue credibly and sensibly to assert that the Respondents reside in St Theodore pursuant to an alleged lease agreement with Bossanova. The Respondents' evidence on this is thus untenable, with Mrs Askar only stating that she did not know that Bossanova had been dissolved. No attempt was made to reconcile that fact with the purported tenancy agreement that she relies on to explain her and her husband's continued residence at St Theodore.

(8) The extraordinary and suspicious coincidence that within 12 days of Mr Kuanyshev persuading VTB to accept his guarantee agreement in support of the transaction and signing his guarantee agreement with VTB on 15th July 2024, the trust and corporate structures by which St Theodore was held at that time were rearranged and restructured, by Mr Clayton on behalf of the unknown mysterious ultimate beneficial owners.

(9) In combination with the fact that Mr Wyatt stated that the rent for St Theodore is in excess of �500,000 per annum, the uncertainty and inadequacy of the information provided by Mr Clayton and AWG only strengthens the inference at this stage that the interest in St Theodore is arranged and managed by Mr Clayton for the ultimate benefit of either or both of the Respondents, and which the Court accepted in making the WFO so as to include reference to Mr Clayton, AWG and St Theodore.

(10) A party's credibility ought to be taken into account when determining what weight to be given to statements made in that party's affidavit (Gee on Commercial Injunctions (7th ed., 2022) at para. 13-015). However, there are serious concerns as to the credibility of the evidence adduced by Mr Clayton (whose own affidavit remains misdated) or the Respondents, where they have failed to provide the Court with any proper documentary evidence supporting those assertions. This is particularly concerning in circumstances where VTB has previously made multiple requests for further evidence and information. Further, the Respondents have said that they are aware of the identity of the purported beneficial owners (Mr Kuanyshev's first witness statement dated 26th February 2026, para. 6 and Mrs Askar's first witness statement, para. 9). However, the Court has not been informed of when or by whom this information was provided to the Respondents.

(11) There was no breach of VTB's duty to disclose as alleged by Mr Clayton. The relevant information available to VTB was canvassed in its skeleton argument and the evidence of Mr Hastings.

57. The question before the Court is therefore whether Mr Clayton's argument that St Theodore is effectively his and is not the Respondents' property should be accepted with the result that the WFO should be discharged insofar as it concerns Mr Clayton, AWG and St Theodore, and if it is not yet to be discharged, what steps should be taken, if any, to resolve this issue. In this respect, it is important to recall that the "assets" of the Respondents which are restrained by the WFO include not only property owned by the Respondents but as para. 7 of the WFO records (as quoted above), they include assets in which the Respondents are interested "legally, beneficially or otherwise" and "any asset which the Respondent has the power, directly or indirectly, to dispose of or deal with as if it were the Respondent's own".
58. In SCF Finance Co v Masri [1985] 1 WLR 876, the Court granted a Mareva injunction in respect of a claim against the first defendant and, upon an indication in the evidence that the first defendant may have been carrying on business using his wife's bank accounts in London, the injunction was extended to cover the wife's accounts as well. The evidence relied on was the completion by the husband of a blank cheque signed by the first defendant's wife in respect of a transaction being carried out by the first defendant. The first defendant's wife applied to discharge the injunction on the ground that the bank accounts belonged to her, not the first defendant. At the hearing before the judge, Hirst J, there were numerous affidavits produced, but as only one day had been set aside for the hearing, it was plain that the judge was not then in a position to consider the entirety of the evidence. Accordingly, it was proposed that the judge deal with a preliminary issue, namely how the Court should deal with a dispute between the plaintiff and a third party as to the ownership of assets within the jurisdiction.
59. The first defendant's wife argued that her evidence ought to be accepted by the Court without further inquiry. The judge rejected that argument and ordered an inquiry into the disputed claim in respect of the first defendant's wife's accounts should the plaintiff succeed in its claim against the first defendant. This decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal. At pages 880-881, Lloyd LJ said that:

"It is now well settled that an injunction will be varied where necessary so as to enable a defendant to pay his ordinary trading debts as they fall due, or to meet his ordinary living expenses. If there is a dispute as to the extent of his living expenses, or as to whether the defendant has other assets out of which he ought to pay his debts, there is a ready solution. Such disputes are resolved every day in the Commercial Court or by the judge in chambers. I can see no difference in principle between a defendant who says, "There are my assets and I need them to pay a third party in the ordinary course of business", and one who says, "These are not my assets at all." In each case the question can and should be resolved without too much difficulty or elaboration by the court. Nor can it make any difference if the defendant's assertion "These are not my assets" is backed up by the assertion of a third party; or if the third party intervenes on his own. If such questions, when they arise between plaintiff and defendant, can be resolved by the court, so they can when they arise between plaintiff and a third party. It is true that the third party may be put to some inconvenience. But where the assets appear to belong to a third party, the court will not have granted the order in the first place without good�reason. Moreover, the third party who applies successfully to have the injunction discharged will be protected by the plaintiff's undertaking in damages: see the additional undertaking incorporated in the order which I made in the present case on 8 May 1984.

So I see no difficulty in the court's resolving any dispute which may arise between a plaintiff and a third party as to the ownership of assets to which the Mareva injunction has been applied. If that is so, then I can see no reason whatever why the court should be obliged to discharge the injunction on the mere say-so of the third party. If the court were so obliged, then the Mareva Jurisdiction would be in danger of being nullified at the whim of the unscrupulous. If a court were not permitted to inquire into a third party's claim, but were bound to accept it at its face value, how could the court be satisfied that any transfer of assets to the third party had occurred before rather than after the injunction?"

60. After a review of earlier authorities, Lloyd LJ explained the approach of the Court to an application by a third party based on the assertion by that third party that an asset or property restrained by a freezing order (a Mareva injunction) for the discharge of that order. At page 884, Lloyd LJ set out his summary of principles (which, having been set out in one paragraph, I have separated into the following sub-paragraphs):

"� For convenience I would summarise the position as follows:

(i) Where a plaintiff invites the court to include within the scope of a Mareva injunction assets which appear on their face to belong to a third party, e.g. a bank account in the name of a third party, the court should not accede to the invitation without good reason for supposing that the assets are in truth the assets of the defendant.

(ii) Where the defendant asserts that the assets belong to a third party, the court is not obliged to accept that assertion without inquiry, but may do so depending on the circumstances. The same applies where it is the third party who makes the assertion, on an application to intervene.

(iii) In deciding whether to accept the assertion of a defendant or a third party, without further inquiry, the court will be guided by what is just and convenient, not only between the plaintiff and the defendant, but also between the plaintiff, the defendant and the third party.

(iv) Where the court decides not to accept the assertion without further inquiry, it may order an issue to be tried between the plaintiff and the third party in advance of the main action, or it may order that the issue await the outcome of the main action, again depending in each case on what is just and convenient �"

61. In Lemos v Lemos [2016] EWCA Civ 1181; [2017] 1 P & CR 12, at para. 21, Longmore LJ explained that the "good reason" to suppose referred to in Lloyd LJ's judgment was the equivalent of a "good arguable case":

"In SCF v Masri [1985] 1 W.L.R. 876 Lloyd LJ said that where a third party asserts that assets belong to him rather than to a defendant, the court is not obliged to accept the assertion without further inquiry. The court may decide to do so but may decide not to accept it if there is "good reason to suppose" that the defendant has an interest in the relevant asset. If there is such good reason, the court may order an issue to be tried (with pleadings and disclosure of all relevant documents) as to whether the defendant has an interest or not. This "good reason to suppose" test is very similar to the test of "good arguable case" for the imposition of the injunction in the first place, see JSC BTA Bank v Ablyazov (No. 11) [2015] 1 WLR 1287 at [68] per Christopher Clarke LJ. The court does not, at this stage, have to be satisfied on a balance of probabilities."

62. I begin my consideration of Mr Clayton's application by dismissing the suggestion that there has been a breach of the duty of disclosure by VTB at the without notice hearing before Bright J, for the reasons given by Mr Barclay KC.
63. The evidence before me concerning the ownership and control of St Theodore appears to be that:

(1) Mr Clayton, or companies within his control, own and control the legal title to St Theodore and provide corporate and trustee services for the beneficial owners of the property, being "three family members" (Mr Clayton's first affidavit, para. 2, 8-10). A trust structure took effect on 27th July 2024.

(2) The identity of the beneficial owners is known to the Respondents and presumably to Mr Clayton, but has not been disclosed to the Court or VTB.

(3) There is or was a tenancy agreement with KAT and subsequently Bossanova, which were owned by Mr Talgat Kuanyshev, Mr Kuanyshev's brother. However, Bossanova is no longer in existence, having been dissolved in November 2025. On 13th-14th January 2026, a new short-term tenancy agreement was purportedly signed on behalf of Bossanova. That said, Mr Wyatt has said that the beneficial owners will not renew the lease for a further term (Mr Wyatt's affidavit, para. 21).

(4) The Respondents reside at St Theodore essentially as tenants and have done so since 2017. Their rent (which is said by Mr Wyatt at para. 12 of his affidavit to be in excess of �500,000 per annum) is paid by Mr Talgat Kuanyshev. I have not seen any documentary evidence of this arrangement.

64. As matters stand, therefore, I am convinced that there is a "good reason to suppose", meaning a good arguable case, that St Theodore is or might be an asset of the Respondents within the wide definition used in the WFO. I reach this conclusion not because I necessarily regard the evidence of Mr Clayton as unreliable, but because there are a number of unanswered questions concerning the Respondents' interest in the property, especially given the fact that Mr Kuanyshev's brother's dissolved company is a party to a tenancy agreement in respect of the property, and because the identity of the beneficial owners of the property remains unknown.
65. On the other hand, I also consider that Mr Clayton and the Respondents have a good arguable case that St Theodore is not one of the Respondents' assets.
66. In these circumstances, I cannot accede to Mr Clayton's application to remove reference to St Theodore, Mr Clayton and AWG from the WFO on a summary basis. Nor do I accede to VTB's submission to dismiss the application on a similar basis.
67. I consider that there should be an inquiry into the question whether St Theodore is an "asset" of the Respondents by way of a trial of a preliminary issue (on the assumption that the WFO is not discharged beforehand on the Respondents' application). This would be just and convenient having regard to the interests of VTB, the Respondents and Mr Clayton. I have in mind, in particular, that the property is said to have an approximate value of �16.5 million (para. 37 and 57 of Mr Hastings' first affidavit) and that the clarification of the ownership of this property is plainly in all of the parties' interests.
68. I will hear the parties as to the directions to be made in support of the trial of this issue.
69. Mr Clayton has submitted that any such inquiry should be conditional upon VTB first obtaining any necessary sanctions licence and providing for payment of any adverse costs within 14 to 28 days of the Court's order. I have not heard from VTB as to this application and so I will consider the application when I consider the further directions to be made.

Conclusion

70. For the reasons explained above,

(1) I dismiss the Respondents' application to increase the financial value threshold from �5,000 for the purposes of the disclosure of assets as ordered by the WFO.

(2) I allow the Respondents' application to amend the cross-undertaking in Schedule B to the WFO so as to require VTB to pay �500,000 into Court (and to apply for the appropriate licence(s)) for the purposes of fortifying their cross-undertaking, subject to VTB obtaining the appropriate licences for this purpose.

(3) I dismiss Mr Clayton's application summarily to remove reference to St Theodore, Mr Clayton and AWG from the WFO. However, I direct that this issue be determined at a trial of preliminary issues. I will hear the parties as to the directions to be made for the purposes of this trial.

71. I am grateful to all of the parties' counsel for their helpful submissions.