Is the term 'signature' to be understood as meaning that the application for a refund must be signed by the taxable person himself or, in the case of a legal person, by its statutory representative, or is the signature of an agent (for example, a representative for tax purposes or an employee of the taxable person) sufficient?'
The questions referred for a preliminary ruling
By its questions, which should be considered together, the referring court asks essentially whether 'signature' of an application for a VAT refund, as referred to in the specimen form set out in Annex A to the Eighth Directive, is a Community law notion which must be interpreted uniformly and, if so, whether it must be understood as requiring, in mandatory terms, that an application for a VAT refund be signed by the taxpayer in person, or whether it is sufficient if it is signed by an agent.
In that regard, it should be noted at the outset that the Eighth Directive does not contain any definition of 'signature'; nor does it make any express reference to the law of the Member States for the purposes of determining the meaning and scope of that term.
According to settled case-law, it follows from the need for uniform application of Community law and from the principle of equal treatment that the terms of a provision of Community law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purposes of determining its meaning and scope must as a general rule be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the Community; that interpretation must take into account the context of the provision and the objective pursued by the legislation in question (see, inter alia, Case 327/82 Ekro [1984] ECR 107 , paragraph 11; Case C-287/98 Linster [2000] ECR I-6917 , paragraph 43; and Case C-5/08 Infopaq International [2009] ECR I-0000, paragraph 27).
Those requirements apply with particular force to the Eighth Directive, in view both of its title and of the content of the third and fifth recitals in the preamble thereto.
As is clear from the third and fifth recitals in the preamble to the Eighth Directive, the aim of that directive is to harmonise the arrangements for the refund of VAT paid in a Member State by taxable persons established in another Member State by eliminating the discrepancies between the arrangements in force at the material time in the various Member States and by seeking to ensure that taxable persons are not treated differently according to the Member State in which they are established.
The aim of the Eighth Directive is thus to harmonise the arrangements relating to the right to a refund of VAT, as provided for in Article 17(3) of Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment (OJ 1977 L 145, p. 1) (see, inter alia, Case C-136/99 Monte Dei Paschi Di Siena [2000] ECR I-6109 , paragraph 20, and Case C-35/05 Reemtsma Cigarettenfabriken [2007] ECR I-2425, paragraph 26).
To that end, the Eighth Directive expressly provides, in Annex A thereto, a pre-established model for VAT refund applications, precisely with a view to harmonising the procedure to be followed in relation to such an application in the case of VAT paid in a Member State by taxable persons established in another Member State. However, that harmonisation objective cannot be attained unless the terms used in the specimen application form are understood in the same way in all the Member States.
It follows that 'signature', as referred to in the specimen form set out in Annex A to the Eighth Directive, is a Community law notion which must have the same meaning and scope in all Member States. Accordingly, it is for the Court to give that notion an autonomous and uniform interpretation in the Community legal order.
In that regard, it should be borne in mind that according to the settled case'law of the Court in interpreting a provision of Community law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (see, inter alia, Case 292/82 Merck [1983] ECR 3781, paragraph 12; Case C-34/05 Schouten [2007] ECR I-1687 , paragraph 25; and Case C-466/07 Klarenberg [2009] ECR I-0000, paragraph 37).
It must be pointed out, first, that there is nothing in the actual wording of Annex A to the Eighth Directive to shed light on the term 'signature' as used therein. The annex simply indicates that a 'signature' is required, and in no way specifies that the signature must be of a particular kind, such as the signature of the taxpayer in person. That is in contrast with other terms used in that annex, such as 'name', or 'nature of' the business, which are expressly accompanied by the words 'of applicant' or 'applicant's'.
Secondly, it is clear from Article 3(a) of the Eighth Directive that, for a refund of VAT, the taxable person must submit 'an application modelled on the specimen contained in Annex A'. Moreover, under Article 6 of that directive, the Member States may not impose on taxable persons any obligation, in addition to those referred to in Articles 3 and 4, other than the obligation to provide, in specific cases, the information necessary to determine whether the application for a refund is justified. It follows that, with regard to the term 'signature' on the specimen form, Article 6 means that the taxable person may not be compelled to comply with requirements other than those provided for in that model such as an obligation on the taxable person to sign in person.
Lastly, such a contextual interpretation is confirmed by the harmonisation aim of the Eighth Directive, which is clear from paragraphs 19 to 22 of the present judgment. The aim pursued by that directive, in expressly providing in Annex A thereto a specimen form for VAT refund applications, cannot be attained unless the terms used in that model are attributed the same meaning and scope in all the Member States, in a way that does not go beyond the requirements specifically provided for in the model. To allow a Member State to impose on a taxable person requirements other than those provided for in such a model for example, the requirement that the taxable person sign in person would amount to imposing a procedural requirement which is incompatible with that objective.
In addition, it should be pointed out that while, contrary to the Thirteenth Council Directive 86/560/EEC of 17 November 1986 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes Arrangements for the refund of value added tax to taxable persons not established in Community territory (OJ 1986 L 326, p. 40), the Eighth Directive does not expressly provide for the possibility of appointing an agent, the fact remains that the Eighth Directive none the less does not exclude that possibility, which means that an application for refund of VAT modelled on the specimen set out in Annex A to the Eighth Directive can be signed by an agent.
In view of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the questions referred is that 'signature' of an application for a VAT refund, as referred to in the specimen form set out in Annex A to the Eighth Directive, is a Community law notion which must be interpreted uniformly to the effect that such a refund application need not necessarily be signed by the taxable person in person and that the signature of an agent may be sufficient for those purposes.
Costs
Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the national court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.
On those grounds, the Court (Fourth Chamber) hereby rules:
'Signature' of an application for a refund of value added tax, as referred to in the specimen form set out in Annex A to the Eighth Council Directive 79/1072/EEC of 6 December 1979 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes Arrangements for the refund of value added tax to taxable persons not established in the territory of the country, is a Community law notion which must be interpreted uniformly to the effect that such a refund application need not necessarily be signed by the taxable person in person and that the signature of an agent may be sufficient for those purposes.
[Signatures]
* Language of the case: German.