A Police Officer, Re Judicial Review

These latter averments are, in my view, misconceived. If a police officer is a defendant in criminal proceedings or a litigant in civil proceedings or a party to fair employment or unfair dismissal or race discrimination tribunal proceedings, there will be a strong presumption against anonymity, evidenced by a long established practice to this effect firmly rooted in the principle of open justice.

[4] In my opinion, the anonymisation of any litigant in any judicial forum engages the principle of open justice. The leading authorities on this topic, Scott �v- Scott [1913] AC 417 and Attorney General �v- The Leveller Magazine [1979] AC 440, are well known. These authorities clearly establish a strong general rule that court proceedings should be conducted in public. In The Leveller , Lord Scarman formulated the principle in these terms:

Lord Scarman considered it " � plain that the basis of the modern law is as Viscount Haldane LC declared it was ". The Lord Chancellor had stated [at p. 439]:

[Pp. 470-471]. Continuing, Lord Scarman observed that " � there must be material (not necessarily formally adduced evidence) made known to the court on which it can reasonably reach its conclusion ". While the principle of open justice is properly described as one of cardinal importance, it is not formulated as an absolute rule. This is expressed with particular clarity by Lord Diplock in The Leveller:

[5] The court's approach to resolving applications of the present kind may also be informed through the prism of Section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 and Article 6(1) ECHR. The latter provides, so far as material: