TB v HSE & Ors (Approved)

That the inherent jurisdiction of the court to dismiss proceedings should be sparingly exercised. In order to defeat a suggestion that a claim was bound to fail on the facts, all that a plaintiff needed to do was put forward a credible basis for suggesting that it may, at trial, be possible to establish the facts that were asserted and that were necessary for success in the proceedings. Barry v. Buckley [1981] I.R. 306, Sun Fat Chan v. Osseous Ltd . [1992] 1 I.R. 425, Kenny v. Trinity College Dublin [2008] IESC 18 (unreported, Supreme Court, 10 th April, 2008) and Ewing v. Ireland [2013] IESC 44 , (unreported, Supreme Court, 11 th October, 2013) approved.

That certain types of cases were more amenable to an assessment of the facts at an early stage than others. Where the case was wholly, or significantly, dependent on documents, then it might be easier for a court to reach an assessment as to whether the proceedings were bound to fail within the confines of a motion to dismiss. Salthill Properties Ltd. v. Royal Bank of Scotland PLC [2009] IEHC 2007, (unreported, High Court, Clarke J, 30 th April, 2009) considered.

That it was not appropriate to dismiss a claim by virtue of forming a view that it was bound to fail on the law. The essential question for the court was whether there was a credible basis, on the facts, on which the plaintiff could hope to establish the claim. ” (emphasis added).

Looking at the present application through the lens of the court’s inherent jurisdiction, it is legitimate to engage in some, albeit limited, analysis of the facts in the case as pleaded. Having engaged in this analysis, it seems to me that the plaintiff’s claim is nevertheless bound to fail. I take this view because it seems to me that the plaintiff has not put forward any credible basis for suggesting that it may, at trial, be possible to establish the facts asserted in her pleadings, which are necessary for a successful claim. I take this view in circumstances where it is fair to say that there are two key themes in the pleadings. The first is that the plaintiff has suffered horrendous injuries as a result of medical negligence (including “theft” of several “glands”, “cartilage”, and “cartilage bones” ; adverse reactions to drugs prescribed to her; and the “breaking” of the plaintiff’s “good left foot” during an operation; with the plaintiff also alleging that the HSE has allowed her “torture” to take place).

The second key theme in the pleadings is that there was a “ cover up ” of medical negligence/medical crimes involving all of those identified in the pleadings (i.e. 20 medical practitioners identified by the plaintiff and 8 named hospitals/medical practices, with some suggestion of the involvement of An Garda Síochána, as well as the contention that the State itself, in particular the Department of Health, is fearful of the third named defendant).

However cautiously this Court approaches the matter, I have to come to the view that there is not a credible basis, on the facts, upon which the plaintiff could hope to establish the claim pleaded. Hence, this is one of those rare cases where it is appropriate, and in my view necessary, to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of this Court to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim against the first defendant.

Carefully considering the pleadings, it seems to me that the claim advanced is wholly unsustainable, bound to fail and constitutes an abuse of process.

It should also be noted that, both in the pleadings and in her oral submissions, the plaintiff makes clear that any cause of action which she claims to have is one which arose on or within days of the 20 th July, 2011. The medical negligence and adverse health consequences of which she complains are said to stem from the foregoing. Even taking into account “ 2012 - gamma ray radiation” and “broken foot in 2013”, her plenary summons was not issued until 7 th September 2018. This reality obviously raises a statute of limitations issue which would seem to me to present a further and insurmountable obstacle for the plaintiff.

It is fair to say that the main focus of the pleadings is on damage to the plaintiff’s health for which she regards the first defendant as responsible. Of the 67 paragraphs in the statement of claim, only paras. 62-67 refer to An Garda Síochána. The following is a summary of what those paragraphs contain:

By way of preliminary comment with respect to the foregoing, it is difficult if not impossible, to ascertain a cause of action with respect to what the plaintiff has pleaded against the second defendant. Although very serious allegations are made, they constitute mere or ‘bald’ assertions which are scandalous in nature. By way of example, the clear implication from any objective reading of paras. 63 and 64 is that two individual members of An Garda Síochána received promotions as a consequence of wrongdoing.

Although, having considered the pleadings and all affidavits before the court, I have come to the view that the allegations comprising paras. 62 - 67 of the plenary summons do not and could not result in the plaintiff having a cause of action against the second named defendant, it is important to note that there is uncontroverted evidence before the court which utterly undermines the assertions made by the plaintiff.

With regard to the allegation at para. 63 that a certain detective garda edited a statement which had been made by the plaintiff, this is addressed at paras. 8 and 9 of an affidavit sworn on 3 rd December 2021 by Inspector Kieran Keyes of the relevant garda station. Having made reference to the allegation of editing the plaintiff’s statement, Inspector Keyes goes on, at para. 8, to make the following averments:

Inspector Keyes proceeds to exhibit correspondence which confirms the withdrawal of that very allegation, and this comprises a letter dated 2 nd August 2016 which was sent by GSOC to the chief superintendent of internal affairs at garda headquarters. That letter states inter alia the following:

It seems appropriate to say that, even from a first-principles perspective, it offends natural and constitutional justice for a plaintiff to make an extremely serious complaint to GSOC concerning a member of An Garda Síochána and, having withdrawn that complaint in 2016, to seek to ‘re-animate’ the withdrawn - complaint by including it in a statement of claim which was not delivered until almost five years later (6 th April, 2021).

Although this court could have nothing but sympathy for a plaintiff who, having regard to the contents of her pleadings, has had significant challenges in her life, it is inimical to justice for these most serious of allegations to be levelled against named individuals, which, very obviously, touch on their professionalism and integrity, without a scintilla of evidence to support what, I am satisfied, constitute vexatious assertions.

Despite feeling compassion for the plaintiff, there must also be a consciousness of the effect on third parties of baseless assertions made, and it is not difficult to conceive of the adverse effect on a hardworking and diligent member of An Garda Síochána engaged in the vital work of the Force upon learning, in 2021, that a scandalous allegation withdrawn by the plaintiff in 2016 was now pleaded in High Court proceedings. I deliberately say diligent and hardworking because that would seem to me to be self-evident from the plaintiff’s plea that the garda in question received a promotion. There is not shred of evidence to suggest that this promotion flowed from wrongdoing as opposed to hard work. In my view the claims, including by innuendo, which the plaintiff seeks to make against members of An Garda Síochána - both named and unnamed - are scandalous and unsustainable in law and in fact.

At para. 9 of his affidavit Inspector Keyes goes on to make the following averments with respect to the statement which, according to the plaintiff, was “edited ” by the named member of An Garda Síochána:

As to the content of those statements, they concern allegations made by the plaintiff with respect to an operation carried out in September 2013 at a named hospital. That operation is referred to in the pleadings. In her statement to An Garda Síochána, the plaintiff stated inter alia:

Inspector Keyes also addresses the plaintiff’s allegations at para. 64 of the statement of claim to the effect that a named garda Sergeant, now Inspector, allegedly made promises to that plaintiff and had copies of her x-ray. Inspector Keyes makes the following averments:

In the aforementioned letter, which comprises exhibit “KK3” to the affidavit sworn by Inspector Keyes, the relevant inspector confirms the averments at para. 10. Two important comments seem to me appropriate. First, the very height of the relevant plea is that a named member of An Garda Síochána did not make further contact with the plaintiff. It is inconceivable that this comprises a cause of action. This, once more, highlights the reality that it would have been of very great benefit to the plaintiff to have at least consulted with a qualified legal professional prior to initiating her claim and drafting the pleadings in question. Second, one could well understand the adverse effect upon someone, diligently and successfully pursuing their career in An Garda Síochána, of being met with a baseless allegation in legal proceedings half a dozen years after the relevant events. I say baseless because there is uncontroverted evidence before the court to that effect.

From para. 12, Inspector Keyes addresses the very serious allegation made by the plaintiff to the effect that it took a year for gardaí to take a statement from her with regard to her allegation that she suffered a violent rape, allegedly perpetrated by her ex-partner. At para. 12 Inspector Keyes avers inter alia the following:

Insofar as the plaintiff alleges that the second-named defendant, its servants and/or agents took a year to take a statement, I say this is plainly untrue and is misleading. I say that Garda [named] spoke to the plaintiff by telephone two days after the date of the alleged offence on the 23 rd April, 2015. Garda [named] by way of report dated 10 th May, 2016, confirms that the plaintiff did not disclose any offence in the course of this conversation. I beg to refer to a copy of this report, upon which marked with the letters and number “KK4” I have signed my name prior to the swearing hereof.

The plaintiff subsequently made a statement to the second-named defendant, its servants and/or agents in May 2016, in which she disclosed the alleged offence.

I say and believe that the plaintiff was informed by letter dated the 15 th September, 2016, that the Director of Public Prosecutions had not directed a prosecution in relation to the alleged offence.”

Once more, this is an example of an allegation made which is scandalous and vexatious and calls into question the professionalism and integrity of the second named defendant, and individual members of the force, regardless of whether it comprises a cause of action against the second named defendant, which I am satisfied is not the case. Once more, uncontroverted evidence wholly undermines what has been asserted.

Between paras. 16 and 18 of his affidavit, Inspector Keyes deals with the allegation made by the plaintiff to the effect that named members of An Garda Síochána bullied her, specifically by threatening “that they would ring my daughter on me”. As well as not constituting a cause of action even if true, there is evidence before the court that it is not true. It is appropriate to add that, like the plaintiff’s pleadings generally, this allegation of a threat that the plaintiff’s daughter would be contacted, comprises a ‘bald’ assertion which, in the context of an allegation of threats made to the plaintiff, is scandalous. Yet, it is unsupported by evidence or by a setting out of facts which, if proved, might conceivably offer any support for the allegation.

Among the averments made by Inspector Keyes is that “ no such person is known” to the second named defendant of the name provided by the plaintiff. He goes on to aver that a particular sergeant interacted with the plaintiff on one occasion in 2016 and set out the details of this interaction in a typed statement which Inspector Keyes exhibits at “KK5”. The content of that statement relates to the reporting of a domestic incident on 24 th July, 2016 involving the plaintiff and her sister. The report indicates that that gardaí found that plaintiff to be “highly intoxicated” and assisted her with arrangements to get home. Reference is made to the plaintiff returning to the relevant garda station making certain allegations concerning clothing allegedly damaged by her sister. The report indicates that the gardaí had certain concerns in relation to the plaintiff. It is also confirmed that a harassment complaint which the plaintiff initially made to gardaí concerning her sister was investigated locally and, because there was no evidence of harassment, it was directed that no prosecution in the matter be brought.

With respect to the final aspect of the plaintiff’s allegations against the second named defendant, the contention that gardaí in certain (unnamed) Stations have a history of “ covering up ” assaults against the plaintiff by a “ known criminals ” who became “garda informers” is an extremely serious, but utterly unsupported allegation which is scandalous and vexatious, comprising an attempt to prejudice or embarrass the second defendant. It seems to me to be utterly unsustainable and an abuse of process.

It is fair to say that the second defendant did not feature significantly in the oral submissions made by the plaintiff. Indeed, she emphasised, inter alia , that certain members of An Garda Síochána (whom she named in her oral submissions) had been very good to her, against the backdrop of the plaintiff leaving her former partner.

I am entirely satisfied that, nowhere in her oral submissions, did the plaintiff make reference to any issue which, if her pleadings were amended to include same, would constitute a cause of action. Nor did the plaintiff, during the course of oral submissions, seek to provide any detail which might render the pleas made by her other than vexatious and scandalous. By that I mean, it is not as if the plaintiff, during oral submissions, sketched out a narrative which, however unlikely, if the asserted facts were ultimately proved, might constitute a cause of action. Insofar as the second named defendant featured at all in the plaintiff’s oral submissions, the principal assertions made by her included the following:-

Even if the foregoing assertions represented the plaintiff’s sworn evidence, they do not seem to me to make any material difference to the pleadings.

The primary approach taken by the second defendant is with reference to O. 19, r. 28 and it is appropriate to deal first with that application, before any analysis of matter from the perspective of this Court’s inherent jurisdiction .

A useful summary of the relevant principles is found in Chapter 16 of Delaney and McGrath and, for present purposes, it is appropriate to quote the following:-

I am satisfied that the pleadings fail to disclose a reasonable cause of action known to the law or likely to be established. This is not a case where, for example, the plaintiff’s pleadings contain what might be described as the ingredients of a good cause of action but where a deficiency in the pleadings might be rectified by means of an amendment. Thus, conscious of the principles in Sun Fat Chan v. Osseous Ltd [1992] 1 IR 425, this is not a situation where the application boils down to a deprivation of the plaintiff’s constitutionally - protected right of access to the courts due to any lack of skill in terms of drafting her pleadings without the assistance of a qualified legal professional.

The present situation is of an entirely different order. The plaintiff does not, for example, allege that she was caused injury by the Gardaí. On the contrary, she lays the blame for a range of injuries at the door of the HSE, including injuries said to stem from having been prescribed a medication produced by the third defendant. The nature of the allegations which the plaintiff makes against An Garda Síochána relate to a wholly undefined and unparticularised alleged involvement in a wide - ranging conspiracy involving (i) a drug company; (ii) the Department of Health; and (iii) a long list of hospitals and medical professionals (both identified and, unnamed), the thrust of the allegation being an involvement in a “cover up” . Such claims are utterly unsustainable. What remains are a range of allegations directed at named members of An Garda Síochána but, when reduced to their bare essence, they amount to assertions that named members of the Force failed in their performance of their duties. The allegations are serious and, to my mind, could fairly be described as scandalous, but I am satisfied that the pleadings do not disclose a sustainable cause of action and could not be “saved” by any amendment to the pleadings.

I am fortified in this view by what the plaintiff had to say about the second named defendant during the course of her oral submissions. The distilled essence of those submissions comprised (i) praise for individual members of An Garda Síochána who had given her great help; (ii) an expressed lack of trust in the Force as a whole on the basis of a ‘bald’ assertion that women are not taken seriously; and, (iii) a contention that An Garda Síochána somehow failed to protect her. Irrespective of the sincerity with which the plaintiff holds these views, they do not constitute the basis for a legal claim, bolster the claim as pleaded, or disclose any amendment which could save the pleadings.

Although I have approached the matter with all necessary caution, I am satisfied that this is one of those rare cases where I am convinced that plaintiff’s claim will fail, insofar as the second defendant is concerned. In reaching that decision, I have considered the pleadings only and have also proceeded on the basis that any statements of fact contained in the pleadings can be proved by the plaintiff. In other words, for the purposes of this exercise, I have accepted the facts as asserted by the plaintiff in the pleadings. However, doing so (i.e. accepting those facts) does not give rise to any cause of action and does not disclose a potentially valid claim, in my view. Thus, the plaintiff cannot possibly succeed on the pleadings and her claim against the second defendant must be dismissed pursuant to O. 19, r. 28. To take one practical example, assuming that the plaintiff can prove at a future trial that Gardaí threatened to telephone her daughter, the foregoing simply does not give rise to any cause of action.

It is also uncontroversial to say that court resources are necessarily limited. Thus, there is an underlying public interest in ensuring that scarce court resources are not expended on claims which disclose no reasonable cause of action, are frivolous, vexatious, scandalous, prejudicial insofar as defendants are concerned, and bound to fail. Furthermore, and on the topic of resources, it cannot be in doubt that the first and second named defendants, and those employed by them, play a vital role in our society. The resources available to these defendants are far from limitless and it seems to me that there is an added public benefit in ensuring that their limited resource, whether measured in person-hours or financial terms, are not expended on being required to meet wholly unmeritorious proceedings. For the sake of completeness, I now turn to the claim against the second defendant from the perspective of the court’s inherent jurisdiction.

Mr. Cooney BL for the second defendant adopted the submissions made by Mr. Binchy BL for the first defendant, with respect to the court’s inherent jurisdiction. The analysis of this Court’s inherent jurisdiction to dismiss proceedings, which I set out earlier in the context of the first defendant’s application, applies equally with respect to the application brought by the second defendant. It is settled law that, unlike the position which pertains when the court considers an application pursuant to O. 19, r. 28, it is permissible to have regard to affidavit evidence (including the averments made by Inspector Keys) in the context of considering the second named defendant’s application to dismiss the proceedings pursuant to this Court’s inherent jurisdiction (see Barry v. Buckley [1981] 1R 306, 308). The sworn evidence of Inspector Keys is uncontroverted. Thus, there is no question of this court preferring one version of events over another. Rather, the vexatious nature of the claims has been established on the basis of undisputed facts.

Applying the relevant principles, I have come to the view that it is clear beyond any doubt that the plaintiff could not succeed in her claim against An Garda Síochána. In my view, the plaintiff has established no credible basis for suggesting that the facts are as she has asserted. In short, the claims which the plaintiff seeks to make against An Garda Síochána, are claims which are scandalous and vexatious and must be dismissed. The proceedings are bound to fail on the merits (quite apart from the insurmountable problem for the plaintiff that no cause of action is disclosed as against the second name defendant).

During the course of this judgment, I have used a variety of terms including “frivolous” . It seemed to me that, even during the hearing, the plaintiff took offence at the use of the term frivolous. For the benefit of the plaintiff, it is important to make clear that this is not to suggest that the court regards her , or the sincerity of her beliefs, as foolish, silly or frivolous. Not having had the benefit of legal advice and assistance, one might well understand the plaintiff’s objection to the use of this term, not least because of the conviction with which she appears to hold her beliefs.

It is important, however, to emphasise that, in a legal context, a claim is frivolous where it is misconceived or futile, insofar as its prospects. In other words, a frivolous claim is one where, seen through the lens of established legal principles, there is no hope of the claim being successful. In my view, this can be said of the plaintiff’s claim.

To say this is not to judge the plaintiff harshly or at all, as the court recognises that she genuinely believes her narrative. However, as I made clear earlier, that is not the ‘yardstick’ by which the present applications must be determined. Furthermore, regardless of how sincerely the plaintiff believes that her claim should succeed, the pleadings are such as designed to cause damage to, not only to institutions, but to countless individuals diligently going about their work in a professional manner within the defendants, and who would be asked to meet proceedings which have no prospect of success whatsoever. For these reasons, the second defendant is entitled to the relief sought at paras. 1 and 2 of its motion.

The relief sought by the third named defendant is in similar terms to the relief sought by the first defendant, in that the third defendant moves its motion on the basis of this Court’s inherent jurisdiction and also relies on s.10(3) of the 2004 Act. In the manner already explained in this judgment, the central claim comprises one of medical negligence and appears to be directed at the HSE and its employees, servants or agents. It will be recalled that, in addition to referring to a range of health complaints, the general endorsement of claim in the plenary summons pleads that the plaintiff’s claim is inter alia “for damages for breach of care and safety whilst a patient of HSE” . With respect to specific allegations directed at the third named defendant, the following comprises a summary: -

The third named defendant did not feature significantly in the oral submissions made by the plaintiff, but it was plain that she stood over her assertions concerning the third named defendant as they appear in the pleadings.

It is fair to say that, although the core claim made by the plaintiff is one of medical negligence, an aspect of same is to allege that she should not have been prescribed a drug she describes as Rasilez Aliskrien in July 2011 which drug, according to the plaintiff, caused significant personal injuries to her.

Having very carefully considered the pleadings, I am satisfied that the plaintiff has not identified any cause of action which is alleged to give rise to a claim for damages against the third defendant specifically.

It seems to me that the pleadings do not specify any act or omission on the part of the third defendant alleged to give rise to any claim for damages. Insofar as the plaintiff alleges that she suffered adverse reactions to the Rasilez Aliskrien, the plaintiff does not assert that she was prescribed it directly by the third defendant. Rather, her case is that a named medical professor in a specific hospital prescribed this drug to her in July 2011. Thus, insofar as the drug in question is concerned, the only conceivable claim is one of medical negligence with regard to the prescription of that drug.

In the manner previously analysed in the context of a consideration of the first applicant’s motion, such a claim would require medical opinion from an independent expert on the question of liability. No such opinion has been obtained by the plaintiff. This is because she decided not to seek same, despite having been put squarely on notice of its importance.

Furthermore, in circumstances where the plaintiff makes clear that she was prescribed the aforementioned medication in July 2011 and claims to have experienced an adverse reaction within a matter of days , there is a very obvious and insurmountable problem for the plaintiff in the form of the statute of limitations, given that legal proceedings were not issued until over seven years later, on 7 th September, 2018.

Thus, this Court is in a position to say definitely that any claim by the plaintiff against the third named defendant is truly one which would constitute a “personal injuries action” within the meaning of the 2004 Act and the plaintiff has not complied with the requirements of s.10 of that Act. Her claim has not been appropriately particularised and, crucially, there is no opinion from a qualified doctor which provides any basis whatsoever for a range of assertions in pleadings whose continued existence cannot be justified and which constitute an abuse of process.

I agree with the submissions made on behalf of the third defendant that it is not possible to discern a cause of action against the third defendant. Insofar as assertions are made, they speak to a claim which is “medical negligence” in nature. Any such claim is without doubt ‘statute barred’.

Furthermore, and considered from the prospective of this Court’s inherent jurisdiction, the plaintiff has not established a credible basis for suggesting that the facts are as asserted. In short, the proceedings are bound to fail on their merits and this triggers the invocation of the court’s inherent jurisdiction to dismiss the proceedings in order to prevent abuse of process. Regardless of how tentatively the court approaches the issue, I am satisfied that this is one of the rare cases where the court’s inherent jurisdiction should be invoked. The following example may best serve to illustrate why.

It seems clear that the plaintiff sincerely believes that the third defendant is involved, variously, in (i) criminality; (ii) control of the Irish Government and HSE; (iii) conducting covert clinical trials despite the risk of death of unsuspecting subjects; and (iv) the provision of false data concerning medications. Regardless of how genuinely the plaintiff holds these views, there is simply no credible case on the pleaded facts with regard to the foregoing allegations of criminality and corruption.

Approaching the matter from the perspective of O.19, r.28, the court must assume that all facts pleaded can be established. However, the third defendant asks the court to approach the matter via its inherent jurisdiction. Doing so entitles the court to consider whether there is a credible basis for suggesting that the plaintiff might be able to establish the facts pleaded and there is none in my view. Thus, the plaintiff’s claim is bound to fail. Hence, the continued existence of the pleaded case constitutes an abuse of process entitling the court to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim against the third defendant.

As I observed earlier, when approaching matters via the court’s inherent jurisdiction, it is permissible to have regard, not only to the pleadings but to affidavit evidence and, in that context, it is appropriate to note that uncontroverted evidence was put before the court in the form of the following averments contained in an affidavit sworn on 25 th November, 2021 by a Mr. Brian Malone, solicitor for the third named defendant: -

Reference is then made to the current European Public Assessment Report (‘EPAR’) in respect of Rasilez (Aliskrien) dated June 2016 and published on the website on the European Medicines Agency. The uncontested averment is also made that “Rasilez (Aliskrien) is a medicine that is only available on a prescription basis” , something confirmed by the European Medicines Agency.

At para. 16 of Mr. Malone’s affidavit, averments are made with respect to the ‘Product Information’ in respect of Rasilez Aliskrien, as published on the website of the European Medicines Agency. It is averred that the Product Information is annexed to the Marketing Authorisation issued by the European Commission and includes the Summary of Main Product Characteristics (‘SPC’), (being information for the use of medical professionals); the product labelling; and the package leaflet (‘PL’) (information which is directed towards the patient). A copy of the current Product Information is exhibited and comprises exhibit ‘BM3’ to Mr. Malone’s affidavit.

At para. 17 a number of matters arising from the Product Information are noted. In short, this comprises a reference to certain adverse reactions stated to have been observed in some patients. Furthermore, the SPC advised that, in the event of any signs suggesting adverse effects which are listed: “patients should discontinue treatment and contact the physician”.

In short, there is before this court uncontroverted evidence as to the regulation regime concerning the medication in question which is utterly undermining of the allegations pleaded by the plaintiff and I take the view that the plainitff’s allegations lack any credible basis.

It is also appropriate to say that, in advance of the present motion, the legal representatives of the third named defendant made its position very clear in the context of inviting the plaintiff to discontinue her proceedings - also making clear that if the plaintiff took this opportunity, no legal costs would be sought against her. In my view, that was a very reasonable and sensitive approach to take and it is appropriate at this point to quote verbatim from the relevant letter which was sent by Messrs Corrigan & Corrigan, solicitors for the third defendant on 8 th November, 2021:

It seems to me that the foregoing letter stated in comprehensive terms, and in a manner designed to ensure that a non-lawyer could understand it, the reasons why the third defendant is entitled to the relief sought in its motion. Unfortunately, the plaintiff declined to accept the offer to discontinue her proceedings without having to face any liability for costs. For the reasons set out in this judgment, the third defendant is entitled to orders per paras. 1 and 2 of the application which issued on 25 November, 2021,

Again, this is not a situation where an amendment might ‘save’ the plaintiff’s claim against the third defendant. Rather, this is a situation where the plaintiff’s claim against the third defendant is bound to fail and, thus, the continued maintenance of the claim constitutes an abuse of process. This is a situation where vexatious claims are made but this Court is satisfied that there is no credible basis for suggesting that the facts are as set out in the pleadings. To take the following example, there is no credible basis for suggesting, not only (i) that the third defendant is involved in criminality; but (ii) exercises control over the Government of this State as well as the HSE; and (iii) that all are implicated in permitting or covering up “torture” . These are allegations utterly lacking in credibility.

For the purpose of efficiency during the hearing, not all affidavits were opened in full. This was on the basis that the court would take time to read all affidavits with care. All parties, including the plaintiff, saw the sense in that approach. Subsequent to the hearing, I carefully considered the contents of all pleadings, affidavit and exhibits. Having done so, I formed the view that it would be appropriate, given certain matters to which the plaintiff made reference in her affidavit of 28 th March 2022, that the plaintiff’s name be redacted. Although it was not apparent to me during the hearing, it subsequently became clear from a close reading of all the papers that, in the past, a certain application may have been made with respect to the plaintiff pursuant to the Mental Health Act and, against that backdrop, it seemed to me to be appropriate, and in ease of the plaintiff, for her identity to be redacted in the context of delivering this judgment.

The court’s decision will undoubtedly come as a disappointment to the plaintiff, given the sincerity with which she holds the views expressed in the pleadings and articulated during the course of her oral submissions.

The court feels genuine sympathy for the plaintiff and any distress this outcome may cause her.

I also wish to express my thanks to the plaintiff for the manner in which she conducted her case during the hearing. Although doubtless a stressful experience, the plaintiff made her points with clarity.

I also wish to express the court’s thanks to counsel for the respective defendants who made all three applications with professionalism, skill and sensitivity.

However, in the manner set out in this judgment, all three defendants are entitled to the relief sought and the plaintiff’s claim must be dismissed against all three.

On 24 March 2020, the following statement issued in respect of the delivery of judgments electronically: “The parties will be invited to communicate electronically with the Court on issues arising (if any) out of the judgment such as the precise form of order which requires to be made or questions concerning costs. If there are such issues and the parties do not agree in this regard concise written submissions should be filed electronically with the Office of the Court within 14 days of delivery subject to any other direction given in the judgment. Unless the interests of justice require an oral hearing to resolve such matters then any issues thereby arising will be dealt with remotely and any ruling which the Court is required to make will also be published on the website and will include a synopsis of the relevant submissions made, where appropriate.”

Having regard to the foregoing, the parties should correspond with each other, forthwith, regarding the appropriate form of order including as to costs which should be made. My preliminary view in relation to costs is that the ‘normal’ rule (i.e. that ‘costs’ should ‘follow the event’) applies. Given that the defendants have been entirely successful in their respective applications (i.e. the ‘event’) and the plaintiff has been entirely unsuccessful in opposing them, following the normal rule would give rise to an order for costs in favour of each of the defendants, as against the plaintiff. In default of agreement between the parties on this issue, short written submissions should be filed in the Central Office within 14 days of the beginning of Michaelmas Term (which starts on 3 October 2022).