A v Minister for Justice & Equality & Ors, S v Minister for Justice & Equality & Ors, I v Minister for Justice & Equality & Ors (Approved)

Both of those judges, working in the sphere of asylum and citizenship law, are confronted by a range of arguments that seem potentially supportable by reference to an interlocking web of existing law. Consequently, notwithstanding the expertise of both judges, and the diligent intellectual contribution which both continue to make, it might be predicted that they, or other judges working in similarly complex areas of law, may differ. To combat potential issues arising from this, the courts system works on the basis of mutual respect.

Reading the analysis of Barrett J in the cases now under appeal, and in particular the section whereby he came to differ from Humphries J, there is evidence of highly rigorous analysis. It is clear that he was neither unmindful of other views nor lacking the respect which requires him to closely scrutinise the law before reaching a different conclusion. In the judgment of Dunne J it is, however, correctly pointed out that no reasons were advanced for not following the earlier precedent. There is, rather, a full analysis of his reasons for reaching a different conclusion.

Horizontal precedent, as that jurisdiction calls this aspect of stare decisis , is referred to in England as co-ordinate jurisdiction precedent. Halsbury (Halsbury�s Laws of England, 5 th edition, volume 11, paragraph 32, footnotes omitted,) correctly explains that co-ordinate precedent is ordinarily to be followed by judges on the same level:

For the purpose of analysing the European Convention of Human Rights and the decisions based on that instrument, it was of considerable assistance that the trial judge gave substantial reasons for his view.