In the instant case the applicant has at all material times asserted that he was entitled to relief by reason of the delay in prosecuting him. Having regard to the comparative uncertainty, not of his making, which existed by reason of a practice adopted by the courts and over which he had no control I am satisfied that the applicant should be allowed to seek the relief which he has been sought and that he should not be precluded from seeking relief on the grounds as failure to comply with the provisions of O. 84 r. 20.
I am accordingly holding that there was a sufficient reason for his delay and his failure to make the application within the time limited in that behalf by O. 84 r. 20.
PROSECUTORIAL DELAY
Mr. O'Carroll on behalf of the applicant claims that there was inordinate delay on the part of the applicant between 1992 and 1998 in failing to prosecute the applicant in respect of the offence concerned.
I cannot accept that contention.
It is not the function of this court to intervene and seek to influence or supervise the prosecution of offenders by the respondent. The solemn statutory obligation rests solely upon the respondent.
In cases such as this the function of the court is simply to establish whether or not there has been a violation of the rights of an accused person to an expeditious trial.
In this case the evidence has established that on 31 st July, 1993, the respondent had decided that the evidence which was then before him did not warrant a prosecution of the applicant in respect of the offences alleged against him.
The applicant was so advised.
In 1996 the position was altered by the fact that a further complaint was made against the applicant by a member of his family. It also involved an allegation of sexual abuse. By 2 nd December, 1998, the applicant's daughter C had reached the age of sixteen years and made an express formal written complaint to the prosecuting authority in respect of the offences alleged.
It is well settled that the respondent is empowered to review the potential prosecution of suspected persons intermittently if additional evidence becomes available or if there is a bona fide change in the circumstances to revive the question of prosecution even where a decision has earlier has been made not to prosecute.
As I have already indicated it cannot, having regard to her age and circumstances, be suggested that C was in any way culpable or guilty of any pre-complaint delay
I am quite satisfied on the evidence of Detective Paul Lynch that following upon the complaint of the applicant's daughter C on 2 nd December, 1998, the prosecuting authorities moved expeditiously and conducted a thorough, appropriate and expeditious investigation before arresting the applicant on 11 th August, 1999. The investigation was then progressed efficiently and expeditiously until 25 th July, 2001 when the applicant was returned for trial.
Having regard to all of the foregoing circumstances it follows that the respondent was guilty of no prosecutorial delay and that the applicant's right to a trial with reasonable expedition has been in no way affected or compromised by any act or omission on the part of the respondent.
It follows that the relief sought by the applicant must be declined.