Criminal Law

Criminal Law Cases You Must Know for the SQE

The cases that actually come up, the tests examiners expect you to apply, and how to think through them under pressure.

The SQE1 criminal law questions are not asking you to write essays. They are asking you to pick the right answer from five options, often where two of them look almost identical. That means you need to know the legal tests precisely, not approximately. Here are the cases that matter, what they actually decided, and how to use them.

Mens Rea: The Cases That Define the Tests

Intention: R v Woollin

Direct intent is straightforward: you want the outcome. The exam will test oblique intent, and the leading case is R v Woollin [1999] 1 AC 82. The House of Lords confirmed that a jury is entitled to find intention where death or serious bodily harm was a virtual certainty as a result of the defendant's actions, and the defendant appreciated that was the case. Two elements, both required.

The word "entitled" matters here. The jury does not have to find intention just because virtual certainty is established. It is a rule of evidence, not a rule of law. SQE questions sometimes present scenarios designed to test whether you know the difference between foresight and intention. Foresight of a probable consequence is evidence from which a jury may infer intent; it is not intention itself. R v Nedrick [1986] 1 WLR 1025 said the same thing a little earlier, but Woollin is the binding House of Lords authority and the one you should cite.

Recklessness: R v G and Another

For over a decade after MPC v Caldwell [1982] AC 341, objective recklessness applied to criminal damage. The House of Lords overruled Caldwell in R v G and Another [2003] UKHL 50, restoring a subjective test. The defendant must have been aware of a risk, and it must have been unreasonable in the circumstances known to them to take that risk. This is the R v Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 396 formulation, now confirmed as correct for recklessness generally.

Know the timeline. Caldwell is dead. G and Another is the authority. If you see a question involving recklessness and criminal damage, the test is subjective.

Actus Reus: Causation Cases You Cannot Skip

The Basic Rules

Causation splits into factual and legal. Factual causation uses the "but for" test from R v White [1910] 2 KB 124. The defendant's act must be a cause of the result, though not necessarily the only cause. Legal causation asks whether the defendant's act was an operating and substantial cause of the result.

Intervening Acts: R v Pagett and R v Jordan

The tricky part is novus actus interveniens, a new intervening act that breaks the chain. Two cases sit at opposite ends of the spectrum.

R v Pagett (1983) 76 Cr App R 279 held that the chain was not broken when police instinctively fired back at Pagett, killing the hostage he was using as a shield. The act of a third party does not break the chain if it was a foreseeable response to what the defendant did.

R v Jordan (1956) 40 Cr App R 152 is the other side. The wound was "practically healed" and the death was caused by palpably wrong medical treatment. The unusual circumstances broke the chain. This case is frequently cited but courts have been reluctant to apply it broadly.

R v Smith [1959] 2 QB 35 takes a different approach: if the original wound is still an operating and substantial cause of death, the chain is not broken even if there was also negligent medical treatment. Smith and Jordan are in tension. The courts prefer Smith. In exam questions, ask whether the original act is still an operating cause. If it is, intervening medical negligence almost never breaks the chain.

The Thin Skull Rule and Drug Cases

R v Blaue [1975] 1 WLR 1411 is the thin skull rule in criminal law. The defendant must take the victim as they find them, including their beliefs. Blaue stabbed a woman who refused a blood transfusion on religious grounds. He was still liable for her death.

Drug supply cases have their own line of authority. R v Kennedy (No 2) [2007] UKHL 38 held that where the deceased freely and voluntarily self-administered a drug, that act of self-injection broke the chain of causation. The supplier was not liable for manslaughter. The free, informed, voluntary act of the victim is a novus actus. This comes up in problem questions more than students expect.

Theft and Dishonesty: The Test That Changed

Theft Act 1968 offences are heavily tested. The elements of theft under section 1 are:

1. Appropriation of property
2. Belonging to another
3. With the intention of permanently depriving
4. Dishonestly

Each element has its own case law. Appropriation is broader than most students assume after R v Gomez [1993] AC 442 and R v Hinks [2000] UKHL 53. Even a valid gift can be an appropriation. The law here is controversial but settled.

Dishonesty: Ivey Replaces Ghosh

This is the most important recent development in SQE criminal law. For decades, dishonesty was tested by the two-stage Ghosh test: first, was the conduct dishonest by the standards of ordinary reasonable and honest people, and second, did the defendant realise it was dishonest by those standards? The second limb was widely criticised because it seemed to allow defendants to escape liability by claiming an idiosyncratic moral code.

The Supreme Court in [Ivey v Genting Casinos [2017] UKSC 67](https://www.getcaselaw.com/case-library/04f3ca9c-9c98-4010-9b2c-ff1cbf85ca25) abolished the second limb, though technically as obiter since Ivey was a civil case. The test is now: what was the defendant's actual state of knowledge or belief as to the facts, and given those facts, was the conduct dishonest by the standards of ordinary reasonable and honest people? The subjective question is about what the defendant believed the facts to be. The normative judgment about whether that is dishonest is entirely objective.

You should still know [R v Ghosh [1982] QB 1053](https://www.getcaselaw.com/case-library/a88a68d0-b240-4388-8a03-fe180f535fbc) because it explains the old test and why Ivey matters. In practice, since the Court of Appeal confirmed in R v Barton and Booth [2020] EWCA Crim 575 that Ivey is the test courts must now follow, Ghosh is historical context. Apply Ivey on your SQE answers.

Robbery and the Force Requirement

Robbery under section 8 Theft Act 1968 requires theft, plus force or the threat of force, immediately before or at the time of stealing, in order to steal.

*R v Dawson* (1985) 81 Cr App R 150 addressed what counts as force. Nudging a victim to make them lose balance was capable of amounting to force. The court rejected an argument that force required something significant. It is a matter of fact and degree for the jury. This is useful in exam questions that test borderline scenarios, a gentle push, a shoulder barge, something that seems trivial.

Note also R v Hale [1979] 68 Cr App R 415 on the timing issue. The court held that appropriation is a continuing act. Even if the force came after the initial taking, the jury could find that the appropriation was still ongoing, so the force was used "at the time of stealing." This extends the window considerably.

Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person

The Offences Against the Person Act 1861 hierarchy is a staple. Know the elements and the key cases:

• Section 47 ABH: Assault or battery occasioning actual bodily harm. R v Miller [1954] 2 QB 282 confirmed that ABH includes any hurt or injury that is more than transient or trifling. Psychiatric injury can qualify after R v Chan-Fook [1994] 1 WLR 689, confirmed in R v Ireland [1998] AC 147.
• Section 20 GBH: Malicious wounding or inflicting GBH. "Malicious" means subjective recklessness as to some harm, confirmed in R v Mowatt [1968] 1 QB 421. You do not need foresight of the gravity of the harm, just some harm.
• Section 18 GBH: Wounding or causing GBH with intent. Specific intent offence. The defendant must intend to cause GBH or resist lawful apprehension.

The distinction between section 20 and section 18 is a classic SQE testing point. Same result, entirely different mental element, different sentence. If the question asks you to identify the most serious offence the defendant could be charged with, look at whether there is evidence of specific intent.

Murder and Manslaughter: The Partial Defences

Murder requires an unlawful killing of a human being under the Queen's/King's Peace with malice aforethought, meaning intent to kill or cause GBH. If you have murder, then ask whether any partial defence reduces it to voluntary manslaughter.

The two main partial defences under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 are:

Diminished responsibility (section 2): Abnormality of mental functioning, arising from a recognised medical condition, that substantially impaired the defendant's ability to understand the nature of their conduct, form a rational judgment, or exercise self-control, and which provides an explanation for the killing.

Loss of control (section 54): The killing resulted from a loss of control, attributable to a qualifying trigger (fear of serious violence, or circumstances of an extremely grave character causing the defendant to have a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged), and a person of the defendant's sex and age with a normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint might have acted similarly. There is no longer a requirement for suddenness, which was the old provocation defence requirement under R v Duffy [1949] 1 All ER 932.

For gross negligence manslaughter, the test from R v Adomako [1994] UKHL 6 requires: a duty of care, breach, a risk of death (not just serious injury, confirmed in R v Misra [2004] EWCA Crim 2375), and that the breach was so grossly negligent that it should be judged criminal.

Defences Worth Knowing in Detail

Self-Defence

Section 76 Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 codifies the common law. The defendant must genuinely believe force was necessary. The amount of force must be reasonable in the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be. R v Williams (Gladstone) [1984] 78 Cr App R 276 established that an honest but unreasonable mistake about the need for force still allows the defence. Reasonableness of the belief goes to whether the belief was genuinely held, not to whether the mistake was justifiable.

Intoxication

DPP v Majewski [1977] AC 443 is the foundation. Voluntary intoxication is no defence to crimes of basic intent. It can be relevant to specific intent offences. So a drunk defendant who lacks the intent to kill might avoid murder but will still be convicted of manslaughter, a basic intent offence. The practical effect is that intoxication rarely gets defendants off completely.

How to Approach Criminal Law SQE Questions

Most criminal law SQE1 questions are structured around a fact pattern. Your job is to identify:

1. What offence or offences are potentially made out on the facts
2. Whether the actus reus is satisfied
3. Whether the required mens rea is satisfied
4. Whether any defence applies
5. What the answer options are actually testing

The last point matters. Often two answer options describe different mental elements. If the question is about a section 18 charge, an answer that says the defendant was "reckless" is wrong, because section 18 requires specific intent. If the question is about robbery and the force came after the taking, an answer that ignores R v Hale and says robbery is not made out is probably wrong.

For dishonesty questions, remember to apply Ivey in two stages: establish the defendant's actual beliefs, then apply the objective test. Don't collapse both stages into one.

You can find a full breakdown of the criminal law topic, with more cases and statutory provisions, on the Caselaw criminal law hub. If you want to test your knowledge against SQE-style questions, the SQE1 practice question tool is worth working through alongside your case review.