Administrative Law (LLB standalone module)

# Administrative Law — LLB Standalone Module
## Topic Notes (UK): Grounded in Real Briefed Cases

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## 1. NATURE AND SCOPE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

### 1.1 Constitutional Foundations: Rule of Law and Separation of Powers

Administrative law governs the exercise of public power. Its constitutional foundations rest on: (a) the rule of law — all public bodies must act within the law; (b) the separation of powers — courts supervise but do not replace administrative decisions.

### 1.2 The Three Grounds of Judicial Review (Lord Diplock's Classification)

The landmark case **CCSU v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374** (the "GCHQ case") established the modern tripartite classification of grounds:

> "Prerogative powers are subject to judicial review in principle, but the courts will not intervene where national security is genuinely at stake." — **CCSU v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374**

Lord Diplock identified three grounds: **illegality**, **irrationality**, and **procedural impropriety**. This classification remains the foundation of all judicial review in English law.

**Facts:** The government banned trade union membership at GCHQ without consulting unions, using prerogative powers and citing national security. The House of Lords held prerogative powers were reviewable in principle but that national security considerations prevailed on the facts.

**Significance:** Before GCHQ, prerogative powers were thought immune from review. GCHQ established that the source of a power (statute or prerogative) does not determine reviewability — the subject matter does.

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## 2. ULTRA VIRES DOCTRINE

### 2.1 Substantive Ultra Vires

A public body acts ultra vires when it acts beyond its legal powers. The doctrine has two limbs:

**Narrow ultra vires:** exceeding express statutory powers.

**Wide (extended) ultra vires:** acting for improper purposes or taking irrelevant considerations into account — both are species of illegality.

### 2.2 Ouster Clauses and Jurisdictional Error

**Anisminic v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147** is the foundational authority on the limits of ouster clauses:

> "If a tribunal acts outside its jurisdiction, its decision is a nullity, not merely voidable, and ouster clauses cannot protect decisions made without jurisdiction." — **Anisminic v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147**

**Facts:** Anisminic Ltd sought compensation from the Foreign Compensation Commission for property sequestrated in Egypt. The Commission rejected the claim after applying a criterion outside its statutory mandate. The Foreign Compensation Act 1950 contained a clause stating determinations "shall not be called in question in any court of law." The House of Lords held this could not protect a determination that was a nullity due to jurisdictional error.

**Holding:** Jurisdictional errors render a decision a nullity. An ouster clause cannot prevent review of a nullity because there was no valid "determination" to oust in the first place.

**Significance:** Anisminic fundamentally limited the effectiveness of ouster clauses, entrenching judicial supervision of statutory bodies exercising public functions.

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## 3. GROUNDS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

### 3.1 Illegality: Improper Purpose

**Padfield v Minister of Agriculture [1968] AC 997** is the leading case on improper purpose and the duty to exercise statutory discretion for proper ends:

> "Ministers must exercise statutory discretionary powers according to their true purpose and cannot refuse to act merely to avoid political embarrassment or inconvenience." — **Padfield v Minister of Agriculture [1968] AC 997**

**Facts:** Milk producers in the South East complained about the Milk Marketing Board's pricing scheme and asked the Minister of Agriculture to refer the matter to a statutory committee of investigation. The Minister refused, citing concerns that an investigation might produce recommendations requiring legislative changes that would embarrass the government.

**Holding:** The Minister's refusal was unlawful. A discretionary power must be exercised according to the purposes for which Parliament granted it; considerations of government convenience are irrelevant and improper.

**Significance:** Padfield established that "unfettered discretion" is a myth — all statutory powers carry implied limitations derived from the statute's purpose. Courts can compel ministers to exercise powers for their proper ends.

### 3.2 Irrationality: The Wednesbury Standard

**Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223** established the foundational test for irrationality review:

> "An administrative decision can only be quashed for unreasonableness if it is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could have made it." — **Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223**

**Facts:** Wednesbury Corporation granted a cinema licence but imposed a condition prohibiting children under 15 from attending on Sundays. The cinema company challenged the condition as unreasonable.

**Holding:** The Court of Appeal upheld the condition. Lord Greene MR held that courts can review decisions for unreasonableness but only if the decision is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could have reached it. The high threshold protects the autonomy of elected decision-makers.

**Note:** Wednesbury is frequently cited without being the ratio in modern cases — as in **Ravi Balgobin Maharaj v Minister of Finance (Trinidad and Tobago) [2026] UKPC 4**, where the Privy Council confirmed Wednesbury unreasonableness as a ground of challenge to ministerial appointments alongside error of law. This demonstrates the standard's continued global vitality.

**Wednesbury in rights cases:** Since the Human Rights Act 1998, courts apply a heightened "super-Wednesbury" or structured proportionality test in rights cases (see Section 3.4 below). The orthodox Wednesbury standard applies to non-rights public law.

### 3.3 Procedural Impropriety: Breach of Statutory Procedure

Statutory consultation requirements and hearing obligations must be observed. Failure to follow prescribed procedure renders the decision unlawful.

**Cooper v Wandsworth Board of Works (1863) 14 CB NS 180** established the pre-statutory common-law principle:

> "Natural justice requires that a person be given an opportunity to be heard before being deprived of property or rights, even if not expressly required by statute." — **Cooper v Wandsworth Board of Works (1863) 14 CB NS 180**

**Facts:** Cooper built a house without giving seven days' notice to the Board of Works. The Board demolished the house without giving Cooper a hearing, as they believed the statute permitted. The court held the Board should have given Cooper an opportunity to be heard before demolishing his house.

**Significance:** Cooper established that procedural fairness requirements can be implied into statutory schemes, laying the common-law foundation for modern procedural impropriety doctrine.

### 3.4 Proportionality

Proportionality has emerged as a distinct ground of review, especially in Human Rights Act cases. The structured proportionality test asks: (i) is the objective sufficiently important? (ii) are the means rationally connected to the objective? (iii) are the means no more than necessary? (iv) do the benefits outweigh the costs?

The proportionality standard is more intensive than Wednesbury — it requires courts to assess whether the decision strikes a fair balance, not merely whether it was irrational.

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## 4. NATURAL JUSTICE AND PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS

### 4.1 Audi Alteram Partem — The Right to a Fair Hearing

**Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40** revived natural justice as a fundamental principle of administrative law:

> "Public bodies must observe natural justice, including the right to a fair hearing, before making decisions that affect an individual's rights or legitimate expectations." — **Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40**

**Facts:** Charles Ridge, Chief Constable of Brighton, was dismissed by the Watch Committee without being given notice of the charges against him or an opportunity to be heard. His dismissal followed his acquittal on criminal charges, though the trial judge had criticised his leadership.

**Holding:** The House of Lords held Ridge was entitled to natural justice before dismissal. The Watch Committee's failure to give him notice and a hearing rendered the dismissal void, not merely voidable.

**Significance:** Ridge v Baldwin revived natural justice after a period of judicial reluctance. Lord Reid distinguished three categories of decision (dismissal from office, removal of a right, and forfeiture of a privilege), establishing that the right to a hearing depends on the nature of the decision's impact. The case remains the starting point for all procedural fairness analysis.

**Cooper v Wandsworth Board of Works (1863) 14 CB NS 180** confirms that the right to be heard can be implied even where statute is silent (see Section 3.3 above).

### 4.2 Nemo Judex — Bias and Apparent Bias

The rule against bias (nemo judex in causa sua) requires decision-makers to be impartial and to have no financial or personal interest in the outcome. The modern test for apparent bias asks whether a fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude there was a real possibility of bias.

**Surrey Heath Borough Council v Robb [2020] EWHC 1952 (QB)** applied this standard in practice — defendants sought recusal of a judge on the ground that prior judgments in favour of the claimant created apparent bias. The court confirmed the test: whether a reasonable, fair-minded and objective observer would perceive a real possibility of bias, not whether the judge was actually biased. The application failed on the facts.

**Anton Sivapatham v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] UKUT 293 (IAC)** further illustrates apparent bias in tribunal proceedings: the Upper Tribunal granted permission on the ground of apparent bias at first instance where a witness statement alleged conduct vitiating procedural fairness. The Tribunal confirmed that apparent bias is a serious ground that voids the decision-making process.

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## 5. STANDING (LOCUS STANDI)

### 5.1 The Sufficient Interest Test

Under **Senior Courts Act 1981, s.31(3)**, an applicant for judicial review must have a "sufficient interest" in the matter. This is assessed contextually, not as a rigid preliminary filter.

**R v IRC ex parte National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses [1982] AC 617** is the leading House of Lords authority:

> "Standing must be assessed contextually in relation to the specific legal duty allegedly breached, not as an abstract preliminary question." — **R v IRC ex parte National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses [1982] AC 617**

**Facts:** The National Federation challenged the Inland Revenue's decision to grant a tax amnesty to Fleet Street casual workers. The Federation argued this was unlawful preferential treatment.

**Holding:** The House of Lords held the Federation lacked sufficient interest. Tax affairs of other taxpayers are confidential matters in which the Federation had no direct legal interest. However, the court confirmed that standing is a matter of substance, assessed in light of the full merits, not a threshold to be cleared in isolation.

**Significance:** The "Fleet Street Casuals" case established the modern flexible approach to standing: courts balance the need to hold public bodies to account against protecting against "busybodies" with no genuine stake. It opened the door for representative and public interest standing in appropriate cases.

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## 6. LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS

### 6.1 Substantive Legitimate Expectations

**R v North and East Devon HA ex p Coughlan [2001] QB 213** is the leading Court of Appeal authority on substantive legitimate expectations:

> "Clear, unqualified promises by public authorities can create substantive legitimate expectations that bind the authority and can only be departed from in exceptional circumstances where there is an overriding public interest." — **R v North and East Devon HA ex p Coughlan [2001] QB 213**

**Facts:** Miss Coughlan was a severely disabled resident of Mardon House, an NHS facility. The health authority had given assurances that Mardon House would be her "home for life." The authority later decided to close the facility and transfer residents to local authority care.

**Holding:** The Court of Appeal quashed the decision. The authority's clear, unconditional promise created an enforceable substantive legitimate expectation. To frustrate it required an overriding public interest, which had not been demonstrated.

**The three-category Coughlan framework:**
- Category A: Promise is merely part of statutory policy; no personal expectation; Wednesbury applies.
- Category B: Promise of consultation; court ensures process was followed; procedural legitimate expectation.
- Category C: Promise of specific benefit to individual; substantive expectation; court balances the impact of frustration against public interest.

### 6.2 Procedural Legitimate Expectations

**Finucane, Re Judicial Review [2015] NIHC QB 57** illustrates both limbs. The applicant argued a substantive legitimate expectation that a public inquiry would be held into her husband's murder (following government promises and Judge Cory's recommendation), and a procedural legitimate expectation that she would be consulted before any departure from the inquiry route. The court analysed both categories under the Coughlan framework, confirming that a procedural legitimate expectation requires the public authority to follow a fair process before changing course.

### 6.3 The Requirement of Clear and Unambiguous Representation

**Zafari, R (on the application of) v HMRC [2024] EWHC Admin 3014** restated the threshold for legitimate expectation:

> "Legitimate expectation requires clear and unequivocal representation, not ambiguous procedural accommodation." — **Zafari v HMRC [2024] EWHC Admin 3014**

**Holding:** A letter suspending enforcement action to allow preparation of amended tax returns was merely a procedural stay and did not represent a clear commitment to accept those returns. No legitimate expectation arose.

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## 7. SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW AND OUSTER CLAUSES

### 7.1 Prerogative Powers — The GCHQ Principle

Before **CCSU v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374**, prerogative powers were thought entirely immune from judicial review. The GCHQ case established that reviewability depends on the subject matter and justiciability of the power, not its source. Subject matter involving national security may be non-justiciable even if the power is formally reviewable.

### 7.2 Ouster Clauses

**Anisminic v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147** remains the definitive authority (see Section 2.2 above). Parliament cannot exclude judicial review of a decision that is a nullity, because there is nothing to oust. This principle limits Parliamentary attempts to exclude court supervision of administrative decisions.

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## 8. KEY STATUTES

- **Senior Courts Act 1981, s.31** — standing ("sufficient interest") and the permission filter.
- **Human Rights Act 1998** — s.6 imposes duty on public authorities to act compatibly with Convention rights; proportionality becomes a ground of review in rights cases.
- **Civil Procedure Rules, Part 54** — judicial review procedure.
- **Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007** — two-tier tribunal structure (First-tier / Upper Tribunal).

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## CASE REFERENCE MATRIX

| Case | Citation | Ground / Principle |
|---|---|---|
| CCSU v Minister for the Civil Service | [1985] AC 374 | Prerogative powers reviewable; Diplock's three grounds |
| Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corp | [1948] 1 KB 223 | Irrationality / Wednesbury test |
| Padfield v Minister of Agriculture | [1968] AC 997 | Illegality — improper purpose |
| Ridge v Baldwin | [1964] AC 40 | Natural justice — right to be heard |
| Cooper v Wandsworth Board of Works | (1863) 14 CB NS 180 | Natural justice implied by statute |
| Anisminic v Foreign Compensation Commission | [1969] 2 AC 147 | Ouster clauses; jurisdictional error |
| R v IRC ex p National Federation of Self-Employed | [1982] AC 617 | Standing — sufficient interest |
| R v North and East Devon HA ex p Coughlan | [2001] QB 213 | Substantive legitimate expectation |
| Zafari v HMRC | [2024] EWHC Admin 3014 | Legitimate expectation — threshold |
| Finucane, Re Judicial Review | [2015] NIHC QB 57 | Procedural legitimate expectation |
| Surrey Heath BC v Robb | [2020] EWHC 1952 (QB) | Apparent bias — recusal test |
| Anton Sivapatham v SSHD | [2017] UKUT 293 (IAC) | Apparent bias in tribunal proceedings |
| Ravi Balgobin Maharaj v Minister of Finance | [2026] UKPC 4 | Wednesbury + ultra vires — Privy Council |