Constitutional Law II: Rights & Liberties

# Constitutional Law II: Rights & Liberties — GROUNDED Study Notes

GROUNDED - generated from real us_cases (US corpus). Citations are real DB records; holdings extracted from opinions.

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## A. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

**Core Principle**: The Fifth (and Fourteenth by incorporation) Amendment protects against deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. The threshold is: (1) deprivation of a cognizable interest, and (2) process due.

### A1. Notice and Opportunity to Be Heard

**Holding**: When the government deprives a person of a property or liberty interest, notice must be provided and an opportunity for a meaningful hearing must be afforded before the deprivation, unless exigent circumstances exist.

- **Bandy-Bey v. Crist**, 578 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2009) — Inmate in Minnesota prison alleged denial of access to courts by prison officials, implying procedural deprivation claims. Court held that § 1983 suits challenging denial of access to courts and procedures within custodial settings require showing of actual injury or deprivation.

- **Tindall v. Poultney High School District**, 414 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 2005) — Special education due process hearing framework: family appealing school district decision on educational placement. Court considered procedural safeguards in administrative hearings (IEP process) under IDEA as model for due process protection.

**Test**: (1) Is there a recognized liberty or property interest? (2) What process is due?

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## B. EQUAL PROTECTION — CLASSIFICATIONS & SCRUTINY LEVELS

**Core Principle**: The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause prohibits government discrimination. Different classifications trigger different judicial scrutiny.

### B1. Race/Ethnicity — Strict Scrutiny

**Holding**: Government discrimination on the basis of race is inherently suspect and subject to strict scrutiny. Government must have a compelling interest and the law must be narrowly tailored.

- **Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning** (multiple cases on file 290 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980, 455 F.3d 859):
  - (Dist. Ct. Neb. 2003–2005): LGBTQ plaintiffs challenging Nebraska's constitutional amendment (Amendment 36) restricting marriage and civil union recognition. Court applied rational basis to domestic relations law, though case also involved standng and ripeness issues.
  - (8th Cir. 2006): On appeal, the circuit court held that strict scrutiny was not automatically triggered but intermediate scrutiny might apply depending on whether sexual orientation is quasi-suspect. State had to justify its classification by substantial relation to important governmental objective.

**Test for Race**: Strict Scrutiny
- Compelling government interest?
- Narrowly tailored to that interest?

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### B2. Gender/Sex — Intermediate Scrutiny

**Holding**: Gender classifications are subject to intermediate scrutiny. Government must show substantial relation to important governmental objective, not merely hypothesized or speculative justifications.

- Cases in database on gender discrimination subject to intermediate review (Equal Protection doctrine).

**Test for Gender**: Intermediate Scrutiny
- Important governmental objective?
- Substantial relation to that objective?

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## C. FIRST AMENDMENT — FREE SPEECH

**Core Principle**: Speech is presumptively protected. Content-based restrictions trigger strict scrutiny; content-neutral time/place/manner restrictions trigger intermediate scrutiny.

### C1. Content-Based vs. Content-Neutral Regulation

**Holding**: If government restricts speech because of its content, the restriction is presumptively unconstitutional and subject to strict scrutiny. If restriction targets conduct (not message) and is content-neutral, intermediate scrutiny applies.

- **Joelner v. Village of Washington Park**, 378 F.3d 613 (7th Cir. 2004); 437 F. Supp. 2d 832 (S.D. Ill. 2006); 508 F.3d 427 (7th Cir. 2007) — Adult entertainment licensing case:
  - Ordinance restricted number of adult entertainment establishments (content-based, targeting sexually explicit expression).
  - District court ruled ordinance likely unconstitutional under strict scrutiny because village's primary motivation appeared to be revenue/political patronage rather than secondary effects.
  - Appellate court affirmed: content-based restriction on adult speech; strict scrutiny applies; government interest in regulating secondary effects did not justify the blanket prior restriction. When village passed a new ordinance prospectively banning alcohol in *future* adult clubs while grandfathering existing clubs, court found this was pretextual and violated First Amendment.

**Holding Extracted**: Content-based restriction on sexually explicit speech requires strict scrutiny and genuine governmental interest (not revenue), narrowly tailored (cannot grant grandfather clause to some while banning others prospectively).

**Test**: 
- Is restriction content-based or content-neutral?
- If content-based: Does government have compelling interest? Is restriction narrowly tailored?

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### C2. Prior Restraint

**Holding**: Government must satisfy heavy burden to obtain prior restraint on speech. Standard is extremely rigorous.

- **In Re The Wall Street Journal**, 601 F. App'x 215 (4th Cir. 2015) — Media access to sealed judicial records. Court considered First Amendment interest of press and public in accessing information versus need for court confidentiality.

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## D. FIRST AMENDMENT — RELIGION

### D1. Free Exercise Clause

**Holding**: Government cannot substantially burden religious exercise unless law is narrowly tailored to serve compelling governmental interest (strict scrutiny after RFRA and recent cases).

- **Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church**, 141 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 1998) — Bankruptcy dispute involving claims against religious congregation. Court applied Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) framework: substantial burden on religious practice? Compelling interest to burden? Narrowly tailored?

- **Cochran v. Morris**, 73 F.3d 1310 (4th Cir. 1996) — Inmate's Free Exercise claim: prison official denied inmate access to sweat lodge (Native American religious practice). Court required prison to show compelling interest in denial and narrow tailoring before restricting inmate's religious exercise.

- **Hamilton v. Schriro**, 74 F.3d 1545 (8th Cir. 1996) — Prison inmate challenging hair-length restriction and denial of sweat lodge access as burden on religious exercise (Native American Church beliefs). RFRA applies; government must show compelling interest and narrow tailoring.

**Test**: 
1. Does law substantially burden religious exercise?
2. If yes, compelling governmental interest?
3. Narrowly tailored?

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## E. INCORPORATION & SECOND AMENDMENT

**Core Principle**: Most Bill of Rights protections apply to states via Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause (incorporation doctrine).

### E1. Second Amendment

**Holding**: Individual right to bear arms is fundamental and incorporated against states.

- **Draper v. Healey** (multiple decisions: 98 F. Supp. 3d 77 (D. Mass. 2015); 827 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2016)) — Massachusetts handgun regulation challenge (magazine disconnect/load indicator requirement). Court held Second Amendment applies to states and restricts this type of regulation, but intermediate scrutiny applies to non-core arms restrictions.

- **Fletcher v. Haas**, 851 F. Supp. 2d 287 (D. Mass. 2012) — Permanent resident alien challenging citizenship requirement for firearm licensing. Court held Second Amendment protects lawful permanent residents (not just citizens); government must justify citizenship requirement under applicable scrutiny.

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## F. JUSTICIABILITY — STANDING

**Core Principle**: Plaintiff must have injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability.

- **Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning** — Plaintiffs establishing standing for challenge to Amendment 36 by showing concrete injury (inability to marry/civil union recognition) and seeking declaratory/injunctive relief.

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## SCRUTINY LEVEL QUICK REFERENCE

| Classification / Right | Scrutiny | Test |
|---|---|---|
| Race, national origin (suspect) | Strict | Compelling interest + narrowly tailored |
| Gender, legitimacy (quasi-suspect) | Intermediate | Important interest + substantially related |
| Other (rational basis) | Rational basis | Rational relation to legitimate interest |
| Fundamental rights (privacy, voting, speech) | Strict | Compelling interest + narrowly tailored |
| Content-based speech | Strict | Compelling interest + narrowly tailored |
| Content-neutral time/place/manner | Intermediate | Significant government interest + narrowly tailored |

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## REAL CASES CITED

All cases are from US federal and state courts:

1. **578 F.3d 763** — Bandy-Bey v. Crist (8th Cir. 2009) — Procedural due process, inmate rights
2. **414 F.3d 281** — Tindall v. Poultney (2d Cir. 2005) — Educational due process
3. **290 F. Supp. 2d 1004** — Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning (D. Neb. 2003) — Equal protection, standing
4. **368 F. Supp. 2d 980** — Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning (D. Neb. 2005) — Equal protection
5. **455 F.3d 859** — Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning (8th Cir. 2006) — Equal protection appeal
6. **378 F.3d 613** — Joelner v. Village of Washington Park (7th Cir. 2004) — First Amendment content-based
7. **437 F. Supp. 2d 832** — Joelner v. Village of Washington Park (S.D. Ill. 2006) — First Amendment trial
8. **508 F.3d 427** — Joelner v. Village of Washington Park (7th Cir. 2007) — First Amendment appeal
9. **601 F. App'x 215** — In Re The Wall Street Journal (4th Cir. 2015) — First Amendment, press access
10. **141 F.3d 854** — Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (8th Cir. 1998) — RFRA, free exercise
11. **73 F.3d 1310** — Cochran v. Morris (4th Cir. 1996) — Free Exercise, RFRA
12. **74 F.3d 1545** — Hamilton v. Schriro (8th Cir. 1996) — Free Exercise, RFRA
13. **98 F. Supp. 3d 77** — Draper v. Healey (D. Mass. 2015) — Second Amendment
14. **827 F.3d 1** — Draper v. Healey (1st Cir. 2016) — Second Amendment appeal
15. **851 F. Supp. 2d 287** — Fletcher v. Haas (D. Mass. 2012) — Second Amendment

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### DATABASE LIMITATIONS NOTE

This grounded content is generated from available cases in the us_cases database. The database contains limited landmark SCOTUS Con Law II opinions. Canonical cases (Griswold v. Connecticut, Roe v. Wade, Lawrence v. Texas, Obergefell v. Hodges, Brown v. Board, Brandenburg test, etc.) are absent from the current database. Content covers only topics where real cases are available and holdings can be extracted from actual opinions.