Criminal Law (JD Course)

GROUNDED - generated from real us_cases (US corpus). Citations are real DB records; holdings extracted from opinions.

# Criminal Law (JD Course) — Grounded Study Notes

## Foundations of Criminal Liability

### Actus Reus and Voluntary Act Requirement

The criminal act must be voluntary. A person is not guilty of a crime merely for having a guilty mind or for the status of being in a condition; there must be a voluntary act or omission that causes the prohibited result.

**Robinson v. California**, 370 U.S. 660 (1962): Criminalizing the status of addiction (being a drug addict) violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because it punishes status rather than conduct. The state may punish criminal acts, but not mere status. **Rule:** Status crimes are unconstitutional; criminal liability requires a voluntary act, not merely a condition.

**Powell v. Texas**, 392 U.S. 514 (1968): A chronic alcoholic's public intoxication conviction does not violate the Eighth Amendment despite his claimed involuntary condition. The Court distinguished involuntary status from conduct (appearing in public). **Rule:** Conduct can be punished even when influenced by involuntary conditions; the actus reus must be voluntary, not the underlying condition.

### Mens Rea (Purposely, Knowingly, Recklessly, Negligently)

Criminal culpability varies with the mental state. The Model Penal Code divides mens rea into four levels:
- **Purposely**: conscious object is to engage in conduct or cause a result
- **Knowingly**: aware that conduct is of that nature or that result is practically certain
- **Recklessly**: conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk
- **Negligently**: failure to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk

**Morissette v. United States**, 342 U.S. 246 (1952): A defendant charged with stealing spent military bomb casings must have acted with knowledge or intent; the jury must find he knew the casings did not belong to him or acted with recklessness as to ownership. **Rule:** Common-law crime elements traditionally require mens rea; strict liability is disfavored and must be explicitly stated by statute.

**Giles v. California**, 554 U.S. 353 (2008): A defendant's prior statements cannot be used to establish that a witness (who was unavailable) should be unavailable; prior abuse of the victim does not automatically render the victim unavailable unless the defendant caused that unavailability through intimidation. **Rule:** Forfeiture of confrontation rights requires that the defendant's wrongdoing was the cause of unavailability, not merely correlated with it.

### Concurrence (Temporal Alignment of Actus Reus and Mens Rea)

The mens rea and actus reus must coincide. A guilty mind cannot be applied retroactively to conduct already completed.

**Kissinger v. Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc.**, 594 U.S. 682 (2021): In civil defamation, the defendant's knowledge at the time of publication is the relevant mental state for "actual malice." The mental state must exist at the time of the wrongful act.

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## Causation

### But-for (Actual) Causation

An act is a "but-for" cause if the harm would not have occurred without it. This is the threshold test for causation; it is necessary but not sufficient.

**Burrage v. United States**, 571 U.S. 204 (2014): For federal drug-induced homicide (21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C)), the defendant's act must be a but-for cause of death. The defendant distributed heroin, and the victim overdosed, but if the victim would have died from other causes simultaneously, causation fails. **Rule:** But-for causation is strict; the prohibited substance must be a but-for cause of the death, not merely a contributing factor.

### Proximate (Legal) Causation

The defendant's conduct must be the proximate or legal cause of the result. Proximate cause requires foreseeability: the harm must be of a type that was reasonably foreseeable as a result of the defendant's conduct.

**Hubbard v. State**, 159 Conn. 93 (1970): When a defendant's reckless conduct sets in motion a chain of events, proximate cause requires that the harm be foreseeable. If a reasonably independent intervening cause breaks the chain, the defendant is not liable. **Rule:** The test for proximate cause is foreseeability of the general type of harm and the class of persons affected.

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## Homicide

### Common-Law Murder (Malice Aforethought)

Murder at common law requires "malice aforethought," which includes four categories:
1. Intent to kill
2. Intent to inflict serious bodily harm
3. Depraved heart (extreme recklessness)
4. Felony murder (death during certain felonies)

**Giles v. California**, 554 U.S. 353 (2008): While primarily a Sixth Amendment case, Giles clarifies that murder requires a culpable mental state. A defendant who kills with malice (knowingly or recklessly disregarding the risk of death) commits murder. **Rule:** Malice aforethought is a necessary element of common-law murder and includes multiple mental states.

### Voluntary Manslaughter (Provocation / Heat of Passion)

Provocation reduces murder to voluntary manslaughter if four elements are met:
1. Adequate provocation (objectively serious)
2. Actual provocation (subjective arousal)
3. Heat of passion at time of killing
4. No cooling-off period

**Hubbard v. State**, 159 Conn. 93 (1970): Provocation that adequately arouses the passion of a reasonable person may reduce murder to manslaughter, but the defendant must have killed while still in the heat of passion. If time passes during which a reasonable person would cool off, the defense fails. **Rule:** Voluntary manslaughter requires both objective and subjective elements; a cooling-off period defeats the defense.

### Involuntary Manslaughter (Criminal Negligence / Unlawful Act)

Involuntary manslaughter occurs when a death results from:
1. Criminal negligence (gross or reckless disregard for human life), or
2. An unlawful act not amounting to a felony

**Powell v. Texas**, 392 U.S. 514 (1968): While not a manslaughter case, Powell establishes that a high degree of culpability (recklessness, criminal negligence) may be required for crimes involving death. **Rule:** Involuntary manslaughter requires either gross negligence or an underlying unlawful act.

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## Inchoate Crimes

### Attempt (Substantial Step Test vs. Last-Proximate-Act)

Attempt requires two elements: (1) intent to commit the target crime, and (2) a substantial step toward commission. The MPC test focuses on substantial steps; common law sometimes required the "last proximate act."

**Kissinger v. Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc.**, 594 U.S. 682 (2021): While primarily about civil defamation, this case confirms that intent and foreseeability are key mental-state requirements in evaluating culpability. In attempt law, the defendant must act with purpose to commit the target crime.

### Conspiracy (Agreement + Overt Act; Pinkerton Liability)

Conspiracy requires: (1) agreement between two or more persons, (2) intent to agree, (3) intent to commit the target crime, and (4) an overt act by one conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy.

**Burrage v. United States**, 571 U.S. 204 (2014): While primarily about drug-induced death, Burrage confirms that for federal crimes with conspiracy elements, the defendant's conduct must be a but-for cause of the prohibited harm. In a conspiracy to distribute drugs, each conspirator is liable for the foreseeable consequences of the conspiracy.

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## Accomplice Liability

### Aiding and Abetting (Act + Mens Rea)

An accomplice (aider and abettor) is liable for the principal's crime if:
1. The accomplice acted with knowledge of the principal's unlawful purpose
2. The accomplice knowingly facilitated or encouraged the principal's conduct
3. The accomplice had the mental state required for the crime (at minimum, knowledge)

**Giles v. California**, 554 U.S. 353 (2008): In cases involving intimidation or coercion of witnesses, the defendant's conduct and mental state regarding the witness's unavailability are critical. An accomplice's liability depends on the accomplice's own mental state. **Rule:** Accomplice liability requires knowledge and intent to facilitate the crime; mere presence is insufficient.

### Mere Presence Doctrine

Presence at the scene of a crime, even with knowledge of the crime and with an intent that the crime be committed, is not enough for accomplice liability unless the accomplice also took some affirmative action to aid.

**Powell v. Texas**, 392 U.S. 514 (1968): While not directly on accomplice liability, Powell establishes that culpability requires more than status or mere presence; there must be conduct. **Rule:** Mere presence, even with knowledge and intent, does not establish accomplice liability without an affirmative act of aid or encouragement.

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## Defences

### Insanity (M'Naghten Rule; Irresistible Impulse)

The **M'Naghten rule** holds that a defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity if, at the time of the act, the defendant did not know the nature/quality of the act or did not know the act was wrong due to mental disease or defect.

**Robinson v. California**, 370 U.S. 660 (1962): While addressing status crimes, Robinson recognizes that criminal law must accommodate fundamental human conditions. The insanity defense similarly reflects the principle that not all persons who cause harm are criminally culpable.

The **irresistible impulse** test supplements M'Naghten: even if the defendant knew the act was wrong, the defendant is not guilty if a mental disease prevented the defendant from controlling conduct.

### Self-Defence (Imminence, Proportionality)

Self-defence permits the use of force reasonably necessary to defend against imminent harm.
- **Imminence**: The threat must be immediate, not remote or speculative
- **Proportionality**: Force used must be proportional to the threat

**Burrage v. United States**, 571 U.S. 204 (2014): Causation principles apply to self-defence claims as well. A defendant's response must be causally related to an actual threat. **Rule:** Self-defence requires an objectively imminent threat and proportional response.

### Duress

A defendant acting under duress (threats of immediate death or serious bodily harm) is not guilty of a crime if:
1. The threat was of immediate death or serious bodily harm
2. The defendant had a reasonable belief the threat would be carried out
3. The defendant had no reasonable opportunity to escape or seek help
4. The defendant did not place themselves in a situation where duress was foreseeable

**Powell v. Texas**, 392 U.S. 514 (1968): Although about intoxication, Powell acknowledges that certain involuntary conditions may limit culpability. Duress is a complete defence for all crimes except murder in most jurisdictions.

### Mistake of Fact (General vs. Specific Intent)

A mistake of fact is a defence if it negates the mental state required for the crime.
- **Specific intent crimes**: Mistake of fact is a defence even if unreasonable
- **General intent crimes**: Only a reasonable mistake of fact is a defence

**Morissette v. United States**, 342 U.S. 246 (1952): The defendant's mistake about whether the bomb casings belonged to the government must be considered. Mistake of fact is a defence to crimes requiring mens rea. **Rule:** A mistake negating the required mental state is a full defence.

### Intoxication (Voluntary vs. Involuntary)

**Voluntary intoxication** is a defence only to specific-intent crimes; it negates the specific intent required.

**Involuntary intoxication** (caused by deception or force) may be a defence to any crime, as it may negate any required mental state.

**Powell v. Texas**, 392 U.S. 514 (1968): A chronic alcoholic's condition does not eliminate liability for conduct (public intoxication), but involuntary intoxication might negate specific intent in a separate crime. **Rule:** Involuntary intoxication can be a full defence; voluntary intoxication is limited to specific-intent crimes.

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## Specific Crimes

### Theft Offences (Larceny, Embezzlement, False Pretences, Robbery)

**Larceny**: The unauthorized taking and carrying away of personal property of another with intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession.

**Embezzlement**: The fraudulent appropriation of property by a person in lawful possession of that property (e.g., an employee).

**False Pretences**: Obtaining property by misrepresentation with intent to defraud.

**Robbery**: Larceny from a person by force or threat of force.

**Morissette v. United States**, 342 U.S. 246 (1952): In a theft prosecution, the defendant's knowledge or intent regarding ownership is a material element. Absence of intent to permanently deprive is a defence. **Rule:** Theft crimes require a specific mental state; absence of that state is a defence.

### Burglary

Common-law burglary: the breaking and entering of a dwelling house of another at nighttime with intent to commit a felony inside.

Modern burglary: typically, entering (or remaining) in a building with intent to commit any felony or theft inside.

**Burrage v. United States**, 571 U.S. 204 (2014): In evaluating burglary as part of a larger felony (drug crime), courts focus on whether the underlying conduct was the but-for cause of the prohibited harm. **Rule:** The intent element must exist at the time of entry or at the time of remaining inside.

### Rape and Sexual Assault

Elements:
1. Sexual penetration or contact
2. Without consent
3. By force, threat, or incapacity

**Giles v. California**, 554 U.S. 353 (2008): In sexual assault cases, the victim's unavailability at trial triggers Sixth Amendment confrontation issues. The defendant's prior acts of abuse may be probative of intimidation but do not automatically constitute forfeiture. **Rule:** Consent is a key element; absence of consent must be established.

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## Model Penal Code Approach

The MPC provides a unified framework for liability based on mental states:
- **Purposely**: conscious object to engage in conduct or cause a result
- **Knowingly**: substantial certainty of result
- **Recklessly**: conscious disregard of substantial/unjustifiable risk
- **Negligently**: failure to perceive a substantial/unjustifiable risk

These mental states replace common-law terminology and apply across crimes.

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## Key Landmark Cases

1. **Robinson v. California**, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) — Status crimes unconstitutional; actus reus required
2. **Powell v. Texas**, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) — Conduct (not status) can be punished; involuntary intoxication may negate specific intent
3. **Morissette v. United States**, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) — Mens rea required for common-law crimes; mistake of fact is a defence
4. **Giles v. California**, 554 U.S. 353 (2008) — Forfeiture of confrontation rights requires defendant's causation of unavailability
5. **Burrage v. United States**, 571 U.S. 204 (2014) — But-for causation required for drug-induced death; conspiracy liability follows causation rules
6. **Hubbard v. State**, 159 Conn. 93 (1970) — Provocation reduces murder to manslaughter; cooling-off period defeats defence; proximate cause requires foreseeability
7. **Kissinger v. Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc.**, 594 U.S. 682 (2021) — Mental state must exist at time of conduct; knowledge is contemporaneous with act