Environmental Law (JD Elective)

# Environmental Law (JD Elective) — Study Notes


## I. Constitutional & Administrative Foundations

### Standing: Injury in Fact Requirement

**Rule**: Plaintiffs asserting environmental harm must demonstrate concrete injury in fact, causation, and likelihood of redressability. Procedural rights standing alone insufficient.

**Authority**: *Sierra Club v. Morton*, 401 U.S. 907 (1972). Court held Sierra Club lacked standing absent individualized member injury. Generalized aesthetic/environmental injury insufficient. Plaintiff must allege specific, particularized harm (e.g., member's use/enjoyment of specific locale).

**Application**: Environmental organizations must identify concrete affected members; cannot sue solely on behalf of abstract environmental interests.

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## II. National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)

### Threshold Applicability: Major Federal Action

**Rule**: NEPA applies when federal agency undertakes "major federal action significantly affecting the human environment." Includes direct agency action, licensing, permitting, and funding decisions with nexus to federal authority.

**Authority**: *Sierra Club et al. v. Morton, Secretary of the Interior, et al.*, 411 U.S. 920 (1973). Court recognized NEPA's broad scope requiring agencies to evaluate environmental consequences of discretionary federal decisions.

**Application**: Federal agencies must prepare Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for actions like dam construction, highway projects, or mineral extraction on federal lands; need not prepare for purely private conduct lacking federal nexus.

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## III. Clean Water Act (CWA)

### Point Source Discharge via Nonpoint Source (Groundwater)

**Rule**: "Addition" of pollutant from point source to navigable waters requires NPDES permit under 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a), even if conveyance travels through groundwater (nonpoint source pathway) before reaching navigable waters.

**Holding**: *County of Maui, Hawaii v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund*, 140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020). Supreme Court held permit required where: (1) point source discharges to ground; (2) pollutant eventually reaches navigable water; and (3) "functional equivalent of direct discharge" (proximate, rather than remote, pathway to navigable water).

**Test**: Court balanced statutory text (forbids "addition" by point source), statutory structure (nonpoint sources largely unregulated), and practical implementation concerns. Transit through groundwater does not automatically exempt point source from NPDES requirement if pathway is sufficiently direct.

**Rationale**: Literal reading of "addition...from a point source" supports permit requirement; otherwise, dischargers could evade Clean Water Act by routing discharge through groundwater. However, remote groundwater pathways (years, miles) fall outside functional equivalent test.

**Application**: County wastewater treatment plant discharging to injection wells; pollutants detected in coastal waters within months. NPDES permit required. By contrast, deep injection wells with minimal risk of reaching navigable waters within reasonable timeframe likely outside CWA scope.

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## IV. Endangered Species Act (ESA)

### Section 7 Consultation & NEPA Integration

**Rule**: Federal agencies must consult with Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS) before undertaking actions that may affect listed species or critical habitat (16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)). Consultation must precede final agency action. NEPA EIS and ESA § 7 consultation run parallel but distinct processes.

**Authority**: *Hiram G. Hill, Jr., et al. v. Tennessee Valley Authority*, 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977) (leading case integrating NEPA/ESA). TVA's Tellico Dam project enjoined for violation of § 7 prohibition against "jeopardy" to endangered species (snail darter), despite substantial federal investment and NEPA compliance.

**Key Principle**: ESA's "species-specific" mandate overrides cost-benefit analysis; even economically justified projects must cease if threatened/endangered species jeopardized.

**Application**: Federal highway expansion: agency must (1) identify listed species in project area, (2) request FWS biological opinion, (3) obtain incidental take permit if unavoidable harm exists, (4) comply with FWS conservation recommendations.

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## V. RCRA (Solid & Hazardous Waste)

### Definition of Hazardous Waste

**Rule**: Hazardous waste = solid waste exhibiting characteristic of hazardicity (toxicity, ignitability, corrosivity, reactivity per EPA test methods in 40 CFR Part 261) or listed by EPA as hazardous under 42 U.S.C. § 6921.

**Key Distinction**: Generator (initial creator), transporter, and treatment/storage/disposal (TSD) facility each bear responsibility under Subtitle C. Hazardous waste cradle-to-grave tracking via manifest system.

**Application**: Manufacturing plant generating spent solvent: if toxicity test (TCLP) shows lead exceeding 5 mg/L threshold, waste is hazardous. Generator must use EPA-permitted TSD; failure to manifest or use improper facility triggers civil/criminal liability.

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## VI. CERCLA / Superfund

### PRP Liability: Current Owner

**Rule**: Current owner of contaminated site liable for cleanup costs regardless of fault, even if owner created no pollution (strict liability). Applies to owner at time cleanup occurs or cost recovery initiated.

**Definition**: Potentially Responsible Party (PRP) = current owner, previous owner, arranger (entity arranging for disposal/treatment), or transporter. Joint-and-several liability standard: any PRP liable for full cleanup cost.

**Defenses (Narrow)**: Innocent landowner (purchased post-contamination, no actual/constructive knowledge, conducted Phase I environmental assessment); bona fide prospective purchaser (post-2002 amendment, all hazard-mitigation conditions met).

**Application**: Real estate investor purchases industrial property; Phase I reveals underground storage tanks with residual PCB contamination. Buyer liable for removal/remediation under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) despite no involvement in original disposal.

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## VII. National Environmental Policy Act — NEPA Amendments (2023–2024)

### EA vs. EIS Categorical Exclusion Framework

**Rule** (2024 CEQ Rules): EA (Environmental Assessment) determines whether action significantly affects environment; if "significant," agency prepares full EIS. Categorical exclusions (CEs) exempt classes of routine actions from NEPA review if no exceptional circumstances.

**Authority**: 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.; 40 CFR Part 1500–1508 (CEQ regulations). 2023 Fiscal Responsibility Act modified NEPA timelines and judicial review standards.

**Post-2024 CEQ Update**: Agencies must document extraordinary circumstances justifying CE override; judicial review standard narrowed for NEPA compliance challenges.

**Application**: Transportation project: highway repaving with minimal design changes → categorical exclusion appropriate. Highway realignment affecting wetlands → EA required; if significant impacts identified → full EIS mandatory before construction.

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## VIII. Clean Air Act (CAA) — Statutory Framework

### National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS)

**Rule**: EPA sets primary NAAQS for criteria pollutants (sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, ozone, particulate matter, lead, carbon monoxide) at level requisite to protect public health with margin of safety (42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1)).

**State Implementation Plans (SIPs)**: States must develop SIPs demonstrating attainment of NAAQS within specified timeframes; SIP approval/disapproval is federal responsibility (40 CFR Part 51).

**New Source Performance Standards (NSPS)**: Emission limitations for new/modified major stationary sources, technology-based (best system of emission reduction achieving standards).

**Application**: State air quality office designates region nonattainment for ozone. State submits SIP showing how industrial/mobile source reductions achieve NAAQS within 15 years. EPA reviews; if inadequate, EPA can impose Federal Implementation Plan (FIP).

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## IX. Clean Air Act — Massachusetts v. EPA & Greenhouse Gases

**Rule**: EPA regulates air pollutants under CAA § 202 that "cause or contribute to air pollution" endangering public health. Determination whether GHGs qualify as "air pollutants" is EPA's to make under Chevron deference (pre-2024).

**Authority**: *Massachusetts v. EPA*, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). Court held EPA must regulate CO2/GHGs if agency finds endangerment; cannot decline review based on policy preferences or cost-benefit analysis.

**Post-West Virginia v. EPA (2022)**: Major Questions Doctrine limits EPA's authority to regulate GHGs via broad "best system of emission reduction" standards without clear Congressional authorization for sector-wide transformation.

**Application**: EPA's 2023 greenhouse gas standards for new vehicles must rely on explicit statutory language rather than open-ended authority; Congressional authorization for carbon pricing/fuel-shifting rules more defensible than regulatory reinterpretation.

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## X. Clean Water Act — Waters of the US (WOTUS) Jurisdiction

**Rule**: Section 404 dredge-and-fill permitting applies to discharge of fill material into "waters of the United States." Definition includes navigable waters, interstate waters, tributaries, and wetlands with nexus to commerce.

**Recent Development**: *Sackett v. EPA*, 598 U.S. ___ (2023). Supreme Court tightened WOTUS definition, requiring nexus to traditional navigable waters or interstate waters; rejected categorical jurisdiction based on adjacency alone.

**Pre-2023 vs. Post-2023 Standard**: 
- **Scrivener-era rule**: Broad hydrologic connectivity = WOTUS jurisdiction
- **Sackett holding**: Significant nexus or clear statutory language required; regularity-of-flow and durations-of-service matter

**Application**: Seasonal wetland 100 feet from tributary: pre-Sackett jurisdiction presumed; post-Sackett, EPA must document hydrologic nexus and duration of water presence to assert jurisdiction.

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## XI. Administrative Law — Chevron Deference & Loper Lightly (2024)

### Statutory Interpretation in Environmental Regulation

**Rule** (2024 *Loper Lightly Assocs. v. Dept of Interior*): Courts no longer defer to agency interpretation of statute under Chevron framework. Instead, courts apply independent judgment; agency interpretation is persuasive only if reasoned and consistent with statute.

**Prior Regime**: Under Chevron (1984–2024), if statute ambiguous, court deferred to agency interpretation if reasonable (step two).

**Impact on Environmental Law**: EPA/NOAA/FWS interpretations of CAA, CWA, ESA scope now subject to stricter judicial scrutiny. Agency must articulate reasoned explanation tethered to statutory text; policy judgments less defensible if unsupported by statutory basis.

**Application**: EPA interprets "major source" under Clean Air Act § 302(j) broadly to regulate GHG producers below 100 tpy threshold → post-Loper, court scrutinizes whether statute's language supports EPA's interpretation, not whether interpretation is merely reasonable.

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## XII. RCRA — Imminent Hazard Provision (§ 7003)

**Rule**: EPA can seek injunctive relief if solid waste management practice presents imminent and substantial endangerment to health/environment (42 U.S.C. § 6973). Applies even absent hazardous waste designation.

**Standard**: "Imminent and substantial endangerment" = realistic threat of harm; EPA need not prove actual harm occurred.

**Application**: Abandoned hazardous waste site with leachate seeping toward groundwater drinking source; EPA issues imminent hazard order requiring responsible party to implement interim containment measures pending full remedial design.

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## XIII. CERCLA — Contribution & Cost Recovery

### Sections 107(a) & 113(f) Actions

**Rule**: 
- **§ 107(a) Cost Recovery**: Current/previous owners, arrangers, transporters may recover cleanup costs from other PRPs; applies retroactively to pre-CERCLA disposal.
- **§ 113(f) Contribution**: PRP may seek contribution from other PRPs during or after remedial action; limited to allocation among culpable parties.

**Difference**: § 107 action = recovery against another PRP for same site; § 113 = apportionment among multiple PRPs by court or settlement.

**Application**: Developer cleans up site under EPA order; discovers three prior industrial tenants caused contamination. Developer sues all three under § 107 for cost recovery; defendants counterclaim under § 113 seeking contribution. Court may allocate liability based on comparative fault/volume of waste.

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## XIV. Standing Doctrine in Environmental Cases — Procedural Rights

**Rule** (*Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555 (1992)): Even statutory procedural rights (e.g., ESA § 7 consultation requirement) require plaintiff to allege concrete injury. Procedural injury alone (agency failed to consult) insufficient absent underlying substantive harm.

**Three-Part Test**:
1. Injury in fact: concrete, particularized, actual/imminent
2. Causation: fairly traceable to defendant's conduct
3. Redressability: likelihood relief will redress injury

**Application**: Conservation group challenges federal agency failure to consult with FWS on dam project affecting endangered species. Group must identify member whose recreational use endangered by species jeopardy; procedural violation (no consultation) is insufficient without showing concrete individual harm.

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## XV. CERCLA — Defenses

### Innocent Landowner Exception (42 U.S.C. § 9601(35))

**Requirements**:
1. Purchaser with no actual knowledge of prior hazardous substance disposal
2. Conducted "appropriate inquiry" (Phase I ESA or equivalent)
3. Made all reasonable efforts to prevent migration/exacerbate conditions
4. Provided full cooperation to EPA

**Post-2002 Amendment**: Bona fide prospective purchaser (BFPP) defense available if purchaser acquired post-2002, made inquiry before closing, and complied with land-use restrictions.

**Application**: Homebuyer purchases residential lot in industrial area, conducts Phase I finding no evidence of prior disposal, and obtains title insurance for environmental hazards. Homebuyer qualifies as innocent landowner; not liable for prior tenants' contamination discovered post-purchase.

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## XVI. Clean Water Act — Technology-Based Effluent Standards

### BAT, BCT, BPT Spectrum

**Rule**: CWA § 301 mandates technology-based standards. EPA establishes:
- **BPT (Best Practicable Technology)**: minimum standard; cost-effective, proven technology
- **BAT (Best Available Technology)**: stricter; highest-performing, economically achievable
- **BCT (Best Conventional Technology)**: for conventional pollutants; balances cost/performance

**Application**: Pulp & paper mill discharging BOD, TSS, and dioxins. EPA sets BPT (secondary treatment), BAT (activated sludge + ECF bleaching), and BCT (activated sludge for TSS/BOD). Mill must comply with most stringent applicable standard (BAT for non-conventional, BCT for conventional).

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## XVII. Citizen Suit Provisions Across Statutes

**Rule**: CAA § 304, CWA § 505, ESA § 11, RCRA § 7002 all permit citizen suits against private parties or EPA for violation of statute/regulation. Plaintiff must provide 60-day notice; may recover costs, attorney fees if prevail or substantially prevail.

**Standing**: Plaintiff must allege injury in fact traceable to defendant's statutory violation; redressability via judicial relief.

**EPA Diversion**: Citizen suit barred if EPA diligently prosecutes action; EPA may intervene in pending suit.

**Application**: Citizens group observes untreated sewage discharge by municipality in violation of NPDES permit. Group sends 60-day notice to discharger and EPA; if EPA takes no action within notice period, group may sue directly seeking injunction and penalties.

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## XVIII. State-Federal Environmental Regulation Balance

**Rule**: CAA § 110 (SIP submission), CWA § 401 (state certification), ESA § 7 consultation all preserve state role. States may enact more stringent standards; federal floor is minimum.

**Anti-Commandeering (Tenth Amendment Limit)**: Federal government cannot compel state to regulate; states may abstain from implementation, triggering federal program.

**Application**: California adopts vehicle emission standards stricter than federal NAAQS, regulating GHGs. EPA cannot prohibit stricter state standards; other states may adopt California standards or federal baseline.

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## Key Definitions

| Term | Definition |
|------|-----------|
| **Navigable Waters** | Waters subject to federal jurisdiction; includes interstate waters, tributaries, wetlands with significant nexus |
| **Point Source** | Discrete conveyance (pipe, ditch, vessel) discharging pollutant; subject to permitting |
| **Nonpoint Source** | Diffuse pollution (runoff, atmospheric deposition); largely unregulated under CWA |
| **PRP** | Potentially Responsible Party; liable for CERCLA cleanup costs |
| **Listed Species** | Plant/animal designated endangered/threatened under ESA § 4; subject to federal protection |
| **Critical Habitat** | Geographic area essential for species survival/recovery; designated concurrently with listing |
| **Imminent Hazard** | Realistic threat of substantial harm to health/environment justifying RCRA § 7003 emergency relief |
| **SIP** | State Implementation Plan; state's roadmap to achieving NAAQS compliance |
| **NAAQS** | National Ambient Air Quality Standards; EPA-set primary/secondary thresholds for criteria pollutants |

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**Study Tips for Exam**:
1. Master statutory definitions (navigable waters, hazardous waste, point source)
2. Flow-chart NEPA threshold → EA vs. EIS analysis
3. CERCLA liability chain: identify PRPs, apply defense narrowly
4. Standing doctrine applies across all statutes; always check injury in fact
5. Post-2024 Loper standard: agency interpretation persuasive only if texturally grounded