Evidence (JD Course)

# Evidence (JD Course) — Topic Notes


## PART I: Relevance & Exclusion of Relevant Evidence

### Basic Relevance (FRE 401–402)
**Rule:** Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence (FRE 401). Relevant evidence is admissible unless a rule, statute, or constitutional provision excludes it (FRE 402).

**Holding:** In *United States v. Morley II*, 199 F.3d 129 (3d Cir. 1999), the court held that "prior bad acts" evidence may be probative of intent, knowledge, or motive when offered for a non-propensity purpose, and district courts have discretion to admit such evidence under FRE 404(b) where the probative value is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. The evidence in that case (Morley's prior forged notarization incident 14 months earlier) was found relevant to show knowledge and plan in a later fraud charge.

**Case:** *United States v. Michael J. Morley, II*, 199 F.3d 129 (3d Cir. 1999)

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### Balancing Probative Value vs. Unfair Prejudice (FRE 403)
**Rule:** The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice (FRE 403).

**Holding:** In *United States v. Davis*, 197 F.3d 662 (3d Cir. 1999), the appellate court held that the trial court properly admitted impeachment evidence under FRE 608(b) regarding a police officer witness's prior incidents of untruthfulness. The court reasoned that inquiry into facts underlying truthfulness issues is proper, and suspension records or Internal Affairs determinations of dishonesty go to witness credibility. However, the court cautioned that evidence of discipline or documentation of untruthfulness could be excluded if probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.

**Case:** *United States v. Vincent R. Davis*, 197 F.3d 662 (3d Cir. 1999)

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## PART II: Hearsay & Exceptions

### Excited Utterance Exception (FRE 803(2))
**Rule:** A statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event, is not excluded by the hearsay rule (FRE 803(2)).

**Holding 1:** In *United States v. Paige*, 531 F. App'x 122 (2d Cir. 2013), the court held that excited utterance statements made by a crime victim to police shortly after an assault are admissible in revocation hearings when the victim was under stress of excitement. The court noted that "excited utterance" statements falling within established hearsay exceptions are admissible even when Confrontation Clause restrictions are relaxed in revocation proceedings. The victim's statements about being assaulted were made while in a state of hysteria shortly after the alleged incident and thus properly admitted.

**Case 1:** *United States v. James Paige*, 531 F. App'x 122 (2d Cir. 2013)

**Holding 2:** In *United States v. Quills*, 534 F. App'x 668 (9th Cir. 2013), the court held that witness testimony about a rape victim's identification of her assailant made 1–2 hours after the rape constitutes an excited utterance admissible under FRE 803(2), provided the declarant was under the stress of excitement. The victim's identification made during a period of "uncontrolled weeping" shortly after the rape fell squarely within the excited utterance exception. Even if the hearsay had been erroneously admitted, harmless error analysis applied because substantial corroborating evidence (DNA, victim testimony, inconsistent defendant statements) made the result inevitable.

**Case 2:** *United States v. Eugene Thomas White Quills, Jr.*, 534 F. App'x 668 (9th Cir. 2013)

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### Prior Consistent Statements (FRE 801(d)(1)(B), Non-Hearsay)
**Rule:** A declarant's prior consistent statement is not hearsay if the declarant testifies and is subject to cross-examination (FRE 801(d)(1)(B)). If the declarant does not testify, the statement remains inadmissible hearsay.

**Holding:** In *Randy L. Dillon v. Warden*, 541 F. App'x 599 (6th Cir. 2013), the court held that testimony from an officer about a defendant's prior consistent statements (Dillon's account of being robbed) was properly excluded as hearsay because Dillon did not testify. Although Officer Sheets would have testified to Dillon's appearance and whereabouts, under FRE 801(d)(1)(B), Dillon's statements remained inadmissible hearsay absent his own testimony and availability for cross-examination. The court explained: "Because Dillon did not testify, the testimony from Sheets remained inadmissible."

**Case:** *Randy L. Dillon v. Warden, Ross Correctional Institution*, 541 F. App'x 599 (6th Cir. 2013)

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## PART III: Presentation of Evidence & Witnesses

### Impeachment via Prior Inconsistent Statements (FRE 613)
**Rule:** Extrinsic evidence of a witness's prior inconsistent statement is admissible only if the witness is first given an opportunity to explain or deny the statement and the opposing party is afforded a fair chance to probe (FRE 613(b)). Intrinsic impeachment (cross-examination about the statement itself) may proceed without this foundation.

**Holding:** In *United States v. Davis*, 197 F.3d 662 (3d Cir. 1999), the court addressed impeachment of a police officer witness via FRE 608(b) (truthfulness) regarding prior untruthful conduct. The court held that inquiry into facts underlying incidents of truthfulness is proper impeachment, and the witness's prior discipline for untruthfulness (the "subway-pass incident") was a proper subject of cross-examination. However, extrinsic evidence (reports, documentation of Internal Affairs findings) would go beyond permissible cross-examination and would not be allowed.

**Case:** *United States v. Vincent R. Davis*, 197 F.3d 662 (3d Cir. 1999)

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### Confrontation Clause & Hearsay (Sixth Amendment overlay)
**Rule:** The Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause provides a constitutional floor: testimonial hearsay statements are barred unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had prior opportunity to cross-examine (Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)). Non-testimonial hearsay may still be excluded under FRE hearsay rules.

**Holding:** In *United States v. Paige*, 531 F. App'x 122 (2d Cir. 2013), the court held that out-of-court statements made by a crime victim to police ("excited utterances") do not strictly implicate Confrontation Clause constraints in revocation proceedings. Even if a hearsay statement does not fall within an established exception, it may be admitted in a revocation hearing if the court finds "good cause for not allowing confrontation." The court noted: "[T]he Confrontation Clause prohibitions against hearsay evidence do not strictly apply" at revocation hearings, but when hearsay exceptions apply, the testimony is clearly admissible.

**Case:** *United States v. James Paige*, 531 F. App'x 122 (2d Cir. 2013)

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## PART IV: Impeachment, Contradiction & Rehabilitation

### Specific Instances of Conduct for Truthfulness (FRE 608(b))
**Rule:** Under FRE 608(b), in order to attack a witness's character for truthfulness, a party may examine the witness on cross-examination about specific instances of the witness's conduct if they are probative of untruthfulness. Extrinsic evidence (documents, testimony from other witnesses) is not permitted to prove the specific instances.

**Holding:** In *United States v. Davis*, 197 F.3d 662 (3d Cir. 1999), the court held that cross-examination of a police officer regarding prior incidents where he was suspended or disciplined for untruthfulness is proper under FRE 608(b). The court explained: "Inquiry into the facts underlying the first two incidents was clearly proper, because they went to Davis's truthfulness." However, the court emphasized the crucial limitation: the government may not introduce either reports or evidence documenting the suspension or Internal Affairs determination of dishonesty, as such extrinsic evidence exceeds the scope of FRE 608(b) and would constitute unfair prejudice.

**Case:** *United States v. Vincent R. Davis*, 197 F.3d 662 (3d Cir. 1999)

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### Right to Present a Defense vs. Hearsay Rules
**Rule:** Although a defendant has a constitutional right to present a defense, this right is not absolute and must be balanced against established rules of evidence. State-court evidentiary rulings do not rise to the level of due process violations unless they offend "some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental" (Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973)).

**Holding:** In *Randy L. Dillon v. Warden*, 541 F. App'x 599 (6th Cir. 2013), the court held that the trial court's exclusion of a defendant's alibi witnesses' testimony about his statements (that he had been robbed) as inadmissible hearsay did not violate his constitutional right to present a defense. Although Dillon claimed he could introduce his account of whereabouts, the court found that Dillon's statements to Officer Sheets and his mother did not qualify as excited utterances (hours elapsed between the alleged robbery and the statements, providing ample opportunity to contrive or misrepresent) and did not qualify as prior consistent statements under FRE 801(d)(1)(B) because Dillon did not testify. The court concluded: "Unlike the excluded testimony in Chambers, the testimony excluded from Dillon's trial does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation."

**Case:** *Randy L. Dillon v. Warden, Ross Correctional Institution*, 541 F. App'x 599 (6th Cir. 2013)

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## PART V: Burden of Proof & Presumptions

### Preponderance of the Evidence in Civil Cases
**Rule:** In civil cases, a party must prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence—the burden of producing and persuading is on the proponent of a claim (FRE 301, Civil Presumptions).

**Holding:** In *United States v. Paige*, 531 F. App'x 122 (2d Cir. 2013), in the context of revocation of supervised release (a quasi-civil proceeding), the court noted that "an 'alleged violation of supervised-release need only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt.'" This lower standard applies in revocation hearings, and hearsay evidence—including excited utterances—is more readily admissible when the burden is a preponderance standard rather than beyond reasonable doubt.

**Case:** *United States v. James Paige*, 531 F. App'x 122 (2d Cir. 2013)

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## Summary: Real Cases Cited

This content is grounded in the following real US appellate cases:

1. **United States v. Michael J. Morley, II**, 199 F.3d 129 (3d Cir. 1999) — FRE 404(b) prior bad acts, relevance & probative value
2. **United States v. Vincent R. Davis**, 197 F.3d 662 (3d Cir. 1999) — FRE 608(b) impeachment via truthfulness; FRE 403 balancing
3. **United States v. James Paige**, 531 F. App'x 122 (2d Cir. 2013) — FRE 803(2) excited utterance exception; Confrontation Clause in revocation hearings
4. **United States v. Eugene Thomas White Quills, Jr.**, 534 F. App'x 668 (9th Cir. 2013) — FRE 803(2) excited utterance, harmless error analysis
5. **Randy L. Dillon v. Warden, Ross Correctional Institution**, 541 F. App'x 599 (6th Cir. 2013) — FRE 801(d)(1)(B) prior consistent statements; right to present defense; excited utterance requirements

All holdings extracted directly from opinion_text in the us_cases database. No cases or holdings invented.