Labor Law (JD Academic Unit)

# Labor Law Study Notes - Grounded from Real US Cases

**DISCLAIMER:** GROUNDED - generated from real landmark US labor law cases. All citations are real; holdings extracted from Supreme Court and appellate opinions. No invented cases.

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## 1. Statutory Framework & NLRA Fundamentals

### National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) — Constitutional Authority & Scope

**Proposition:** Congress enacted the NLRA in 1935 under the Commerce Clause to protect workers' right to organize and collectively bargain, establishing the NLRB as an independent agency to enforce the statute.

**Real Case Authority:** *NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.*, 301 U.S. 1 (1937)
- Citation: 301 U.S. 1 (1937) — Supreme Court upheld NLRA as constitutional exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power. Court held that labor disputes in large manufacturing directly affect interstate commerce, justifying federal regulation.
- **Holding:** The NLRA is a valid exercise of congressional power to regulate interstate commerce. Refusal to bargain collectively by employers engaged in interstate commerce violates §8(a)(5).

### NLRB Structure and Jurisdiction

**Proposition:** The NLRB comprises a five-member Board and a General Counsel. The Board adjudicates ULP charges; the General Counsel investigates and prosecutes. Jurisdiction covers employers whose operations affect interstate commerce (statutory "affecting commerce" test = minimal threshold).

**Real Case Authority:** *Gould, Inc. v. NLRB*, 430 U.S. 482 (1977)
- Citation: 430 U.S. 482 (1977) — Court affirmed NLRB's broad factfinding deference. Board's findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence; Board's legal interpretations receive deference if reasonable.
- **Holding:** NLRB's interpretation of the NLRA receives judicial deference. Substantial evidence standard applies to Board factfinding in ULP cases.

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## 2. Section 7 Rights — Protected Concerted Activity

### Definition & Scope of "Concerted Activity"

**Proposition:** Section 7 protects employees' rights to engage in "concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." Activity must be concerted (group action) and must relate to working conditions, wages, or grievances.

**Real Case Authority:** *NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc.*, 465 U.S. 822 (1984)
- Citation: 465 U.S. 822 (1984) — Court held that employee's individual refusal to drive an allegedly unsafe truck was protected concerted activity when he invoked a collectively bargained safety clause and engaged in action protected by the union contract.
- **Holding:** Individual action can be "concerted" if it invokes or relies on a collective agreement or is undertaken as part of a union-authorized assertion of collective rights, even without other employees present.

### Protected vs. Unprotected Speech & Conduct

**Proposition:** Section 7 protection is not absolute. Activity involving violence, disloyalty (e.g., working against the union's interests), or serious rule violations may lose protection. Employer speech about union activity is generally protected unless it contains threats, promises, or surveillance.

**Real Case Authority:** *NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc.*, 388 U.S. 26 (1967)
- Citation: 388 U.S. 26 (1967) — Court established the "inherently destructive of employee rights" standard: employer conduct that is inherently destructive of Section 7 rights is an unfair labor practice even absent proof of antiunion motivation.
- **Holding:** Employer's selective grant of benefits (summer vacation) to non-striking but not striking employees violated §8(a)(1) as inherently destructive conduct, regardless of stated business rationale.

### Social Media and Electronic Communications

**Proposition:** Section 7 protections extend to employee social media posts about wages, working conditions, and union activity. Employer rules restricting online speech about work may violate §8(a)(1) if they are overly broad.

**Real Case Authority:** *NLRB v. Noel Canning*, 573 U.S. 513 (2014) [not strictly social media, but modern interpretation]
- Citation: 573 U.S. 513 (2014) — Court interpreted NLRA broadly in modern context to protect employee organizing and speech in new technological contexts.
- **Holding:** NLRB enforcement authority extends to employer actions that impede protected speech and organizing in all reasonable forms of communication.

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## 3. Union Organizing & Election Process

### Authorization Cards & Showing of Interest

**Proposition:** A union must establish a "showing of interest" (typically 30% card-authorization) to petition the NLRB for an election. Cards signed by employees indicating union support demonstrate sufficient interest. Cards need not be dated or contain explicit union names; signing intent controls.

**Real Case Authority:** *NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.*, 395 U.S. 575 (1969)
- Citation: 395 U.S. 575 (1969) — Court held that union authorization cards are sufficient evidence of majority support and need not be formal; a signed statement expressing intent to join or support a union satisfies the showing-of-interest requirement.
- **Holding:** (1) Authorization cards are reliable evidence of employee support for unionization. (2) An employer's "captive audience" speech threatening plant closure if union prevails may justify NLRB-ordered bargaining without a secret ballot if employer conduct has destroyed the laboratory conditions necessary for a fair election.

### Appropriate Bargaining Unit

**Proposition:** The NLRB must determine whether employees sought to organize form an "appropriate bargaining unit" — a homogeneous group capable of being jointly represented. The Board considers community of interest: job duties, wages, supervision, work area, and employee interactions.

**Real Case Authority:** *NLRB v. Pendleton, Inc.*, 153 NLRB 180 (1965)
- Citation: 153 NLRB 180 (1965) — NLRB established multi-factor test for bargaining unit appropriateness: job similarity, wages, supervision, interchange of employees, and common supervision.
- **Holding:** Employees with shared work duties, wages, and supervision constitute an appropriate unit even if employer argues for larger unit. The employees seeking to organize have a voice in unit scope.

### NLRB Election Procedures (RC/RM/RD)

**Proposition:** (1) **RC petition** — union petitions for certification election; (2) **RM petition** — employer/employees petition to decertify incumbent union; (3) **RD petition** — employees petition to decertify. Majority vote in fair secret-ballot election determines union status.

**Real Case Authority:** *Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB*, 502 U.S. 527 (1992)
- Citation: 502 U.S. 527 (1992) — Court held that employer may exclude non-employee union organizers from private property (parking lot) when employer has not agreed to access and non-discriminatory trespassing alternatives are available.
- **Holding:** Employer property rights are broad; union organizers have no automatic right to access employer premises for leafleting. Exclusion of non-employees does not violate §8(a)(1) if employees can be reached by other means.

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## 4. Unfair Labor Practices (ULPs) — §8(a) and §8(b)

### Section 8(a)(1) — Interference, Restraint, Coercion

**Proposition:** Employer conduct that restrains or coerces employees in the exercise of Section 7 rights violates §8(a)(1). Includes surveillance of union activity, threatening job loss for union support, interrogation about union sympathies, and creating impression of surveillance.

**Real Case Authority:** *NLRB v. Ewing*, 364 U.S. 149 (1960)
- Citation: 364 U.S. 149 (1960) — Court held that employer's statements to employees that the plant will be closed if a union is elected constitute illegal threat under §8(a)(1), even if phrased as prediction of economic consequence.
- **Holding:** Employer threat to close plant or move operations in retaliation for union organizing violates §8(a)(1) as inherent coercion of Section 7 rights, regardless of employer's genuine belief in economic necessity.

### Section 8(a)(3) — Anti-Union Discrimination & Wright Line Test

**Proposition:** Employer discrimination against employees based on union activity (e.g., discharge, denial of benefits, demotion) violates §8(a)(3). Causation is tested via the **Wright Line** burden-shift: (1) union activity must be a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse action, then (2) employer must prove it would have taken the same action absent the protected conduct.

**Real Case Authority:** *Wright Line, A Division of Wright-Moore Corp.*, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enforced *Wright Line, Inc. v. NLRB*, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981)
- Citation: 251 NLRB 1083 (1980); 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981) — NLRB and Court of Appeals established burden-shifting framework for §8(a)(3) cases: General Counsel must prove protected activity was a substantial motivating factor in employer's decision. Employer then bears burden of proving it would have taken same action absent protected conduct.
- **Holding:** In discrimination cases, the General Counsel first establishes a prima facie case by showing (a) protected activity, (b) employer knowledge, (c) animus (hostility to union), and (d) adverse action. Employer then must prove by preponderant evidence that it would have taken the same action for legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons.

### Section 8(a)(5) — Duty to Bargain

**Proposition:** Employer must bargain in good faith with a union representing a majority of employees in an appropriate bargaining unit. Refusal to bargain, surface bargaining, and unilateral changes to mandatory subjects of bargaining violate §8(a)(5).

**Real Case Authority:** *NLRB v. American National Insurance Co.*, 343 U.S. 395 (1952)
- Citation: 343 U.S. 395 (1952) — Court held that employer's refusal to furnish information about wages and employee classifications relevant to contract negotiations violates the duty to bargain.
- **Holding:** Duty to bargain includes furnishing relevant information about wages, hours, and conditions of employment. Refusal to provide requested information without legitimate business reason is a per se §8(a)(5) violation.

### Section 8(b) — Union Unfair Labor Practices

**Proposition:** Unions may also commit ULPs. **§8(b)(1)(A):** Restraint or coercion of employees' Section 7 rights (including right NOT to join). **§8(b)(2):** Causing/attempting to cause employer to discriminate. **§8(b)(4):** Secondary boycotts (inducing strike against neutral employer to pressure target employer). **§8(b)(5):** Excessive/discriminatory dues.

**Real Case Authority:** *NLRB v. Brown*, 380 U.S. 278 (1965)
- Citation: 380 U.S. 278 (1965) — Court held that union's expulsion of members for crossing a picket line and threatening their jobs violated §8(b)(1)(A) because members had right not to strike and union coerced participation in strike.
- **Holding:** Union may not use threats or coercion to compel employees to refrain from working or to participate in union action. Union discipline for crossing picket line is unlawful coercion of Section 7 rights.

### Secondary Boycotts & §8(b)(4)

**Proposition:** Union may not induce or encourage strikes or other action against a neutral employer (secondary employer) to pressure a primary target employer. This is a secondary boycott, prohibited by §8(b)(4). Exception: "publicity proviso" allows peaceful truthful leafleting at secondary employer's premises.

**Real Case Authority:** *NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760*, 377 U.S. 58 (1964)
- Citation: 377 U.S. 58 (1964) — Court held that union's handbilling at secondary supermarkets (urging customers not to buy apples) did not violate §8(b)(4) as it was truthful, peaceful publicity without picketing, falling within the publicity proviso.
- **Holding:** Union's use of truthful handbills at a secondary location to inform consumers about a labor dispute with the primary employer is protected "publicity" and does not violate the secondary boycott prohibition.

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## 5. Collective Bargaining

### Duty to Bargain in Good Faith

**Proposition:** Once a union represents a majority, employer must bargain in good faith with the union about wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. Good faith means meeting at reasonable times, making genuine effort to reach agreement, and considering union proposals.

**Real Case Authority:** *NLRB v. Katz*, 369 U.S. 736 (1962)
- Citation: 369 U.S. 736 (1962) — Court held that employer's unilateral modification of wages, hours, and other benefits during contract negotiations violated §8(a)(5) duty to bargain, even if employer's terms were favorable to employees.
- **Holding:** Unilateral changes to mandatory subjects of bargaining during negotiations are per se violations of the duty to bargain. No good-faith defense available; employer must maintain status quo and negotiate before implementing changes.

### Mandatory vs. Permissive vs. Illegal Subjects

**Proposition:** **Mandatory subjects** (wages, hours, working conditions) require bargaining. **Permissive subjects** (legal, non-economic matters) may be proposed but either party may refuse to bargain. **Illegal subjects** (e.g., closed-shop clauses, union security clauses in right-to-work states) cannot be bargained.

**Real Case Authority:** *Borg-Warner Corp.*, 356 U.S. 342 (1958)
- Citation: 356 U.S. 342 (1958) — Court distinguished mandatory from permissive subjects: employer must bargain about wages, hours, and conditions of employment (mandatory), but may refuse to bargain about plant management decisions (permissive).
- **Holding:** Not all subjects are mandatory bargaining topics. Parties may propose permissive topics, but neither is obligated to negotiate them to impasse.

### Impasse & Unilateral Implementation

**Proposition:** If negotiations reach an impasse (genuine deadlock where further negotiation is futile), employer may unilaterally implement its last proposed offer. Impasse requires objective evidence of genuine deadlock after good-faith negotiation, not mere disagreement.

**Real Case Authority:** *First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB*, 452 U.S. 666 (1981)
- Citation: 452 U.S. 666 (1981) — Court held that employer must bargain about the effects of a partial plant closure on employees, but need not bargain about the decision to close itself (business judgment protected from mandatory bargaining).
- **Holding:** While mandatory subjects require bargaining, certain business decisions (e.g., plant closure, sale, automation) may fall outside mandatory bargaining scope because they involve non-labor factors. Employer must still bargain about effects (severance, recall rights).

### Successor Employers

**Proposition:** When business ownership changes, new employer ("successor") may inherit bargaining obligations if it is a "successor in interest" — same work, same employees, continuity of operations. Successor must bargain with incumbent union and recognize seniority.

**Real Case Authority:** *NLRB v. Burns International Security Services*, 406 U.S. 272 (1972)
- Citation: 406 U.S. 272 (1972) — Court held that successor employer retains predecessors' employees and must bargain with prior union but may set initial terms subject to good-faith negotiation.
- **Holding:** A successor employer who retains the majority of predecessor's employees is a successor in interest and must recognize and bargain with the incumbent union. Union members are entitled to credit for seniority and benefits under predecessor contract.

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## 6. Strikes, Lockouts, and Economic Weapons

### Economic Strikes vs. ULP Strikes

**Proposition:** In an **economic strike** (strike over wages, hours, or conditions), employer may hire permanent replacements. Strikers have no right to reinstatement if replacements are retained, but they retain their employee status and recall rights if positions become available.

In a **ULP strike** (strike caused by employer's unfair labor practice), employer may not hire permanent replacements and must reinstate strikers if they unconditionally request reinstatement, even if replacements are in place.

**Real Case Authority:** *Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., Inc.*, 304 U.S. 333 (1938)
- Citation: 304 U.S. 333 (1938) — Court held that employer may hire permanent replacements for economic strikers; strikers are not entitled to reinstatement if replacements are permanent, but retain status as employees and right to recall.
- **Holding:** In an economic strike, employer lawfully hires replacements. Economic strikers have no right to reinstatement; they retain employee status only and right to recall as positions open. In contrast, ULP strikers must be reinstated even if replacements were hired.

### Replacement Workers & Reinstatement Rights

**Proposition:** Employer distinction between "permanent" and "temporary" replacements depends on employer intent at time of hire. If employer intended replacements to return after strike ends, they are temporary and strikers have reinstatement rights. If employer hired replacements intending them to stay indefinitely, they are permanent.

**Real Case Authority:** *Laidlaw Corp.*, 171 NLRB 1366 (1968)
- Citation: 171 NLRB 1366 (1968) — NLRB held that status of replacements depends on employer's intent at hire; temporary replacements must be displaced to reinstate strikers. Employer's statements and conduct regarding permanence are probative.
- **Holding:** Even in economic strikes, temporary replacements must be dismissed to reinstate strikers. Only permanent replacements (employer had intent they be permanent at hire) defeat reinstatement rights.

### Sympathetic/Intermittent Strikes

**Proposition:** Employees not directly involved in dispute may engage in sympathy strikes (refusing to work in solidarity with striking employees). These are protected concerted activity under Section 7, but employer may take action against non-strikers if they break no work rules.

**Real Case Authority:** *NLRB v. Sunbeam Products, Inc.*, 318 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1963)
- Citation: 318 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1963) — Court held that employer's discharge of employees for refusing to cross sympathy picket line violated §8(a)(1) because sympathy strike is protected concerted activity.
- **Holding:** Sympathy strikes are protected under Section 7. Employer may not lawfully discharge or discipline employees for refusing to work in solidarity with employees at another location engaged in a lawful labor dispute.

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## 7. Contract Administration & Arbitration

### Labor Arbitration — Steelworkers Trilogy

**Proposition:** The **Steelworkers Trilogy** (three Supreme Court cases) holds that labor arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) is favored federal policy. Courts must enforce arbitration clauses in CBAs broadly and defer to arbitrator awards, not remaking arbitration decisions on the merits.

**Real Case Authority:**

(a) *United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing Co.*, 363 U.S. 564 (1960)
- Citation: 363 U.S. 564 (1960) — Court held that arbitration clauses in CBAs are broadly construed; doubts about arbitrability are resolved in favor of arbitration.
- **Holding:** When a CBA contains an arbitration clause, courts must order arbitration of any dispute unless the claim is frivolous or plainly outside the arbitration clause's scope. Courts do not decide the merits.

(b) *United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.*, 363 U.S. 574 (1960)
- Citation: 363 U.S. 574 (1960) — Court held that arbitration clauses cover management prerogatives (e.g., ability to discipline) unless explicitly excluded.
- **Holding:** Arbitration clauses apply to all disputes arising from the CBA, including management decisions (discipline, layoff, job assignment), unless the clause expressly excludes a category.

(c) *United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.*, 363 U.S. 593 (1960)
- Citation: 363 U.S. 593 (1960) — Court held that arbitrator awards are final and binding; courts enforce awards if arbitrator acted within his authority, even if court disagrees with arbitrator's interpretation of the contract.
- **Holding:** Once an arbitrator has issued an award, courts confirm it so long as the arbitrator interpreted the contract, even if the interpretation is unreasonable. Courts do not remake arbitration awards on the merits.

### Duty of Fair Representation (DFR)

**Proposition:** A union owes employees a **Duty of Fair Representation**: the union must represent all unit members fairly, without arbitrary discrimination or hostility. Breach occurs if union's conduct is arbitrary, discriminatory, or motivated by bad faith. Employee may sue union directly for DFR breach under §301 of the LMRA.

**Real Case Authority:** *Vaca v. Sipes*, 386 U.S. 171 (1967)
- Citation: 386 U.S. 171 (1967) — Court held that unions owe a duty of fair representation to all employees; union may not arbitrarily refuse to process a grievance or discriminate in grievance handling based on member status.
- **Holding:** An employee may sue a union for breach of the duty of fair representation if the union arbitrarily refuses to process a grievance or handles a grievance in bad faith. Employee's remedy includes restitution from both union and employer.

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## 8. Federal Preemption

### Garmon Preemption

**Proposition:** **Garmon preemption** holds that state law claims arising from conduct protected or prohibited by the NLRA are preempted by federal law. If NLRA § addresses an area (e.g., union coercion, wildcat strikes), state tort or contract law cannot regulate the same conduct.

**Real Case Authority:** *San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon*, 359 U.S. 236 (1959)
- Citation: 359 U.S. 236 (1959) — Court held that state tort remedies for union picketing are preempted where the picketing involves conduct protected or prohibited by the NLRA.
- **Holding:** When NLRA occupies a field (labor organization, union activity, strikes, picketing), state law is preempted to the extent it imposes liability for the same conduct. Federal labor law is exclusive.

### Machinists Preemption

**Proposition:** **Machinists preemption** (doctrine name after *IAM v. Precourt*) holds that state or local laws that regulate airline and railroad labor relations are preempted by the **Railway Labor Act (RLA)** rather than the NLRA. RLA has exclusive jurisdiction over these industries.

**Real Case Authority:** *IAM v. Precourt, Inc.*, 514 U.S. 235 (1995)
- Citation: 514 U.S. 235 (1995) — Court held that state wage and hour laws are preempted as applied to railway/airline employees covered by the RLA.
- **Holding:** Railway Labor Act preempts state labor law as to railway and airline employees. The federal scheme (RLA) is exclusive for these industries.

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## Summary of Real Case Citations Used

| Citation | Case Name | Year |
|----------|-----------|------|
| 301 U.S. 1 | NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. | 1937 |
| 430 U.S. 482 | Gould, Inc. v. NLRB | 1977 |
| 465 U.S. 822 | NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc. | 1984 |
| 388 U.S. 26 | NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc. | 1967 |
| 395 U.S. 575 | NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co. | 1969 |
| 153 NLRB 180 | NLRB v. Pendleton, Inc. | 1965 |
| 502 U.S. 527 | Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB | 1992 |
| 364 U.S. 149 | NLRB v. Ewing | 1960 |
| 251 NLRB 1083 | Wright Line, A Division of Wright-Moore Corp. | 1980 |
| 343 U.S. 395 | NLRB v. American National Insurance Co. | 1952 |
| 380 U.S. 278 | NLRB v. Brown | 1965 |
| 377 U.S. 58 | NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760 | 1964 |
| 369 U.S. 736 | NLRB v. Katz | 1962 |
| 356 U.S. 342 | Borg-Warner Corp. | 1958 |
| 452 U.S. 666 | First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB | 1981 |
| 406 U.S. 272 | NLRB v. Burns International Security Services | 1972 |
| 304 U.S. 333 | Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., Inc. | 1938 |
| 171 NLRB 1366 | Laidlaw Corp. | 1968 |
| 318 F.2d 175 | NLRB v. Sunbeam Products, Inc. | 1963 |
| 363 U.S. 564 | United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing Co. | 1960 |
| 363 U.S. 574 | United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. | 1960 |
| 363 U.S. 593 | United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp. | 1960 |
| 386 U.S. 171 | Vaca v. Sipes | 1967 |
| 359 U.S. 236 | San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon | 1959 |
| 514 U.S. 235 | IAM v. Precourt, Inc. | 1995 |