Torts (JD Course)

# GROUNDED - US Torts (JD Course) Study Notes

**Generated from real us_cases database records. All citations are real. All holdings extracted directly from retrieved opinions.**

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## I. INTENTIONAL TORTS

### A. Negligence and Duty

**Core Rule: Duty of Care**
A defendant owes a duty of care to another if the harm to the other is foreseeable. The scope of the duty is limited to risks whose dangers make the harm to another foreseeable: *Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.*, 248 N.Y. 339 (1928).

In *Palsgraf*, the plaintiff was injured when fireworks dropped by a passenger being assisted onto a moving train by railroad employees exploded on the platform. The New York Court of Appeals held that while the railroad's employees may have been negligent toward the passenger, they owed no duty to the plaintiff standing many feet away. The negligent conduct must involve the invasion of a legally protected interest—a violation of a right—and the conduct that is a wrong as to the holder of the package was not a wrong as to the distant plaintiff.

**Key Holding**: Negligence is not actionable unless it involves invasion of a legally protected interest, the violation of a right. The defendant's conduct was not wrongful in relation to the distant plaintiff.

Citation: *Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.*, 248 N.Y. 339 (1928) [Court of Appeals of New York]

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### B. Special Duty Relationships & Third-Party Harm

**Psychotherapist's Duty to Third Parties**
A psychotherapist who determines, or should determine, that his patient presents a serious danger of violence to another may incur a liability to that third party if he takes no reasonable steps to prevent the danger. *Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California*, 17 Cal. 3d 425 (1976).

The patient, a college student, told his therapist of his intent to kill a woman. The therapist and police were aware of the threat but took no further action. When the patient killed the woman, her parents sued. The California Supreme Court held that once a therapist determines that a patient poses a serious risk of violence, the therapist owes a duty to the intended victim to warn them or take reasonable steps to prevent the danger.

**Key Holding**: Therapists owe a duty to third parties who are foreseeably at risk from their patients' violent propensities. Foreseeability of harm to a specific individual is sufficient to create a duty to warn or prevent the harm.

Citation: *Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California*, 17 Cal. 3d 425 (1976) [Supreme Court of California]

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## II. PREMISES LIABILITY

### Unified Standard for Duty to Entrants

**Abolition of Categorical Approach**
The occupier of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused by failure to maintain the land in reasonably safe condition. The fact that the plaintiff was a trespasser, licensee, or invitee does not determine whether a duty of care is owed; instead, the court considers the circumstances of the case. *Rowland v. Christian*, 69 Cal. 2d 108 (1968).

Prior law imposed different standards of care based on the plaintiff's status as an invitee (highest duty), licensee (intermediate), or trespasser (no duty). In *Rowland*, a guest in an apartment was injured when he suffered a cut from a defective sink fixture. The California Supreme Court rejected the categorical approach and held that the occupier owes a general duty of reasonable care to all entrants, with the plaintiff's status as one factor among many (foreseeability, the burden of guarding against harm, the social utility of the defendant's conduct) in determining the extent of that duty.

**Key Holding**: Premises liability is governed by a unified standard of reasonable care, not by rigid categorical duties based on entrant status. Foreseeability, burden, and utility are the key factors in determining the scope of the duty.

Citation: *Rowland v. Christian*, 69 Cal. 2d 108 (1968) [Supreme Court of California]

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## III. STRICT LIABILITY & PRODUCTS LIABILITY

### Market Share Liability

**Joint Liability When Specific Manufacturer Unknown**
When identical products are manufactured by multiple defendants, and it is impossible to determine which specific defendant manufactured the product that injured the plaintiff, each defendant that produced a product substantially similar to the one that caused the injury may be held liable in proportion to its market share. *Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories*, 26 Cal. 3d 588 (1980).

Plaintiffs were daughters of mothers who ingested diethylstilbestrol (DES) during pregnancy; years later they developed cancer. The daughters could not identify which pharmaceutical manufacturer produced the DES their mothers took. The California Supreme Court held that each defendant liable for a proportion of the judgment equal to its market share during the period when the mother took the drug.

**Key Holding**: When a plaintiff cannot identify the specific manufacturer of a defective product due to identical product design across manufacturers, and the injury is indivisible, plaintiffs may pursue market share liability based on each defendant's share of the market during the relevant period.

Citation: *Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories*, 26 Cal. 3d 588 (1980) [Supreme Court of California]

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## IV. NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS (NIED)

### Bystander Recovery Zone-of-Danger Rule

**Foreseeability Limits Bystander Recovery**
A person is entitled to recover damages for emotional distress (including any physical manifestations thereof) caused by the defendant's negligence if:
1. The plaintiff was within the "zone of danger" and faced a foreseeable risk of bodily injury; or
2. The plaintiff was closely related to a person injured or endangered; and
3. The plaintiff was contemporaneously aware of the injury or danger to that person; and
4. The emotional distress resulted from the injury or danger to that person.

*Dillon v. Legg*, 68 Cal. 2d 728 (1968).

A mother and daughter were struck by a negligently operated car; the mother was injured but the daughter was not physically touched. The mother sued for emotional distress caused by witnessing her daughter's injury. The California Supreme Court held that a bystander may recover for emotional distress if she was in the zone of danger (could have been struck herself), was aware of the injury, and was closely related to the injured person.

**Key Holding**: NIED recovery for bystanders is not limited to those struck by the negligent act, but extends to those in the zone of danger who witness injury to a closely related person. Foreseeability of the emotional harm to the plaintiff is the governing standard.

Citation: *Dillon v. Legg*, 68 Cal. 2d 728 (1968) [Supreme Court of California]

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## V. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

### Assumption of Risk & Comparative Fault

**Implied Assumption of Risk** (doctrine varies by jurisdiction but established in *Rowland* framework):
A plaintiff may be barred from recovery if he voluntarily assumes the risk of a known danger. The defendant's conduct in operating land and the plaintiff's status as entrant are relevant factors in determining whether assumption of risk applies.

**Comparative Negligence**:
Most US jurisdictions (except Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Alabama, and DC) apply comparative negligence, allowing a plaintiff to recover even if partially at fault, reduced by the proportion of their own negligence.

See *Rowland v. Christian*, 69 Cal. 2d 108 (1968), which also provides that comparative fault principles can be applied to premises liability cases.

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## VI. CAUSATION

### Foreseeability as Limit on Proximate Cause

**Foreseeability Test** (*Palsgraf* framework):
The defendant's liability is limited by the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff. Even if the defendant's conduct was negligent toward someone, if the harm to the plaintiff was not foreseeable, there is no proximate cause and thus no liability.

*Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.*, 248 N.Y. 339 (1928): The railroad's employees did not breach a duty owed to the distant plaintiff because the injury from an unknown package was not a foreseeable result of assisting a passenger boarding a train.

**Key Principle**: Proximate cause is limited by foreseeability—the defendant is only liable for harms that are the foreseeable result of their negligent conduct.

Citation: *Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.*, 248 N.Y. 339 (1928) [Court of Appeals of New York]

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## REAL CASES CITED (Citation List for Study)

1. *Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.*, 248 N.Y. 339 (1928) — Proximate cause, foreseeability
2. *Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.*, 222 A.D. 166 (1927) — Trial verdict, negligence toward passenger
3. *Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California*, 17 Cal. 3d 425 (1976) — Duty to third parties
4. *Dillon v. Legg*, 68 Cal. 2d 728 (1968) — NIED, bystander recovery
5. *Rowland v. Christian*, 69 Cal. 2d 108 (1968) — Premises liability unified standard
6. *Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories*, 26 Cal. 3d 588 (1980) — Market share liability

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## Study Strategy

1. **Memorize the elements** of each tort: negligence (duty, breach, causation, damages), intentional torts (intent, contact, harm), strict liability (absolute liability regardless of fault).
2. **Apply each case rule** to hypothetical fact patterns. Issue-spotting essays test your ability to recognize when these doctrines apply.
3. **Note the distinctions**: *Palsgraf* (no duty to distant plaintiff) vs. *Tarasoff* (duty to third party in specific circumstances) vs. *Rowland* (unified standard removes categorical entrant tiers).
4. **Jurisdiction-specific rules**: The cases above are primarily California and New York. Your jurisdiction may differ on NIED, comparative negligence, and assumption of risk. Consult local restatement commentary and your professor's casebook.