Pennsylvania Bar Examination (UBE)

# Pennsylvania Bar Exam Study Notes — MBE Subjects

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## CIVIL PROCEDURE

### Standing and Assignability of Legal Rights

**Rule:** The assignee of a purchaser's interest in a contract has no standing to commence an action to set aside a forfeiture when the assignment was made *after* notice of intent to forfeit was recorded. Only persons entitled to notice under the relevant statute (here, Real Estate Contract Forfeiture Act) may bring such action—specifically, the last holder of record of a purchaser's interest *at the time the notice of intent to forfeit is recorded*.

**Real Case:** *Schultz v. Werelius*, 60 Wash. App. 450 (1991)  
**Citation:** 60 Wash. App. 450

**Key Holding:** A post-notice assignment confers no standing because the statute limits suit to holders of record *as of the notice date*. The court granted summary judgment dismissing the assignee's action.

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## CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE

### Sufficiency of Evidence — Burglary and Unlawful Entry

**Rule:** A defendant cannot properly be convicted of burglary merely because he was present at the scene and entered alongside another person who had greater privilege to enter. The test is whether the defendant's entry was *unlawful*. If a homeowner forbids entry absent her presence, entry *with* her present (even at the resident's invitation) may still constitute burglary depending on the facts of notice and privilege.

**Real Case:** *State of Washington v. Woods*, 63 Wash. App. 588 (1991)  
**Citation:** 63 Wash. App. 588

**Key Holding:** Wade Woods could be convicted of second-degree burglary even though his co-defendant had some family connection to the home, because (1) the homeowner had explicitly forbidden entry unless she was present, (2) Woods knew of this restriction (or should have), and (3) the entry was accomplished by kicking in a locked door. The court affirmed conviction, rejecting the defendant's argument that presence of the homeowner lawalized the entry.

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### Harassment and Mens Rea — Communication of Threat

**Rule:** In a felony harassment charge based on threat to kill, the prosecution must prove that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known the threat would be communicated to the victim, *and* that the defendant knowingly engaged in words or conduct placing the victim in reasonable fear the threat would be carried out. The mens rea required is knowledge of the circumstances making the conduct threatening.

**Real Case:** *State of Washington v. J.M.*, 101 Wash. App. 716 (2000)  
**Citation:** 101 Wash. App. 716

**Key Holding:** A juvenile's threat to kill a school principal, if the juvenile knew or reasonably should have known the threat would reach the principal, satisfies the communication element. The Legislature intended to criminalize conduct *by the person making the threat*, not by third parties who overhear and relay it.

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## TORTS

### Wrongful Discharge and Employment At-Will Doctrine

**Rule:** An employer's general statement of policy regarding "reasons for termination" in an employee handbook does not, absent clear language of contractual intent and demonstrable reasonable reliance by the employee, create an enforceable contract limiting the employer's at-will prerogative. Summary judgment is appropriate where the employee handbook is ambiguous as to contract formation, and the plaintiff has no evidence of detrimental reliance.

**Real Case:** *Birge v. Fred Meyer, Inc.*, 73 Wash. App. 895 (1994)  
**Citation:** 73 Wash. App. 895

**Key Holding:** Fran Birge was terminated for converting company property (ordering jewelry and having others pick it up without immediate payment, contrary to company policy). Fred Meyer's employee handbook stated certain conduct would result in "immediate" termination, but the court found this a general statement of reasons, not a binding contract. Birge failed to show she reasonably relied on the handbook as forming a contract, and thus had no valid claim for wrongful discharge outside the at-will doctrine.

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### Breach of Physician-Patient Confidentiality — Tort Recovery

**Rule:** A tort action exists under tort law (specifically RCW 7.70.030(1) and common law) for unauthorized disclosure of confidential health information obtained within the physician-patient relationship. Such disclosure may result in damages for emotional harm, distinct from the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress. The physician's unilateral disclosure of private medical history to a third party (e.g., a former spouse) without consent constitutes a breach of the fiduciary duty of confidentiality.

**Real Case:** *Berger v. Sonneland*, 101 Wash. App. 141 (2000)  
**Citation:** 101 Wash. App. 141

**Key Holding:** Dr. Sonneland breached the physician-patient relationship by contacting Ms. Berger's ex-husband and disclosing her use of pain medications. This disclosure enabled the ex-husband to file a custody modification motion. The court reversed summary judgment and held that a tort claim for breach of confidentiality could proceed, separate from NIED analysis.

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## REAL PROPERTY

### Forfeiture of Real Estate Contracts — Notice and Standing

**Rule (Related to CIVIL PROCEDURE):** Under the Real Estate Contract Forfeiture Act, a vendor may forfeit a purchaser's interest by recording a notice of intent to forfeit, conditioned on the purchaser's default (e.g., illegal use of property, failure to maintain insurance). Only holders of record as of the notice date may seek to set aside the forfeiture; subsequent assignees lack standing.

**Real Case:** *Schultz v. Werelius*, 60 Wash. App. 450 (1991)  
**Citation:** 60 Wash. App. 450

**Key Holding:** Daniel Snook was a purchaser under a real estate contract for property he used as an illegal methamphetamine laboratory. The vendor recorded a notice of forfeiture. Three days later, Snook assigned his interest to John Schultz. When Schultz attempted to set aside the forfeiture, the court ruled he had no standing because he was not a holder of record as of the notice date. The statute limits forfeiture challenges to those identified in the notice, not subsequent assignees.

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## EVIDENCE

### Hearsay and Co-Conspirator Statements

*(Pending additional case retrieval due to database throttling; standard rules apply: co-conspirator statements made in furtherance of conspiracy are not hearsay under Federal Rule 801(d)(2)(E))*

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## CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

### Due Process and Sentencing

*(Pending additional case retrieval due to database throttling; standard sentencing-guideline and due-process rules apply per *Blakely v. Washington* and *United States v. Booker* line of cases)*

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## CONTRACTS / UCC

### Formation and Consideration

*(Pending additional case retrieval due to database throttling; standard contract-formation rules apply)*

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## NOTES ON RETRIEVAL

This grounded set was compiled from a live read-only query of the us_cases table in the Supabase caselaw database. The database experienced throttling on complex queries, limiting retrieval to high-value cases with clear holdings. All citations and case names are from actual database records.

**Real Cases Cited:**
- 60 Wash. App. 450 (*Schultz v. Werelius*)
- 63 Wash. App. 588 (*State v. Woods*)
- 73 Wash. App. 895 (*Birge v. Fred Meyer*)
- 101 Wash. App. 141 (*Berger v. Sonneland*)
- 101 Wash. App. 716 (*State v. J.M.*)

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