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SQE1 · FLK1 · Free samples

Constitutional and Administrative Law — free SQE1 sample questions

90 free, worked single-best-answer questions for Constitutional and Administrative Law, shown in the official SRA SBAQ format with the correct answer and a cited rationale. Drill the full bank in timed practice once you’ve worked through these.

  1. Question 1

    A solicitor advises a client who owns a commercial property that was compulsorily purchased by a local authority in 2019. The local authority followed all procedural requirements under the relevant statute. The client believes the compensation awarded was inadequate and that the compulsory purchase order itself was unnecessary. In 2023, Parliament passes an Act stating that all compulsory purchase orders made between 2015 and 2020 are 'validated and confirmed as lawful, and no court may question their validity or award additional compensation.' The client wants to challenge the 2023 Act. What is the likely outcome of a challenge to the validity of the 2023 Act?

    • A.The challenge will fail because Parliament has unlimited legislative power and may enact retrospective legislation.✓ correct
    • B.The challenge will succeed because the Act violates the rule of law by removing judicial review.
    • C.The challenge will succeed because the Act breaches the client's property rights under the European Convention on Human Rights.
    • D.The challenge will fail unless the client can prove the Act is incompatible with retained EU law.
    • E.The challenge will succeed because courts may strike down Acts that violate fundamental common law rights.

    Why A is correct

    Parliamentary sovereignty permits Parliament to enact any law, including retrospective legislation that removes remedies or limits judicial review (*Burmah Oil Co (Burma Trading) Ltd v Lord Advocate* [1965] AC 75). The doctrine means courts cannot invalidate primary legislation. Option B is the strongest distractor but fails because the rule of law does not override parliamentary sovereignty. While the Act may engage ECHR rights (option C), courts can only issue a declaration of incompatibility under s.4 HRA 1998, not invalidate the Act (*R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice* [2014] UKSC 38).

  2. Question 2

    A woman applies for judicial review of a decision by the Home Secretary to refuse her asylum claim. The Home Secretary's decision letter states that the application was refused because the woman 'failed to provide credible evidence of persecution.' The woman has a sworn statement from a human rights organisation and medical evidence of torture. The Home Secretary's internal file reveals that the deciding officer never read these documents and instead relied solely on a country guidance report that did not address her specific claim. On what ground is the woman most likely to succeed in her judicial review claim?

    • A.Illegality, because the deciding officer failed to take into account a relevant consideration by ignoring the sworn statement and medical evidence.✓ correct
    • B.Irrationality, because no reasonable decision-maker could have concluded that the woman provided no credible evidence when faced with medical evidence of torture.
    • C.Procedural impropriety, because the woman was not given a fair opportunity to have her evidence considered before the decision was made.
    • D.Proportionality, because the refusal to grant asylum was disproportionate to any legitimate aim pursued by the Home Secretary.
    • E.Legitimate expectation, because the woman had a substantive legitimate expectation that all evidence she submitted would be read and assessed.

    Why A is correct

    ## Correct Answer: A — Illegality (failure to consider relevant considerations) ### Legal Framework The three classic grounds of judicial review were set out by Lord Diplock in **Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 (GCHQ)**: illegality, irrationality, and procedural impropriety. **Illegality** encompasses the rule that a decision-maker must not fail to take into account considerations that are legally required to be considered. This principle is well-established in **R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Venables [1998] AC 407** (Lord Browne-Wilkinson), where the House of Lords confirmed that ignoring relevant material renders a decision unlawful for illegality. It is also affirmed in **R (Corner House Research) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office [2008] UKHL 60** and the foundational analysis in **Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] AC 997**. Here, the deciding officer never read the sworn statement from the human rights organisation or the medical evidence of torture — both plainly material to an asylum credibility assessment. The failure to read and engage with directly relevant evidence submitted by the applicant is a paradigm example of **failure to consider a relevant consideration**, which is a species of **illegality**. ### Why the other options are weaker - **Option B (Irrationality):** The *Wednesbury* unreasonableness test (**Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223**) requires a decision so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could have reached it. While the outcome may also be irrational, the *primary* and more precise defect on these facts is the failure to read the evidence at all — that is illegality, not irrationality. The SQE expects candidates to identify the most precise ground. - **Option C (Procedural impropriety):** Procedural impropriety covers failures of natural justice (bias, right to a fair hearing) and breach of statutory procedural requirements. The woman was able to submit her evidence; the defect is that it was ignored rather than that she was denied an opportunity to present it. That is an illegality, not a procedural failing. - **Option D (Proportionality):** Proportionality as a freestanding domestic public law ground is not yet fully established in English law for non-EU/ECHR contexts following **R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 26**. Even where applicable, it is not the best-fitting ground on these facts. - **Option E (Legitimate expectation):** Legitimate expectation (procedural or substantive) requires a clear and unambiguous representation or established practice: **R v North and East Devon Health Authority, ex parte Coughlan [2001] QB 213**. A general expectation that submitted documents will be read does not constitute the kind of specific representation required to found a legitimate expectation claim. ### Conclusion The most precise and legally accurate ground is **illegality**: the deciding officer was obliged to consider the relevant evidence submitted and failed entirely to do so, rendering the decision unlawful.

  3. Question 3

    Parliament enacts the Dangerous Dogs (Control) Act 2024, which makes it a criminal offence to own certain breeds of dog without a licence. Section 12 of the Act states: 'A court may not grant any remedy or relief in respect of anything done under the authority of this Act, and no proceedings may be brought questioning the validity of any provision of this Act.' A dog owner whose pet was seized under the Act wishes to argue that the seizure violated his rights under Article 8 ECHR (right to private and family life). What is the most accurate statement about the remedy available to the dog owner?

    • A.The court may strike down section 12 because it purports to oust judicial review entirely, following R (Privacy International) v Investigatory Powers Tribunal [2019] UKSC 22.
    • B.The court may issue a declaration of incompatibility under section 4 Human Rights Act 1998 if section 12, and the Act more broadly, cannot be read compatibly with Article 8 ECHR, even though such a declaration does not affect the legal validity or continuing operation of section 12.✓ correct
    • C.The court must use its power under section 3 Human Rights Act 1998 to read section 12 as not applying to proceedings raising Convention rights, and may then grant any appropriate remedy including quashing the seizure.
    • D.No remedy is available because section 12 is a valid ouster clause enacted by a sovereign Parliament and is therefore conclusive and binding on the courts.
    • E.The court may award damages under section 8 Human Rights Act 1998 only, because section 12 validly removes all other remedies including judicial review.

    Why B is correct

    **Option B is correct.** Under **section 4 Human Rights Act 1998**, a higher court (High Court or above) may issue a declaration of incompatibility where primary legislation cannot be read compatibly with a Convention right and where the court is satisfied that the provision is incompatible. Crucially, such a declaration does **not** affect the validity, continuing operation, or enforcement of the provision in question (s.4(6) HRA 1998). Parliament remains sovereign and the legislation stands unless and until Parliament amends it (cf. *R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice* [2014] UKSC 38; *Bellinger v Bellinger* [2003] UKHL 21). The dog owner may therefore argue that section 12 (and the underlying seizure power) is incompatible with Article 8 ECHR and seek a declaration to that effect. **Option A is wrong.** Parliamentary sovereignty means that courts cannot strike down Acts of Parliament. *R (Privacy International) v Investigatory Powers Tribunal* [2019] UKSC 22 concerned an ouster clause in relation to a tribunal's jurisdiction and suggested that a clause purporting to remove all supervisory jurisdiction might not be effective in relation to inferior tribunals—but the Supreme Court did not strike down primary legislation and that power does not exist in English constitutional law. **Option C is wrong.** Section 3 HRA 1998 imposes a duty to read and give effect to legislation compatibly with Convention rights 'so far as it is possible to do so.' However, it does not permit courts to *disapply* primary legislation, and where a compatible reading is not possible, the court's remedy is a declaration of incompatibility under section 4, not disapplication (*Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza* [2004] UKHL 30). Section 3 is an interpretive tool, not a power to override clear statutory text. **Option D is wrong.** An ouster clause in primary legislation cannot wholly remove the court's ability to consider Convention compatibility and issue a declaration of incompatibility under the HRA 1998. While courts respect Parliament's intention expressed in clear statutory language, the HRA 1998 itself is a statute of Parliament and the section 4 power exists alongside any ouster clause. **Option E is wrong.** Section 8 HRA 1998 allows courts to award damages where that is necessary to afford 'just satisfaction,' but only *in addition to* other remedies, not as an exclusive remedy. Furthermore, whether any remedy—including damages—is available turns on whether the court has jurisdiction to hear the claim at all, which the ouster clause purports to restrict. The correct analysis is that a declaration of incompatibility under section 4 remains available and is the best answer.

  4. Question 4

    A tribunal established by statute to hear employment disputes includes a clause in the enabling Act stating 'decisions of the tribunal shall be final and shall not be questioned in any court of law.' An employee receives an adverse decision from the tribunal. The employee's solicitor discovers that the tribunal chair is a non-executive director of the employer company, a fact not disclosed during the hearing. The employee was unaware of this connection when the hearing took place. Can the employee successfully apply for judicial review of the tribunal's decision?

    • A.No, because the ouster clause prevents any court from reviewing the tribunal's decision.
    • B.Yes, because the ouster clause does not protect decisions made in breach of natural justice.✓ correct
    • C.No, because employment disputes are outside the scope of judicial review.
    • D.Yes, because all ouster clauses are void as contrary to the rule of law.
    • E.No, unless the employee can prove the bias actually affected the decision's outcome.

    Why B is correct

    Ouster clauses do not protect decisions made in excess of jurisdiction or in breach of fundamental procedural requirements such as natural justice (*Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission* [1969] 2 AC 147). Apparent bias arising from the undisclosed connection violates the rule against bias (*Porter v Magill* [2001] UKHL 67: whether a fair-minded observer would conclude there was a real possibility of bias). Option A fails because *Anisminic* establishes that such clauses are construed narrowly. Option E is wrong: apparent bias vitiates the decision regardless of actual effect (*R v Gough* [1993] AC 646, refined in *Porter*).

  5. Question 5

    The Secretary of State for Education issues guidance to all state schools stating that 'schools must not teach any materials that present political issues in a partisan manner.' A teacher at a state secondary school is dismissed for showing students a documentary about climate change that the headteacher deemed 'partisan.' The teacher followed the national curriculum and the documentary included multiple viewpoints. The school's governors upheld the dismissal on the basis that the Secretary of State's guidance required it. What is the legal status of the Secretary of State's guidance?

    • A.It is binding on schools because it was issued by a Minister of the Crown.
    • B.It is not legally binding but schools must have regard to it when making decisions.✓ correct
    • C.It is binding only if incorporated into the school's employment contract with the teacher.
    • D.It has no legal effect unless Parliament has enacted it as subordinate legislation.
    • E.It creates a legitimate expectation that schools will follow it in all cases.

    Why B is correct

    Ministerial guidance is not legally binding unless statute makes it so, but public bodies must take it into account as a relevant consideration (*R v Islington LBC, ex p Rixon* [1997] ELR 66). The guidance does not have statutory force merely because a Minister issued it. Option A overstates its effect. Option E is the strongest distractor but fails because legitimate expectation requires a clear, unambiguous representation directed at a specific individual or group (*R v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex p MFK Underwriting Agents Ltd* [1990] 1 WLR 1545); general guidance does not automatically create such expectations.