SQE1 · FLK2 · Free samples
Criminal Law — free SQE1 sample questions
95 free, worked single-best-answer questions for Criminal Law, shown in the official SRA SBAQ format with the correct answer and a cited rationale. Drill the full bank in timed practice once you’ve worked through these.
Question 1
A student takes a laptop from the university library intending to use it for the evening and return it the next morning. University policy permits short-term borrowing without formal sign-out. The student returns the laptop undamaged after 18 hours. Has the student committed theft of the laptop?
- A.Yes, because he appropriated property belonging to another.
- B.Yes, because he did not follow the formal sign-out procedure.
- C.No, because he lacked the intention to permanently deprive the university of the laptop.✓ correct
- D.No, because the laptop was returned undamaged.
- E.No, because the university consented to the taking.
Why C is correct
Theft under s.1 Theft Act 1968 requires dishonest appropriation of property belonging to another with intention to permanently deprive. Section 6(1) extends this to treating property as one's own to dispose of regardless of the other's rights, but mere borrowing is insufficient (*R v Lloyd* [1985] QB 829). The student intended only temporary use and returned the laptop, negating the required mens rea. Option E is a strong distractor but consent relates to dishonesty rather than eliminating the actus reus of appropriation (*R v Gomez* [1993] AC 442 confirms appropriation can occur even with consent). The critical missing element is intention to permanently deprive.
Question 2
A defendant threatens to stab a security guard while holding a knife behind his back where the guard cannot see it. The guard hears the words but is unaware of the knife. The guard feels frightened and believes the threat is genuine. Has the defendant committed assault?
- A.Yes, because the guard apprehended immediate unlawful violence.✓ correct
- B.Yes, because the defendant possessed a weapon during the threat.
- C.No, because the guard did not see the knife.
- D.No, because words alone cannot constitute assault.
- E.No, because the defendant did not touch the guard.
Why A is correct
Assault is committed when the defendant intentionally or recklessly causes the victim to apprehend immediate unlawful violence (*R v Ireland* [1998] AC 147). Words can constitute assault; silence or words alone can suffice if they cause apprehension. The guard believed the threat and feared immediate violence, satisfying the actus reus and mens rea. Option D is wrong because *R v Ireland* and *R v Constanza* [1997] 2 Cr App R 492 confirm words alone can constitute assault. Option C is irrelevant; what matters is whether the victim apprehended violence, not whether they saw the means. The hidden knife is evidentially relevant but not legally necessary for the offence.
Question 3
A man punches another man once in the stomach during a fight. The victim feels winded and experiences pain and discomfort for several hours but suffers no visible bruising and does not seek medical attention. By the following day he feels entirely normal. What offence has the defendant most likely committed?
- A.Common assault only, because there is no visible injury and therefore no actual bodily harm.
- B.Battery only, because the harm was too transient and minor to constitute actual bodily harm.
- C.Assault occasioning actual bodily harm under s.47 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, because pain lasting several hours is more than transient or trifling.✓ correct
- D.Inflicting grievous bodily harm under s.20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, because a punch to the stomach is an inherently serious act.
- E.No offence beyond a civil wrong, because the victim recovered fully within 24 hours and suffered no lasting harm.
Why C is correct
**Correct answer: C** **Legal framework** Section 47 OAPA 1861 requires: (i) an assault or battery; (ii) which occasions; (iii) actual bodily harm (ABH). A deliberate punch is a battery. The question is whether the harm reaches the ABH threshold. **What counts as ABH** In *R v Miller* [1954] 2 QB 282, Lynskey J defined ABH as "any hurt or injury calculated to interfere with the health or comfort of the victim". In *R v Chan-Fook* [1994] 1 WLR 689, the Court of Appeal confirmed that ABH must be "more than merely transient or trifling" but need not be permanent or serious; it includes pain that is more than fleeting. Crucially, **visible injury is not required**: in *T v DPP* [2003] Crim LR 622 (DC), momentary loss of consciousness was held to constitute ABH even without lasting physical injury. Pain and discomfort lasting several hours plainly satisfies the *Chan-Fook* threshold. **Why the other options are wrong** - **A** – Wrong in law: ABH does not require visible injury (*Chan-Fook*; *T v DPP*). Discomfort lasting hours is not merely trifling. - **B** – Battery (s.39 Criminal Justice Act 1988) captures unlawful touching but does not reflect the harm actually caused. The harm here exceeds the trivial and the more serious charge under s.47 applies. - **D** – Grievous bodily harm means "really serious harm" (*DPP v Smith* [1961] AC 290). Winding that resolves within a day falls far short of that threshold. - **E** – Full recovery does not negate criminal liability; ABH is assessed at the time of the offence, not by reference to eventual outcome. **Conclusion** The battery occasioned harm that was more than transient or trifling (several hours of pain), satisfying the ABH threshold from *Chan-Fook*, so s.47 OAPA 1861 is the most appropriate charge.
Question 4
A man sees his neighbour's expensive bicycle leaning against a fence. He takes it, intending to ride it home and return it the next day. However, once home, he decides to keep it permanently. He puts it in his garage where it remains for two weeks. At what point, if any, does the man commit theft?
- A.When he first takes the bicycle, because appropriation under s.3(1) Theft Act 1968 occurs at that moment and dishonesty is sufficient for theft.
- B.When he first takes the bicycle, because although he then lacked intent to permanently deprive, s.6(1) Theft Act 1968 deems borrowing in circumstances equivalent to an outright taking to satisfy that requirement.
- C.When he decides to keep the bicycle permanently, because at that point he assumes a right of the owner over property still belonging to another, giving rise to a fresh appropriation coinciding with the newly formed intention to permanently deprive.✓ correct
- D.He commits no theft at any point, because the intention to permanently deprive must exist at the very moment of the original taking and cannot be formed or relied upon retrospectively.
- E.He commits no theft because property left unattended in a public place cannot be the subject of theft under the Theft Act 1968.
Why C is correct
## Legal Analysis ### The core issue: coincidence of actus reus and mens rea Theft under **s.1(1) Theft Act 1968** requires: (1) dishonest (2) appropriation (3) of property (4) belonging to another (5) with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it. All five elements must coincide. ### Why the original taking is not theft When the man first takes the bicycle he lacks the **intention to permanently deprive** (s.1(1); s.6(1) TA 1968). He intends to return it the next day. A mere borrowing, even dishonest, is not theft: the mens rea is absent at that moment. **Option D** is wrong as an absolute proposition, however, because theft *can* be committed later. ### Why s.6(1) does not assist at the point of taking **Section 6(1) TA 1968** deems a person to intend permanent deprivation where they treat the thing as their own regardless of the other's rights — but only where the borrowing is "for a period and in circumstances making it equivalent to an outright taking or disposal" (*R v Lloyd* [1985] QB 829, CA). A firm intention to return it the next day does not satisfy that threshold at the moment of taking, so **Option B** is wrong. ### The decisive moment: the later decision to keep the bicycle **Section 3(1) TA 1968** defines appropriation broadly as "any assumption by a person of the rights of an owner", and expressly provides that this **includes a later assumption of a right** by a person who has come by the property innocently: *"where a person has come by the property (innocently or not) without stealing it, any later assumption of a right to it by keeping or dealing with it as owner amounts to an appropriation."* This provision was enacted precisely for the present scenario. When the man **decides to keep the bicycle permanently**, he assumes the owner's rights over property that still **belongs to another** (s.5(1) TA 1968 — the neighbour retains legal ownership). At that same moment he has the **intention to permanently deprive**. All five elements of theft now coincide. This is confirmed by the plain words of s.3(1) and is consistent with **R v Hinks** [2001] 2 AC 241 (HL) on the width of appropriation. ### Why Option A is wrong Dishonesty alone (assessed under the objective test in **Ivey v Genting Casinos** [2017] UKSC 67, applying the standards of ordinary decent people) is not sufficient; the intention to permanently deprive must also be present. It was not when he first took the bicycle. ### Why Option E is wrong There is no rule in the Theft Act 1968 excluding unattended property from the scope of theft. Property belongs to another so long as the owner has any proprietary right or interest (s.5(1)). ### Conclusion **Option C** is correct. The man commits theft at the point he decides to keep the bicycle permanently, because at that moment s.3(1) TA 1968 provides a fresh appropriation of property still belonging to another, coinciding with his newly formed intention to permanently deprive and his dishonesty.
Question 5
A woman punches a man once in the face during an argument. He suffers a broken nose and extensive bruising. Medical evidence confirms the injury required surgical intervention and took six weeks to heal. There is no evidence that she intended to cause serious harm. She is charged with an offence against the person. What is the most appropriate charge?
- A.Common assault under s.39 Criminal Justice Act 1988, because the injury resulted from a single punch.
- B.Battery under s.39 Criminal Justice Act 1988, because unlawful physical force was applied.
- C.Assault occasioning actual bodily harm under s.47 Offences Against the Person Act 1861, because the injury required medical treatment.
- D.Inflicting grievous bodily harm under s.20 Offences Against the Person Act 1861, because the broken nose constitutes serious harm and there is no evidence of specific intent.✓ correct
- E.Causing grievous bodily harm with intent under s.18 Offences Against the Person Act 1861, because surgical intervention was required.
Why D is correct
**D is correct.** A broken nose requiring surgical intervention and six weeks to heal constitutes **grievous bodily harm** — meaning 'really serious harm' (*DPP v Smith* [1961] AC 290). In *R v Bollom* [2003] EWCA Crim 2846, the Court of Appeal confirmed that the assessment of whether harm is 'grievous' must take account of the victim's individual circumstances and the overall severity; a fracture requiring surgery readily satisfies this threshold. The appropriate charge is therefore **s.20 OAPA 1861** (inflicting GBH), which requires only that the defendant foresaw some physical harm — not necessarily serious harm (*R v Savage; R v Parmenter* [1992] 1 AC 699). A punch to the face plainly carries that foresight. **Why not the other options:** - **A & B** (common assault/battery, s.39 CJA 1988): These summary-only offences are wholly inadequate for injuries of this severity. - **C** (s.47 ABH): ABH covers injuries that are 'more than transient or trifling' (*R v Chan-Fook* [1994] 1 WLR 689), but a broken nose requiring surgery goes beyond ABH and properly constitutes GBH; s.47 would undercharge. - **E** (s.18 GBH with intent): Section 18 requires **specific intent** to cause grievous bodily harm or to resist arrest. A single punch during an argument does not, without more, evidence such intent; s.20 is the appropriate charge where intent to cause GBH is absent. **Note on wounding:** The facts do not describe a wound. *JCC v Eisenhower* [1984] QB 331 requires a break in the continuity of the **whole skin** (all layers). A broken nose is a fracture, not a wound, so the 'malicious wounding' limb of s.20 is not engaged; the 'inflicting GBH' limb is.