SQE1 · FLK1 · Free samples
Tort — free SQE1 sample questions
85 free, worked single-best-answer questions for Tort, shown in the official SRA SBAQ format with the correct answer and a cited rationale. Drill the full bank in timed practice once you’ve worked through these.
Question 1
A surgeon performs a routine appendectomy on a patient. During the operation, the surgeon follows all standard procedures and exercises reasonable care. However, the patient suffers nerve damage, a recognised risk that occurs in 1% of such operations even when performed correctly. The patient was properly warned of this risk before consenting to surgery. The patient now wishes to sue the surgeon for negligence. Is the surgeon likely to be liable in negligence?
- A.Yes, because the patient suffered injury during the surgeon's treatment.
- B.No, because the surgeon met the standard expected of a reasonable surgeon.✓ correct
- C.Yes, because the injury was a foreseeable consequence of the operation.
- D.No, because the patient consented to the risk of nerve damage.
- E.Yes, because the surgeon is strictly liable for all surgical complications.
Why B is correct
Under *Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee* [1957] 1 WLR 582, a doctor is not negligent if they act in accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical opinion. The surgeon followed standard procedures and exercised reasonable care. Mere occurrence of a recognised complication does not establish breach. Option D is a strong distractor, but consent relates to battery and informed consent, not to whether the duty of care was breached. The *Bolam* test determines breach, and it is not satisfied here.
Question 2
A factory emits fumes that smell unpleasant but cause no harm to health. The smell is noticeable at a neighbouring residential property every evening between 6:00 PM and 8:00 PM when production peaks. The residents find the smell significantly interferes with their use and enjoyment of their garden during summer evenings. The factory has operated at this location for 25 years; the residents moved in two years ago. Can the residents succeed in a claim for private nuisance?
- A.No, because the factory was operating at this location before the residents moved in, which provides a complete defence.
- B.Yes, provided the interference is substantial and unreasonable, judged by reference to the standards of the ordinary person and all the circumstances of the locality.✓ correct
- C.No, because private nuisance is only actionable where the defendant's activity causes physical damage to health or to the claimant's property.
- D.Yes, because any perceptible interference with a neighbour's use of land automatically constitutes a nuisance.
- E.No, because an interference lasting only two hours per day is insufficiently prolonged to be actionable as a private nuisance.
Why B is correct
## Correct answer: B ### The law of private nuisance Private nuisance protects against **substantial and unreasonable interference** with a claimant's use and enjoyment of land (or with recognised proprietary interests in land). Physical damage is not required; sensible personal discomfort — including offensive smells — is a well-established head of liability: *St Helen's Smelting Co v Tipping* (1865) 11 HLC 642 (HL), which distinguished between physical damage cases and 'personal discomfort' cases, the latter requiring the court to consider the character of the locality. ### Why the other options are wrong **Option A — 'coming to the nuisance'** The fact that the factory pre-dates the residents' arrival is **not a complete defence**. This was established in *Bliss v Hall* (1838) 4 Bing NC 183, where the court held that a claimant who came to a nuisance could still sue. The Supreme Court emphatically confirmed in *Coventry v Lawrence* [2014] UKSC 13 that 'coming to the nuisance' is not a defence, although prior use may be one factor in assessing reasonableness (particularly if a prescriptive right to commit the nuisance has been acquired after 20 years of *actionable* nuisance, which is a distinct and narrow point). **Option C — physical harm required** This is incorrect. *St Helen's Smelting Co v Tipping* (above) confirmed that sensory interference with enjoyment, including smell, can be actionable without physical damage to property or health, subject to the locality test. **Option D — any interference suffices** This overstates the law. Trivial or wholly unremarkable interferences are not actionable. The interference must be *substantial*: *Sedleigh-Denfield v O'Callaghan* [1940] AC 880; *Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd* [1997] AC 655 (HL). **Option E — duration too short** There is no fixed minimum duration. Recurrent interference — here, every evening during summer — can be substantial and unreasonable even if each episode is limited in time. Temporary or intermittent nuisances have been held actionable: *De Keyser's Royal Hotel Ltd v Spicer Bros Ltd* (1914) 30 TLR 257. ### Conclusion The residents can potentially succeed. The key question is whether the regular evening smell constitutes substantial and unreasonable interference judged by the standards of an ordinary person in that locality — which, on the given facts, it well may. Option B correctly states this test.
Question 3
A journalist publishes an article stating that a restaurant 'has been serving food to customers despite failing its last three health inspections.' This statement is factually true. However, the journalist was motivated entirely by personal spite after the restaurant owner refused to serve the journalist. The restaurant owner sues for defamation. The statement has caused significant harm to the restaurant's reputation and business. Is the defence of truth likely to succeed?
- A.No, because the journalist acted with malice in publishing the statement.
- B.Yes, because the statement is factually accurate regardless of motive.✓ correct
- C.No, because the journalist's spite negates the defence of truth.
- D.Yes, but only if the journalist can prove the publication was in the public interest.
- E.No, because malicious publication of true statements can still be defamatory.
Why B is correct
Section 2 of the Defamation Act 2013 provides that truth is a complete defence to defamation if the imputation is substantially true. Malice or improper motive is irrelevant to the defence of truth, as confirmed in *Alexander v North Eastern Railway Co* (1865) 6 B&S 340. Option A is the strongest distractor but is wrong because malice does not defeat truth; it only defeats qualified privilege under *Horrocks v Lowe* [1975] AC 135. The journalist's motive is irrelevant when the statement is true.
Question 4
A pedestrian slips on ice outside a solicitor's office at 7:00 AM in January. The office does not open until 9:00 AM, and the ice formed overnight. The pavement is part of the public highway maintained by the local council. The pedestrian suffers a broken wrist and seeks advice on suing the solicitor's firm for negligence. No gritting had been carried out by anyone. Does the solicitor's firm owe the pedestrian a duty of care in these circumstances?
- A.No, because the firm has no duty to maintain the public highway outside its premises.✓ correct
- B.Yes, because occupiers must ensure safe access to their premises at all times.
- C.Yes, because the ice was a foreseeable hazard adjacent to the firm's property.
- D.No, because the pedestrian was not visiting the firm's premises.
- E.Yes, because businesses owe a duty to all users of adjacent public highways.
Why A is correct
A solicitor's firm has no duty to grit or maintain the public highway outside its premises; this responsibility lies with the highway authority. In *McGeown v Northern Ireland Housing Executive* [1995] 1 AC 233, the House of Lords held that occupiers do not owe duties in respect of hazards on adjacent public highways unless they have created or adopted the danger. The pedestrian was not on the firm's premises, and the ice formed naturally. Option D is incorrect because visitor status is irrelevant when the injury occurs on the highway itself, not on the occupier's land.
Question 5
A newspaper publishes an article stating that a local councillor 'was seen taking cash payments from property developers in exchange for planning favours.' The statement is false. The article was published online exactly 11 months ago and remains accessible on the newspaper's website, where it has been read by approximately 50,000 people. The councillor wishes to bring a defamation claim and asks about the applicable limitation period. What is the correct limitation period for the councillor's defamation claim, and from when does it run?
- A.Six years from the date of first publication, under the Limitation Act 1980's default tort period.
- B.Three years from the date of first publication, applying the personal injury limitation period by analogy.
- C.One year from the date of first publication, under s.4A of the Limitation Act 1980, and the continued online availability of the article does not restart or extend that period.✓ correct
- D.One year from the date on which the councillor first became aware of the publication, under s.4A of the Limitation Act 1980.
- E.A fresh one-year limitation period runs each day the article remains accessible online, because each new download constitutes a fresh publication.
Why C is correct
**Correct answer: C** **Limitation period – s.4A Limitation Act 1980** Section 4A of the Limitation Act 1980 (inserted by s.5 of the Defamation Act 1996) provides that an action for libel or slander must be brought within **one year** from the date on which the cause of action accrued, i.e. the date of **first publication**. Here, first publication was 11 months ago, so the councillor is still within time, but only just. **The single publication rule – s.8 Defamation Act 2013** Prior to the Defamation Act 2013, the common law 'multiple publication rule' (derived from *Duke of Brunswick v Harmer* (1849)) meant that every fresh communication of a defamatory statement to a new reader was a separate cause of action with its own limitation period. Section 8 of the Defamation Act 2013 abolished this for causes of action arising on or after 1 January 2014 and replaced it with the **single publication rule**: where a person publishes a statement to the public and subsequently publishes it again in the same or substantially the same manner, the one-year limitation period runs from the **date of the first publication** to the public. The continued accessibility of the article on the newspaper's website therefore does **not** create new causes of action or reset the limitation clock. This makes option E wrong. **Discretion to disapply – s.32A Limitation Act 1980** The court retains a discretion under s.32A of the Limitation Act 1980 to allow a defamation claim to proceed outside the one-year period if it is equitable to do so, but that discretion is not engaged here because the councillor is still within the primary period. **Why the other options are wrong** - **A (six years):** The six-year period under s.2 Limitation Act 1980 applies to general tort claims (e.g. negligence causing pure economic loss). Defamation has its own specific one-year period under s.4A, which takes precedence. - **B (three years):** Three years is the primary limitation period for personal injury claims under s.11 Limitation Act 1980 and has no application to defamation. - **D (one year from date of knowledge):** Section 4A runs from the date of **first publication**, not from the claimant's knowledge. A 'date of knowledge' trigger applies in personal injury (s.14 LA 1980) and latent damage in negligence (s.14A LA 1980), but not in defamation. - **E (fresh period daily):** This reflects the pre-2013 multiple publication rule from *Duke of Brunswick v Harmer*, which s.8 of the Defamation Act 2013 has abolished for publications on or after 1 January 2014.