Application for Leave to Appeal under Section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 by Przemyslaw Lukasz Pojda against the Lord Advocate, representing the Republic of Poland (High Court of Justiciary)
[2025] ScotHC 2025hcjac33High Court of Justiciary2025
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BAILII · Verbatim mirror
Lord Matthews
Lord Armstrong
OPINION OF THE COURT
delivered by LORD MATTHEWS
in
the application for leave to appeal under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003
by
PRZEMYSLAW LUKASZ POJDA
Appellant
against
THE LORD ADVOCATE, REPRESENTING THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND
Respondent
Appellant: Party
Respondent: Dickson, sol ad ; the Crown Agent
12 August 2025
[1]
By European arrest warrant dated 13 June 2016, replaced by another warrant dated
15 July 2019, the Republic of Poland sought the extradition of the appellant to serve a prison
sentence of 4 years, of which 3 years 8 months and 18 days was outstanding. Nothing turns
on the fact that a replacement warrant was issued. The convictions were in respect of the
supply of controlled drugs, fraud and a threat to assault a witness.
2
[2]
In due course, after a somewhat protracted process, the sheriff, on 6 March 2025,
ordered the appellant's extradition to Poland.
[3]
He now seeks to appeal to this court on the following grounds:
"I do not agree with the High Court (sic) decision to be deported to Poland. I have
lived in Scotland from 2006, I have Home Office and settled status, I have also family
here and 7 years old son."
[4]
In his report, the sheriff sets out the detailed history of the case. It was peppered
with adjournments because of the withdrawal of solicitors and attempts by the appellant to
obtain new agents. In due course, he represented himself and gave evidence at the hearing
before the sheriff. He also appeared on his own behalf before us and was assisted by an
interpreter.
The appellant's submissions before the sheriff
[5]
Extradition would not be compatible with the appellant's rights under Article 8 of
ECHR. He had lived in Scotland since 2006 and had a partner and, at that time, a 6 year old
son. Prior to his remand he was self-employed as a fitness instructor. Extradition was
barred by passage of time in terms of section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003. The offences
were committed in 1999 and the enforceable judgment was dated 2003.
The background
[6]
It appears that the appellant was present in court on 27 November 2003 when he was
sentenced in connection with the offences in the warrant. Execution of the sentence, which
came into effect on 7 October 2004, was suspended for 5 years, a condition being that he did
not commit another offence. During the period of suspension, on 9 December 2004, he
breached that condition by committing other offences, including another drugs offence. That
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resulted in a conviction on 14 February 2006 and a prison sentence for 1 year and 2 months,
the sentence again being suspended. Due to the commission of this second offence the court
in Zabrze on 21 May 2008, ordered execution of the original suspended sentence. The
appellant did not appear at the hearing on 21 May 2008, although he was aware of it. On
3 June 2008 he appealed against the decision and in August 2008 appointed counsel to
appear for him. He and his counsel were present when the appeal was refused on
20 November 2008.
[7]
On 30 January 2009 his counsel petitioned the court for postponement of execution of
the sentence but this was refused on 20 May 2009. An appeal against that decision was
refused on 12 August 2009. It appears that on 17 December 2008 the appellant changed his
surname, having married. He told his probation officer that he stayed in Scotland
temporarily and then said that he stayed in Spain. A search for him proved ineffective when
it was discovered that he was in the UK and an application for a European arrest warrant
was made on 20 May 2016.
The appellant's evidence
[8]
The appellant told the sheriff that he arrived in the United Kingdom in October or
November 2006. He worked on various jobs until 2016 when he was arrested on the first
extradition warrant. He was granted bail but did not attend court at a hearing later that
year. He worked as a personal trainer between 2016 and 2023 and began a relationship with
his girlfriend, who was also from Poland. They had a son born in 2017 and had lived
together from that point. She had visited him with their son while he was remanded for
these proceedings and spoke to him a few times a week. Both he and she had settled status
for immigration purposes.
4
[9]
He knew about the criminal convictions in Poland and, as far as he was concerned,
when he left he was subject only to a suspended sentence and he was not running away. In
cross-examination he acknowledged that it was a condition of the suspended sentence that
he did not commit a further offence but he had breached that condition and another
suspended prison sentence was imposed.
[10]
He acknowledged that because of this second conviction he was ordered to serve the
sentences attributable to the charges in the arrest warrant but he claimed he only learned of
this once he had arrived in the United Kingdom. He was aware of the decision at the
hearing of 21 May 2008 ordering him to be imprisoned, although he was not present. He
had attended the hearing of the appeal, which was refused. He acknowledged that his
lawyer had petitioned the court to postpone execution of the sentence but that was refused
and that a further appeal against that was refused. He accepted the proposition which was
put to him in cross-examination that he was hoping that the whole thing would just go
away. He also accepted that when he was arrested on the extradition warrant he gave a
false name.
[11]
His son would visit him in prison around once a month. The only family he had in
Poland was his mother. His girlfriend had a sister in Poland. If he was extradited, his
girlfriend and son would remain in the United Kingdom and he intended to return there
after serving his sentence following any extradition.
The sheriff's decision
[12]
The appellant had been living in the shadow of potential extradition and
imprisonment from his arrival in the United Kingdom. He had committed an offence and
thereby breached the condition of his suspended sentence. He knew from November 2008
5
that a decision had been made to imprison him. It was not necessary to determine whether
his original arrival here or his return after the hearing of 20 November 2008 represented him
fleeing from justice, rendering him a fugitive.
[13]
It is quite plain, however, that he was a fugitive.
[14]
As far as his Article 8 claim was concerned, while having formed a relationship and
becoming a father was a significant development in his life, all this was done in the
knowledge of his precarious situation. He had not changed or developed his life in
ignorance of the prospect of extradition in a way which might support a plea of oppression.
The passage of time was not substantial, having regard to the gravity of the conviction and
the delay occasioned by his failure to appear in the extradition proceedings.
[15]
Although his extradition would constitute a grave interference with the family life, it
was proportionate to the pursuit of the substantial interest in honouring international
obligations and preventing the United Kingdom from becoming a place of refuge for
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