Svetlana Bunina v Orkhan Nasibov

This is a without notice application for alternative service of a freezing injunction made against the respondent on 2 March 2026 in the amount of £1.7 million.

this matter is urgent in view of the imminent return date; and

the application concerns the ability to serve the respondent in the first place.

I have already accepted, during the course of submissions, that it is appropriate for this hearing to be dealt with in private.

The underlying claim, in brief, concerns the liability of the respondent to the applicant under the terms of a Personal Guarantee Agreement dated 7 February 2025 (“ the PGA ”). The PGA guaranteed the obligations of Guavapay UAB, a company of which the respondent is the sole director, which operates a payment services business including in relation to cryptocurrencies.

Also on 7 February 2025, the applicant entered into a Funds Storage Agreement with Guavapay UAB for the storage of 15 Bitcoin. She has since demanded to withdraw the Bitcoin. However, in the absence of a response from Guavapay UAB, she has made a demand for payment under the PGA with the respondent.

The claim form in this matter was issued on 10 February 2026, and the Particulars of Claim were filed on 2 March 2026 following the injunction hearing. These have been served on the respondent pursuant to section 1140 of the Companies Act 2006 , by leaving them at his address shown in Companies House filings for English companies.

At the hearing of the injunction application, I understand that the judge was alerted to the possibility that the applicant may need to return to court to apply for alternative service in respect of the freezing injunction pursuant to CPR 6.27.

Against that background, the applicant now does indeed seek an order for alternative service by Telegram instant message to the Telegram address, known as a handle, associated with the respondent, namely, “@FXpower96”. I understand that this Telegram address has been used in previous communications between the respondent and Mr Vladislav Bunin, the applicant’s husband, who had contact with the respondent in relation to the subject matter of this claim.

Having read the evidence served in support of the application from Mr Jamang, I am satisfied that the requirements of CPR 6.27 (which rule is interpreted consistently with the approach to service of the claim form under CPR 6.15) are made out in the circumstances of this case. In particular:

the respondent was born in Armenia and is a citizen of the Republic of Vanuatu. Companies House filings show his country of residence as England;

there appear to be three addresses in England which are associated with the respondent. Personal service has been attempted, as I can see from the evidence, at all of them, but has not proved possible;

service of the freezing order is urgent. The return date is listed for 16 March 2026 and, to be effective, the freezing order must be served on the respondent. Furthermore, the freezing injunction provided that the respondent has disclosure obligations which will be triggered by service;

in my judgment, this is just the type of case where alternative service may very well be warranted (in other words, it is a freezing order), and as I have already indicated, the judge was, in any event, alerted to this possible application;

I accept that the application has been made as soon as reasonably practicable; and

I consider it to be essential to ensure that the contents of the freezing order are communicated to the respondent.

A point that was very properly raised by Mr Kuhn, acting on behalf of the applicant, both during his oral submissions and in his written skeleton argument, concerns the fact that there are different approaches to be taken to alternative service applications, depending on whether the respondent is “present” in the jurisdiction or not. Mr Kuhn tells me that it is not clear where the respondent is at present. He might be in or out of the jurisdiction.

In this context, Mr Kuhn drew my attention to the recent authority in the Court of Appeal of Fridman v Agrofirma Oniks LLC & Anor [2026] EWCA Civ 139 , in which the question of what is meant by presence in the jurisdiction was considered by Lewison LJ, who held, at [90], that the judge below had been correct in his decision that presence in the jurisdiction is not lost by temporary absence.

I am satisfied here that the respondent is present in the jurisdiction in the Fridman sense, such that there is no need to consider service out of the jurisdiction and conformity with rules in foreign jurisdictions under CPR6.40. In this regard, I note in particular that the Companies House filings are as recent as early this year and that, in those filings, England is given as the respondent’s place of residence. The evidence, therefore, in my judgment, strongly shows that this is a temporary absence case, even assuming it to be right to say that the respondent is currently out of the jurisdiction, which, as I have said, is not known.

Telegram is, I understand from the evidence, an instant messaging application similar to WhatsApp. It is well established that the Court may order alternative service by WhatsApp, in particular, for freezing injunctions (see, by way of example, Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank PJSC v Shetty [2020] EWHC 3243 (Comm) at [114] to [116]);

I also note, as Mr Kuhn mentioned in his submissions, that alternative service by even more creative means has been permitted in other cases, such as via non-fungible token on the blockchain in the context of a crypto fraud dispute (see D'Aloia v Persons Unknown [2022] EWHC 1723 (Ch) at [38] to [40].

Telegram and, in particular, the address “@FXpower96”, have been used in previous communications between the respondent and the applicant’s husband, as I have said.

In addition, the evidence before the Court shows that the demand under the PGA was successfully sent by the applicant’s solicitor to the respondent using this method on 6 February 2026. Mr Kuhn showed me, during the course of the hearing, a screenshot of that message, which has at the bottom on the right-hand side, two green ticks, indicating receipt of the message by the respondent.

Mr Kuhn has made various points by way of full and frank disclosure in his skeleton argument, which I bear in mind, but none of those points, in my judgment, affects the merits of the application.

Mr Kuhn has taken me to the draft order, and has drawn my attention in that order in particular to a reference in the recitals to CPR81.4 (2)(c) to (d) in relation to requirements for a contempt application in respect of the freezing injunction.

For all the reasons that I have identified, I am content that this is an appropriate case in which to grant the application for alternative service.