Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) · Court of Appeal (Criminal Division); judgment of the court delivered by Stephenson LJ.
Facts
The defendant (Roberts) gave a lift to a young woman. While the car was moving at 20–30 mph, he made unwanted sexual advances. She opened the door and jumped from the vehicle to escape, sustaining injuries. He was charged with assault occasioning actual bodily harm under section 47 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861.
History
Convicted at trial. The defendant appealed against conviction, arguing that the victim's voluntary act of jumping broke the chain of causation.
Issue
Whether the victim's act of jumping from a moving car to escape the defendant's assault constituted a novus actus interveniens that relieved the defendant of liability for her injuries.
Held
Appeal dismissed. The victim's response was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the defendant's conduct; causation was not broken.
Ratio
- A victim's reasonable action taken to escape an unlawful assault does not break the chain of causation; the defendant remains liable for injuries resulting from that escape if the response was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the assault.
The judgments
Stephenson LJ (lead)
Stephenson LJ gave the judgment of the court. He held that the question is whether the victim's reaction was the natural result of what the defendant said and did, in the sense that it could reasonably have been foreseen as a consequence of his conduct. Only a reaction so unreasonable that it could not have been foreseen by a reasonable person in the defendant's position would break the chain of causation.
Key reasoning
- The court asked whether the victim's reaction was a natural result of what the defendant said and did, in the sense of being something that could reasonably have been foreseen as a consequence of his conduct. If so, and the victim's act was within the range of reasonable responses, the defendant remains the cause of the injury.
- The victim's response breaks the chain only if it is so unreasonable or unexpected that no reasonable person could have foreseen it as a consequence of the defendant's conduct. The victim need not choose the best way of escaping, since she may be put in a position of fright and confusion.
- Jumping from a moving car to escape sexual assault was held to be a natural, instinctive reaction, not a voluntary intervention that severs liability.
Where it fits in the module
This case sits at the core of Topic 1 on causation in the actus reus. It sets out the foreseeability or natural result approach to a victim's reaction as a possible novus actus interveniens, and was later applied in Williams and Davis (a hitch-hiker who jumped from a moving car). It is read with Pagett (escape and reflex reactions), Blaue (thin skull rule), and the medical intervention cases, of which Jordan and Smith are earlier decisions and Cheshire and Malcherek and Steel are later ones.
Criticisms
- The 'reasonable foreseeability' test is vague and fact-sensitive, giving juries wide discretion.
- It blurs the distinction between factual and legal causation by importing a normative standard into the causation inquiry.
- The 'daft' formulation is pejorative and lacks analytical precision; it may undervalue victim autonomy.
- The decision may extend liability too far where the victim's reaction is extreme but psychologically understandable.
Written with AI (nvidia/nemotron-3-ultra-550b-a55b) on 1 November 2026, reviewed for errors by a second model (claude-sonnet-5.5 (Claude Code reviewer)). Read the case itself at [1971] 56 Cr. App. R. 95, [1972] Crim LR 27. Spotted an error? Tell us.