“Deception about payment to prostitute does not vitiate consent to sexual intercourse.”
Linekar agreed to pay a prostitute for sexual intercourse but never intended to pay and left without paying afterwards. He was charged with rape on the basis that her consent was vitiated by his deception about payment.
Whether deception as to matters collateral to the sexual act itself (such as payment) can vitiate consent for the purposes of rape charges.
The Court of Appeal quashed the rape conviction. Deception as to payment does not vitiate consent to sexual intercourse, as payment is collateral to the nature and purpose of the act itself.
This case established important limits on which types of deception can vitiate consent, clarifying that not all dishonesty in sexual encounters constitutes rape. It remains influential in distinguishing between deceptions that do and don't vitiate consent.
You're reading the free summary of R v Linekar. Create a free account to unlock the full reasoning, the cited authorities and the verbatim judgment — plus structured briefs for 412,000+ UK judgments.
No card required. Free forever.
OSCOLA Citation
R v Linekar [1995] QB 250 (CA)
Multiple official and mirror sources — pick whichever loads cleanly on your network.
Falls back to Google for old citations BAILII catalogues separately
Common Room
0 comments · About the Common Room →
No comments yet — start the discussion.
Voted-best comments help future students and feed Caselaw's AI study tools.