R v Colin Morris & Anor

The provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 apply to these offences. Under those provisions, where an allegation has been made that a sexual offence has been committed against a person, no matter relating to that person shall during their lifetime be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify them as the victim of these offences. This prohibition applies unless waived or lifted in accordance with section 3 of the Act .

These separate appeals against sentence, whilst unrelated to each other, have been heard together, raising as they do a similar ground of appeal. In both cases the appellants were sentenced for serious sexual offending for which they have received sentences of imprisonment for life under section 285 of the Sentencing Act 2020 . The appellants respectively contend that the sentence and/or the custodial minimum term was excessive.

Leave to appeal against the sentences imposed was granted by the single judge.

On 23 December 2024, in the Crown Court at Cardiff, the first appellant Colin Morris, who is aged 49, was sentenced by His Honour Judge Harrison to a sentence of imprisonment for life with a minimum term to be served of 14 years, less time spent in custody on remand. Concurrent determinate sentences were imposed for other offences, together with a Sexual Harm Prevention Order and a Restraining Order. He was also made the subject of the notification requirements under Part 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 , and an order was made that he would, or might be, included in the relevant list by the Disclosure and Barring Service.

On 31 January 2025, in the Crown Court at Manchester Minshull Street, the second appellant, Carl Jones (aged 58) was sentenced by His Honour Judge MacAdam to imprisonment for life under section 285 of the Sentencing Act 2020 , with a minimum term to serve of 25½ years less 320 days spent in custody on remand. He was also made the subject of a Sexual Harm Prevention Order, a Notification Order under Part 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 , and an order that he would or might be included in the relevant list by the Disclosure and Barring Service. The judge did not specify the precise calculation of the custodial term as required – see R v Cookson [2023] EWCA Crim 10 . We shall return to this later.

Before we turn to the detail of these appeals against sentence, it is necessary for us to set out the requirements for the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment for life under section 285 of the Sentencing Act 2020 .

The common theme between these appeals against sentence is serious sexual offending over many years against young children.

In the Morris appeal, the appellant pleaded guilty to offences of Causing or Inciting a Child under 13 to Engage in Sexual Activity, Attempted Rape, and Rape against C1; and further offences of Rape and Attempted Rape in respect of C2. All of the offences occurred whilst the two complainants were under the age of 13 and were, as the judge identified in sentencing, of extreme young age. The appellant also made and distributed both still and moving images of his offending.

The appellant Jones was sentenced after pleading guilty to repeated sexual offending against 11 complainants, including offences of Rape, Sexual Assault and Sexual Activity with a Child. All of the offences were committed when the 11 complainants were under the age of 13.

It is not in dispute in either appeal that both appellants were correctly assessed as dangerous offenders within the meaning of section 308 of the Sentencing Act 2020 , which gave rise to the question of the appropriate sentence to be imposed.

" Required life sentence for offence carrying life sentence

the offender is aged 21 or over at the time of conviction,

the offence is a Schedule 19 offence …

the offence was committed on or after the 4 th of April 2005, and

the court is of the opinion that there is a significant risk to members of the public of serious harm occasioned by the commission, by the offender, of further specified offences …

The pre-sentence report requirements … apply to the court in relation to forming the opinion mentioned in subsection 1(d).

the offence, or

…"

In sentencing each of the respective appellants, the judge identified the rape offences, whether attempted or completed, as the lead sentences, whilst making all remaining sentences concurrent, but reflecting the aggregated offending within the lead sentences.

Offences of rape and attempted rape are listed in Schedule 19 to the Sentencing Code. Further, in these appeals the appellants were each aged 21 or over at the time of conviction and, save for Counts 2, 3 and 4 against C1 in the Jones appeal, all offences occurred after the 4 th of April 2005. Equally, as we have already observed, both appellants were respectively found to be dangerous offenders in that there was a significant risk to members of the public of serious harm occasioned by the commission, by the offender, of further specified offences. The central issue, therefore, is whether in these appeals the sentencing judges were incorrect to reach the conclusion that a sentence of imprisonment for life was necessary in accordance with sub section 3 .

"Where the sentencing judge is satisfied in the exercise of his judgment that an offender is dangerous and that the conditions at section 225(2)(a) and (b) [now section 285 of the Sentencing Act 2020 ] are met, there is no discretion. He must pass a life sentence." [10]

The seriousness of the offence itself, on its own or with other offences associated with it …. This is always a matter for the judgment of the court;

The defendant's previous convictions… and

The level of danger to the public posed by the defendant and whether there is a reliable estimate of the length of time he will remain a danger;

The available alternative sentences". [22]

Further, in R v Wilder [2023] EWCA Crim 1295 , it was stated that a sentence under section 285 is " …not the same as a discretionary life sentence because there is a duty to impose such a sentence if the court has formed the evaluative judgment that the circumstances set out in section 285 exist" [23].

Accordingly, the sentencing judge is required to assess the seriousness of the offence, on its own, or any offences associated with it, any previous convictions of relevance, the level of danger to the public posed by the offender, and whether there is a reliable estimate of how long the danger will remain, as well as the available alternative sentences.

We turn to the appeals in a little more detail.

On the 30 April 2023, the appellant was arrested after the police had examined one of two mobile phones seized from him. The phones were to provide clear video evidence, in still and moving images, of repeated sexual offending over approximately nine years by the appellant. The victims of his offending, C1 and C2, were very young female children. The offences were reflected in two Indictments: Indictment A and Indictment B. The offences and sentencing are summarised in Annex A at the end of this judgment.

In Indictment B, Colin Morris vaginally raped C2 and videoed what he was doing. He penetrated the child's labia and vagina with the head of his penis and then ejaculated over her. That offence occurred on the 19 October 2021. Previously, on the 20 September 2021, the appellant had vaginally raped C2 and video recorded what he was doing. After penetrating her vagina with the head of his penis, he masturbated until he ejaculated over her vagina. Count 3 concerned an attempted oral penetration of C2 by the appellant when she was 16 months old. Counts 4, 5 and 6 relating to the making of category A and B images of the vaginal rape and attempted rape in counts 1, 2 and 3.

"When considering these in relation to Mr Morris's behaviour, the risk of recidivism is more realistically assessed as high. He is assessed as presenting a high risk of serious harm … and within the context of his offending, this assessment is extended to children in general, particularly those to whom he may have access. The harm is identified as sexual, emotional, physical and psychological, the longevity of which cannot be overestimated."

There was little that could be said by way of mitigation, save that the appellant Morris had no previous convictions. In sentencing the appellant, the judge concluded that the seriousness of the offences, both those relating to rape and attempted rape, together with the other offences and the period of time over which they occurred, led him to conclude that a sentence of imprisonment for life was justified and, therefore, was required.

In deciding upon the minimum custodial term to be served in custody, the judge concluded that the rape and attempted rape offences fell within category 1A of the Guideline, providing a Starting Point of 16 years, and a range of 13 to 19 years' imprisonment. There were multiple factors of serious harm and high culpability, which required a category 1A assessment. Further, taking into account that this was not a single offence of rape and was against two victims, with further associated offending, required an upward adjustment. The judge increased the custodial term to 28 years. That sentence was then reduced to reflect the guilty pleas by 25 per cent, leading to a sentence of 21 years, two-thirds of which was 14 years. That was declared to be the minimum term of custody as part of the sentence of imprisonment for life under section 285 of the Sentencing Act.

On behalf of the appellant, Mr Baker argued that the judge was wrong to conclude that a sentence of imprisonment for life was required, and that in its place the appellant should have been sentenced to a determinate term. A Sexual Harm Prevention Order would be sufficient, it was submitted, to provide the appropriate supervision and protection from future risk. The second ground of appeal was in relation to the length of the custodial term, based on a sentence of 28 years. Mr Baker submitted that such a term was excessive. Whilst the single judge gave permission only for the first ground, relating to the imposition of the life sentence, we gave permission on his second ground (as we have also in the Carl Jones appeal). Mr Baker argued that the minimum custodial term of 14 years was manifestly excessive.

On behalf of the respondent, Mr Roberts argues that the judge was correct to impose a life sentence under section 285 for this very serious offending. Further, that the judge was required to impose sentencing for many offences, reflecting them in the lead sentences. A sentence of 28 years' imprisonment, before plea discount and further reduction to the minimum term, was not excessive. Mr Roberts argued that the judge correctly applied the provisions within section 285 of the Sentencing Act.

On any view, the sexual offending by this appellant upon two very young victims involved repeated offending over approximately nine years, when one of the victims was as young as 18 months old. The extreme youth of the victims, together with the repeat offending, filming and distributing of what he was doing merited the conclusion which the sentencing judge reached. The argument advanced by Mr Baker, that a determinate sentence, coupled with a Sexual Harm Prevention Order, would have been sufficient to both punish and protect, seems to us to underestimate both the seriousness of the offending and the continuing risk that the appellant poses.

During the sentence hearing the court head evidence of the appellant's online communication with other paedophiles, during which they exchanged images and expressed their sexual views. In those conversations the appellant distributed some of his own images which he had made. This provided clear evidence of the deep-seated sexual interest that the appellant has for very young children. Within the Pre-Sentence report this was identified as lending support to the conclusion that the appellant's future risk, given the circumstances of this offending, meant that he would present a risk for the long term and for the foreseeable future. Accordingly, the evidence demonstrated to the sentencing judge, as it does to us, the level of danger to the public posed by this appellant is high and will remain so, indefinitely. The sentence of imprisonment for life was fully justified.

We find that we are also unpersuaded that the custodial term fixed by the judge was excessive or wrong in principle. The sentence was to reflect not a single offence of rape but multiple offending, on two extremely young victims and during a nine-year period. It merited the minimum term that was imposed and was not, in our judgment, either excessive or wrong in principle. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal.

This appellant's offending took place over a period of 20 years, between 2002 and 2023. There were 47 offences to which the appellant pleaded guilty, involving his sexual offending upon 11 young boys, who were aged between 6 and 16 at the time of the abuse.

There were eight counts of Rape of a Child under 13, involving six young boys. Most of those counts were multiple incident counts of the offence. The remaining offences involved various forms of sexual assault, sexual activity with a child, and incitement to engage in sexual activity. The offences and the sentences are set out in Annex B at the end of this judgment.

The disclosure of the appellant's offending was, as is not unusual, sequential. C8 made the first disclosure when he told the police that when he was aged 10, 11 and 12, the appellant had groomed him when taking him on days out. It was whilst he stayed at the appellant's home from time to time that the sexual offending took place. The appellant touched C8's genitals and also asked C8 for oral sex, which was refused.

The remaining complainants informed the police of similar conduct in relation to them. C1 described multiple incidents of having his penis touched by the appellant between the ages of 5 and 12, and multiple incidents of the appellant performing oral sex on C1. The appellant also rubbed his erect penis on C1 and touched his buttocks.

C2 described that he was regularly sexually assaulted between the ages of 8 and 11. The appellant told C2 to touch the appellant's penis and the appellant also performed oral sex on C2 and ejaculated on C2's body.

C3 described multiple incidents of his penis being touched by the appellant between the ages of 9 and 12, and of the appellant ejaculating on C3's body. Also, the appellant placed his penis against C3's anus and raped him at a time when he was between 10 and 12 years old.

C4 was sexually abused between the ages of 6 and 15, with multiple incidents of sexual touching, oral and anal rape. Count 28 represented multiple incidents of oral rape, whilst Count 32 reflected multiple occasions of anal rape when C4 was aged between 10 and 12. Count 33 reflected further multiple occasions of anal rape when C4 was aged between 13 and 15. Count 35 reflected multiple incidents of oral rape during the same time period.

C5 described a similar pattern to other victims, involving the touching of his genitals by the appellant, the appellant licking C5's anus and having C5 masturbate him when C5 was between the ages of 6 and 11. He was raped anally on multiple occasions, as reflected in count 47.

C6 witnessed an occasion in which C4 was being anally raped by the appellant; and on subsequent occasions, the appellant touched C6's penis.

C7 was subjected to similar sexual offending, including anal rape when he was aged 10 (Count 52) and aged 11 (Count 59).

C9 provided evidence of multiple occasions of the appellant touching his penis, licking his anus and requiring C9 to put his penis into the appellant's mouth, as well as the oral rape of C9 when he was aged between 8 and 12.

C10 described an occasion when the appellant masturbated in front of him when they were at an hotel in Blackpool.

C11 was orally raped by the appellant (Count 74).

Whilst the appellant had two previous convictions for criminal offences, neither was relevant for the purposes of sentencing.

In sentencing the appellant, the judge identified the seriousness of the offending, the number of complainants, and the period of time over which these offences were committed. Six of the complainants) were victims of rape from a very young age. They were C3, 4, 5,7,9 and 11. Three of those complainants were raped repeatedly, with evidence that one of them, C4, had been raped a number of times over a ten-year period. All of the complainants had been the subject of other sexual offending as we have identified, and which the judge had set out carefully in his sentencing remarks.

The judge treated the rape offences as lead offences for sentencing purposes. He concluded that those offences fell within category 1A of the Sentence Guideline for Rape of Victims Under the Age of 13. This provided a Starting Point of 16 years' imprisonment, with a range of 13 to 19 years. There were aggravating factors, including the young age of the complainants when the offending started, the presence of others, including children (for example, C6 in Count 49), and of ejaculation. Further, since this was sentencing in respect of 11 complainants, there was a need substantially to increase the sentence from the starting point.

The judge found little personal mitigation to affect the sentence to be imposed.

The judge concluded that a sentence of imprisonment for life under Section 285 was required. In fixing the minimum term of custody, the judge determined that the notional sentence for all of the offending would have been 45 years’ imprisonment, which he reduced by 15 per cent for the guilty pleas and then discounted by one-third to reflect the minimum term to be served in custody as part of the sentence of imprisonment for life - see section 323 of the Sentencing Act 2020 . The resulting custodial term of 25½ years was imposed upon the rape offences. On each of the remaining offences the sentences imposed were concurrent terms of eight years' imprisonment. The judge made clear that whilst some of those sentences might have been high for the individual circumstances, others were low. This unconventional approach, according to the judge, did not affect the total sentence.

On behalf of the appellant it is submitted by Mr English KC, firstly that it was wrong to impose a sentence of imprisonment for life when other appropriate disposals were available, including an Extended Sentence. Secondly, it is said that the notional custodial term was excessive when set at 45 years. It is argued that the judge failed to give sufficient credit for the mitigating factors which were available, although it is accepted on the appellant's behalf that they are not substantial. He submitted that the appellant has accepted his culpability and has sought to address the cause of his offending. Mr English also argued that the minimum term, based on a notional sentence of 45 years' imprisonment, was manifestly excessive.

For the Respondent, Mr Enoch KC submits that the imposition of the sentence of imprisonment for life was entirely justified, given the circumstances of these offences, which were committed against 11 victims over 20 years. He submitted that the circumstances of the offending, as well as the contents of the pre-sentence report, clearly demonstrated the appellant's continuing and long-term risk of serious further offending. Further, Mr Enoch submitted that whilst the custodial term was high, it was merited on the facts of this case.

"There is no doubt that Mr Jones has caused the victims significant serious sexual, emotional, psychological and physical harm from which they are unlikely to fully recover from. Most seriously, harm included oral and anal rape, which would cause the victims physical harm and placed them at risk of serious internal injury and infection. There is also the immense emotional and psychological harm of the indignity and trauma of such abuse. … It is likely that the victims will require psychological or even psychiatric interventions."

The Victim Impact Statements provided by the complainants demonstrate individually and collectively that they have struggled in various aspects of their lives, whether in education, relationships, working life and in their personal confidence. We are satisfied that the judge was correct to form the opinion that the appellant and his offending were of such seriousness as to justify a sentence of imprisonment for life.

"Offences may be of such severity, for example involving a campaign of rape, that sentences of 20 years and above may be appropriate."

When increasing the notional sentence to 45 years, forming the basis for the minimum term of 25½ years, we find that the judge imposed a sentence which was excessive. Whilst the judge was seeking to substantially increase the sentence above the guideline for a single offence and to reflect the totality of offending, it is unclear how, with respect, the judge decided that the custodial term should be 45 years. This becomes more apparent from the narrative within the guideline to which we have referred. In our judgment, that sentence was excessive and requires this court to quash the custodial term and to impose the correct minimum term.

On the basis that the rape offences each fell within category 1A of the Guideline and that the extent of the appellant's offending over 20 years could properly be described as a campaign of rape against young male children, we conclude that a sentence of 35 years would have been appropriate for a determinate notional sentence. After a discount for the guilty plea, that sentence is reduced to 30 years. Reducing that notional sentence to two-thirds for the purposes of section 232 of the Sentencing Act 2020 provides a minimum term of 20 years. That term will be imposed on each offence of Rape, being Counts 22, 28, 32, 47, 52, 59, 67 and 74. All other sentences will remain unaffected. Taking into account time served on remand of 320 days, the minimum term for the appellant is 19 years and 45 days.

We are not persuaded that in either of these appeals against the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment under section 285 of the Sentencing Act 2022 was either wrong in principle or manifestly excessive. We commend both judges for their careful and structured approach to these difficult sentences.

Although the single judge did not appear to give leave for the argument on minimum terms to be served, we have heard submissions upon that issue in respect of both appeals. We do not find that the minimum term imposed in the appeal of Morris was excessive or wrong in principle and we, therefore, dismiss that appeal. However, we are persuaded that the minimum term imposed in the appeal of Jones was manifestly excessive and therefore grant leave and quash the minimum term ordered by the judge and in its place, impose a minimum term on each of the rape offences of 19 years and 45 days. To that extent this appeal is allowed.

The Victim Surcharge Order in the case of Jones must be quashed because some of the offences occurred before 1 April 2007.