R v Lee Munro

This is an appeal of sentence after the grant of leave by the single judge.

On 24 July 2025, in the Crown Court at Bolton, the appellant changed his plea to guilty in respect of three offences of assault occasioning actual bodily harm (counts 2, 3 and 4). Two other counts were ordered to lie on the file, namely count 1 (controlling or coercive behaviour) and count 5 (the making of threatening communications).

Subsequently, on 19 September 2025, the appellant was sentenced to a total of 45 months' imprisonment, comprising 15 months in respect of count 2, ten months in respect of count 3, and 20 months in respect of count 4. All of those sentences were ordered to run consecutively to each other.

The facts are these. The appellant and the complainant had been in a relationship since 2017. The relationship started positively but began to in sour around 2018. The appellant became jealous and possessive, and would act in an abusive manner. The behaviour became worse throughout the relationship due to the appellant's consumption of drugs and alcohol. His mental health also declined, and the abuse to which the complainant was subjected also occurred when he was sober.

The first assault (the subject of count 2) occurred between 1 January 2019 and 1 December 2019 at the complainant's then home. The appellant made to punch the complainant in the face, and she reacted instinctively by putting a hand up to block the punch. This resulted in the appellant breaking and snapping the ligament in the complainant's right thumb. She did not attend hospital on that occasion but she did attend several days later because she was unable to grip things with her thumb. She told the doctor that she had trapped her thumb in a door. About one month later the appellant damaged her thumb again and she had to attend at the hospital a second time. On that occasion it was confirmed that the complainant’s thumb was fractured.

The second assault (the subject of count 3) took place on New Year's Day 2023. It entailed the appellant punching the complainant in the face during the course of an argument. The complainant did not call the police due to a fear of repercussions and did not seek medical attention, despite her eye being swollen and painful. As her eye was still very swollen after two weeks, however, she felt that she had no choice but to seek medical attention. An X-ray showed a large haematoma, although nothing was broken.

The third assault (the subject of count 4) took place in around March 2023. The complainant was folding laundry in her daughter's bedroom at her home address when the appellant threw her daughter's phone at her face, causing her to suffer a large black eye. The complainant went to hospital but gave a cover story that she had fallen into a skip. Nothing was broken but the complainant suspected nerve damage and reported "reduced sensation to her face" at the time, although a diagnosis of nerve damage was not reflected in her medical notes.

The relationship ended at some point after this incident.

On 1 September 2023 the police received a call from the complainant that the appellant was at her property "kicking off". The police attended but the appellant had left. The complainant did not feel that she could provide a statement at that time, but she later provided details of the incidents described. The appellant was subsequently arrested.

At the time of sentence the appellant was aged 41. He had 15 convictions for 25 offences spanning from 2002 to 2017. His earlier convictions included criminal damage, assaulting a police constable, driving with excess alcohol, other driving offences, and disorderly behaviour. In 2005 he was sentenced to three years and 21 months' detention in a young offender institution for a section 18 offence of causing grievous bodily harm, a section 20 offence of wounding, and also an offence of battery. In 2012 he received a community order for producing cannabis. In 2014 he received a community order for three offences of battery and one of harassment. Also in 2014 he was sentenced to a community order for driving with excess alcohol. In 2015 he was sentenced to a community order for criminal damage. In 2017 he received a suspended sentence for an offence of criminal damage.

In his sentencing remarks the judge drew attention to the fact that the three offences of assault for which the appellant was being sentenced were committed in a domestic context and when there were children present in the house. He added that they involved not merely the physical injuries sustained by the complainant, but that they had also had an impact on her mental health, as well as that of the children.

After describing the assaults, the judge went on to refer to the fact that the author of the pre-sentence report had assessed the appellant as presenting a very high risk of committing further domestic violence and to the fact that, although a letter written by the appellant showed that the appellant had "some insight", this appeared to be more in relation to the impact on the children than on the complainant.

The judge then turned to the relevant Sentencing Council guideline. In his view, each of the counts entailed offences that were appropriately categorised as category B1 offences. This, despite the fact that the harm in relation to count 3 was "not quite as serious", in the judge's view, as it was in relation to counts 2 and 4. In relation to each count the judge explained that there was significant aggravation given the appellant's previous convictions and the domestic context of the assaults for which the appellant had to be sentenced.

Having noted that for a category B1 offence the guideline gives a starting point of 18 months' custody, with two and a half years at the upper end of the applicable sentencing range, the judge then addressed count 2. He stated that, taking into account both the aggravating features and the appellant's mitigation, if the appellant were being sentenced in respect of this count alone, then the sentence would have been two years' custody. However, the judge reduced that (he used the word "mitigate", but nothing turns on this) to take into account the fact that the sentence was going to be consecutive to the two other sentences – and so for totality. As a result, the sentence was reduced to 18 months prior to credit for the guilty plea, which, after such credit, took the sentence down to 15 months' imprisonment.

The judge then addressed count 3. He explained that, after a trial and on a standalone basis, the sentence would have been 18 months, but he reduced this to 12 months (before credit for the guilty plea) to take account of totality, and to ten months to reflect the appellant's guilty plea.

As to count 4, the judge referred to the fact that, by the time this offence was committed, there was, as the judge put it, "a history of violence". He went on also to refer to the nerve damage suffered by the complainant. He noted that, had there been a trial, the notional sentence, before credit for the guilty plea, would have been two and a half years' custody, which he then reduced for totality reasons to two years, before reducing that still further to 20 months in the light of the appellant's guilty plea.

It is Miss McGinty's submission on this appeal that the overall sentence of 45 months' imprisonment was manifestly excessive. We observe that Miss McGinty appeared on behalf of the appellant before the sentencing judge. We are grateful to Miss McGinty for the economy and high quality of her submissions before us today.

Miss McGinty takes no issue with the sentence in respect of count 2. However, she submits in relation to counts 3 and 4 that the judge was wrong to categorise them as category B1 offences. She submits, rather, that the judge should have treated them as category B2 offences.

In relation to count 3 in particular, Miss McGinty submits that the judge erred in categorising the offence as category 1 for harm purposes, since the injury was limited to bruising to the face, following a single punch. As a result, she submits, the offence should have been categorised as category 2, and then aggravated to account for the additional harm to the victim, before a reduction to account for totality and credit for the guilty plea. On that basis, she submits, the sentence was too high.

Similarly, in relation to count 4, Miss McGinty submits that this also was a category 2 harm offence, in that the injury involved bruising to the face and the medical evidence did not identify a formal diagnosis of nerve damage. Miss McGinty adds that the only aggravating feature was that, by the time that the offence covered by this count was committed, there was a history of violence against the complainant and that, on this basis, the judge was wrong to have gone up from the starting point in the guideline by a further six months in arriving at a notional sentence before credit for the guilty plea.

Miss McGinty furthermore submits that the appellant was significantly disadvantaged by a risk assessment conducted by the Probation Service which appeared to be based on allegations for which the appellant was not to be sentenced, and that the judge did not reduce any part of the sentence to account for any mitigation.

Dealing first with the issue of categorisation, we reject the submission that the judge was wrong to treat count 4 as involving category 1 harm. We do so because, whether there was nerve damage or not, the judge was entitled to consider not only the fact that the complainant suffered (not for the first time) a black eye, but also the fact that there was substantial impact upon her of the appellant's offending. The judge made reference to this at the outset of his sentencing remarks in referring to the impact on the complainant "over a period of time", describing that as "the cumulative result" of the appellant's abuse. He referred also to "her psychological problems". The judge rightly took these maters into account, in accordance with the guideline, in arriving at his assessment concerning harm.

The same applies to count 3. It is true that, as the judge himself acknowledged, the physical injury sustained by the complainant in respect of this offence was not as severe as in relation to count 2, or for that matter count 4, assuming that there was the nerve damage which the complainant considered was caused by the latter. The fact remains, however, that the assault which was the subject of count 3 was part of the cumulative impact of all three assaults.

We have read the victim impact statements in this case, as had the judge. They make for harrowing reading. The impact on the complainant was considerable.

We, accordingly, do not agree with the submission that the judge ought not to have categorised counts 3 and 4 as category B1 offences.

Nor do we accept the submission made by Miss McGinty in relation to count 4 in particular that the only aggravating feature applicable in that case was the fact that there was a history of violence against the complainant. As the judge noted, there was also the fact that the offences (including, therefore, the count 4 offence) were committed in a domestic context.

All in all, we are clear that the judge's assessment not only as to categorisation but also as to the aggravating features applicable in the case of each of the assaults was right.

This brings us to Miss McGinty's submission that the appellant was significantly disadvantage by a risk assessment conducted by the Probation Service which appeared to be based on allegations for which he was not to be sentenced. We do not agree that this was the position. However, in any event, it is clear that the judge was well placed to arrive at his own assessment as to the risk presented by the appellant.

Lastly, as for the suggestion that the judge did not reduce any part of the sentences to account for mitigation, that again is not right. The judge referred, in terms, to doing so.

Having considered the various submissions advanced by Miss McGinty, we ask ourselves whether the overall sentences imposed upon the appellant were manifestly excessive. We have concluded that they were not. The judge correctly categorised the offences; he correctly took into account relevant aggravating and mitigating features; and he had appropriate regard to the totality principle, before giving credit for the appellant's guilty pleas, as to which no criticism is made. Having done these things, he arrived at sentences which were appropriate and which were not, in our judgment, manifestly excessive.

It follows that the appeal against sentence is dismissed.