House of Lords · 3-2: Lords Steyn, Slynn and Jauncey in the majority; Lords Hutton and Hobhouse dissenting
Facts
The defendant, a carer, befriended an elderly man of low intelligence and over several months he withdrew sums of money from his building society account and gave them to her, in total about 60000 pounds. The gifts were made voluntarily and were valid gifts in civil law, but she was charged with theft on the basis that she had acted dishonestly.
History
The defendant was convicted of theft at the Crown Court. The Court of Appeal dismissed her appeal against conviction, following Gomez, and she appealed to the House of Lords, which dismissed the appeal by a majority of three to two.
Issue
Whether a voluntary transfer of property by the owner to the defendant can amount to appropriation under section 3(1) of the Theft Act 1968 when the defendant's conduct is dishonest.
Held
Appeal dismissed by a majority of three to two; the conviction for theft stood.
Ratio
- A defendant appropriates property within section 3(1) Theft Act 1968 by assuming the rights of the owner, even where the owner voluntarily makes a gift, if the defendant's conduct is dishonest.
The judgments
Lord Steyn (lead)
Held that appropriation is a neutral term covering any assumption of the rights of an owner. A voluntary gift can be an appropriation if the defendant's conduct is dishonest. The law should not create a loophole for those who exploit vulnerable people.
Lord Hutton (concurring)
Dissented. Held that a gift that is valid under the civil law passes ownership to the donee, so that accepting it is not an assumption of the rights of an owner, and that Gomez should not be extended so far as to make the acceptance of a gift theft.
Lord Hobhouse (concurring)
Dissented. Held that theft requires an adverse interference with or usurpation of the rights of the owner, which does not occur where the owner effectively gives the property away, and that dishonesty in procuring a gift is not a substitute for that element.
Key reasoning
- The term 'appropriation' in section 3(1) is neutral and covers any assumption of the rights of an owner, following Gomez.
- The owner's consent to the transfer does not prevent appropriation if the defendant's conduct is dishonest.
- The law of theft should protect vulnerable people from exploitation, and a narrow reading would create an unacceptable loophole.
- Dishonesty is the key element that distinguishes criminal from non-criminal conduct in this context.
Where it fits in the module
Hinks sits alongside Gomez (1993) and Morris (1984) as a foundational case on the meaning of appropriation in property offences. It illustrates the tension between a broad statutory interpretation and the requirement of adverse interference, a debate shown in earlier cases such as Pitham and Hehl (1977) and continued in later cases such as Briggs (2003). The case is central to Topic 5 examination of how the Theft Act 1968 defines the actus reus of theft.
Criticisms
- The majority's interpretation renders the concept of appropriation almost meaningless by equating it with any dishonest acquisition.
- It blurs the distinction between theft and fraud, since the defendant's conduct might be better prosecuted under deception offences.
- The decision creates uncertainty about when a gift becomes criminal, particularly regarding the vulnerability of the donor.
- The dissenting view that appropriation requires adverse interference is more consistent with the ordinary meaning of the word and the structure of the Theft Act.
Written with AI (nvidia/nemotron-3-ultra-550b-a55b) on 1 November 2026, reviewed for errors by a second model (claude-sonnet-5.5 (Claude Code reviewer)). Read the case itself at [2000] 3 WLR 1590, [2001] Crim. L.R. 162. Spotted an error? Tell us.