R v Matthews and Alleyne

Facts

Matthews and Alleyne robbed and beat a man, then took him to a bridge and threw him into the river below. He could not swim, which they knew, and he drowned. They were convicted of murder and appealed on the ground that the jury had been misdirected on the mental element of murder, in light of Woollin.

History

The appellants were convicted at the Crown Court and appealed to the Court of Appeal Criminal Division.

Issue

Whether the Woollin direction on foresight of virtual certainty constitutes a substantive definition of intention or a rule of evidence, and what the correct jury direction on intention in murder should be.

Held

The appeals were dismissed. The Court held that the Woollin direction is a rule of evidence, not a definition of intention.

Ratio

• The Woollin direction is a rule of evidence: the jury must be directed that they are not entitled to infer intention unless they are sure that death or serious bodily harm was a virtual certainty and the defendant appreciated that, but they are not obliged to infer intention even if those conditions are satisfied.

The judgments

Key reasoning

• The court examined the history of the definition of intention from Moloney through Hancock and Shankland to Nedrick and Woollin.
• It concluded that Woollin did not create a new definition but gave a direction on how juries should approach foresight of consequences as evidence of intention.
• The direction that the jury are not entitled to find intention unless virtual certainty is proved is a safeguard against over-ready inference of intention.
• The jury retains the discretion not to find intention even if virtual certainty is established.

Where it fits in the module

This case is central to the Oxford Criminal Law Mods Topic 1 on basic principles, specifically the mens rea of murder and the meaning of intention. It follows Woollin and precedes the House of Lords decision in G and R (2003) which dealt with recklessness. It illustrates the judicial struggle to distinguish between foresight of consequences as evidence of intention and as a definition of intention, a debate that also informs the discussion of recklessness in Caldwell and G and R. The case is often taught alongside Moloney, Hancock and Shankland, Nedrick, and Woollin to trace the evolution of the concept of intention.

Criticisms

• The distinction between a rule of evidence and a substantive rule is conceptually fragile and may not be understood by juries.
• The direction not entitled to find versus required to find creates a confusing middle ground that effectively makes virtual certainty a de facto definition of intention.
• The decision leaves open the possibility that a jury could find intention without virtual certainty, undermining the clarity sought by Woollin.
• Some argue that the court missed an opportunity to provide a clear statutory definition of intention.