RAJ v MSH

This is my judgment on a trial of preliminary issues ( TPI ). The issues are the familiar ones which arise in most libel claims:

The single natural and ordinary meaning of the words complained of;

Whether, in those meanings, the words complained of amount to allegations of fact or expressions of opinion;

Whether, in those meanings, the words complained of are defamatory at common law.

There is also a claim for malicious falsehood, and I return to this below.

Parties, factual background, publications complained of

The Claimant is a university lecturer who, at the material time, was the academic lead for his university’s LLB Law and Practice course, with programme management and teaching responsibilities.

The Defendant was a final year student on the university’s LLB Law and Practice course in the academic year commencing September 2019. Some of the modules the Defendant undertook during that academic year were taught and assessed by the Claimant.

In 2020, the Defendant was awarded a 2:2 degree. She says that she narrowly missed out on a 2:1, falling short by just 2 points.

On 5 November 2020, the Defendant sent an email to members of the University Registry team, titled “Re: Complaint – LLB Result Classification – Urgent Review Request” ( the Review Request ). An anonymised copy of the Review Request is attached at Appendix 1 to this judgment.

On 2 December 2020, the Defendant submitted to the University an appeal against her degree classification ( the Academic Appeal ). An anonymised copy of the Academic Appeal is attached at Appendix 2 to this judgment.

Procedural history

The history of this claim has been lengthy and convoluted. I do not need to describe every twist and turn.

The Claimant’s present case is set out in his Amended Particulars of Claim dated 14 June 2023 ( A/PC ). The most recent iteration of the Defence is a proposed Re-Amended Defence dated 17 November 2023. It is unclear to me whether permission has been granted to the Defendant to rely on this document but, in any event, she was ordered to file a document setting out her case on meaning etc and did so on 17 September 2024 ( the Defendant’s Statement on Meaning ) so I have taken this as definitive of her position.

A TPI was first ordered by Master Dagnall on 19 July 2024 when he simply directed that “ there shall be a trial on meaning as a preliminary issue ”. Later, Collins Rice J directed in her Order of 17 September 2025 that the parties’ submissions should be “strictly limited to” the issues that I have identified above (natural and ordinary meaning, fact/opinion, defamatory at common law).

The Defendant filed a revised skeleton argument for the TPI on 10 October 2025 and the Claimant filed a revised position statement on 8 December 2025. I have taken both into account, notwithstanding that they were filed outside the timeframe imposed by Collins Rice J.

Legal principles

For the purposes of the libel claim, I must identify the single, natural and ordinary meaning of the statements complained of, applying the well-established principles re-stated by Nicklin J in Koutsogiannis v Random House Group Ltd [2019] EWHC (KB) 48, [2020] 4 WLR 25 at [12] (approved by the Court of Appeal in Corbyn v Millett [2021] EWCA Civ 567 , [2021] EMLR 19 ). I direct myself by reference to those principles and do not need to set them out here. The overall task is to determine the meaning that would be conveyed to the ordinary reasonable reader, reading the statement once.

The hypothetical reader is taken to be representative of those who would read the publication in question. However the Court should be cautious about ascribing particular characteristics to publishees without evidence (principle (xi)). A party who wishes to argue that publishees would have understood a statement in a particular sense because they already knew additional facts that had a bearing on how the meaning would have struck them must usually identify those facts and those publishees who knew them (an “innuendo meaning”, in libel law parlance).

I am not bound by the parties’ pleaded meanings: I can take my own view, so long as I do not find a meaning that is more injurious than the claimant’s pleaded meaning: principle (xiii). Further, in relation to principle (xiii), claimants can (to some extent) choose which aspects of a statement they complain about: “…the judge should not normally make a finding of any meaning which is not either advanced to some extent in the statement of case or submissions of one or other party, or within the same class or range as a meaning so advanced” : Yeo v Times Newspapers Ltd [2015] 1 WLR 971 at [82] (Warby J).

A statement must be read in its context. In certain circumstances, the relevant context may extend beyond the document in which the statement is situated and include extrinsic material, so long as it could reasonably be expected to be known to (or read by) all the publishees: Riley v Murray [2020] EWHC 977 (QB) , [2020] EMLR 20 at [16]-[17] (Nicklin J). A party who wishes to rely on such extrinsic material must identify it in their statement of case: Hijazi v Yaxley-Lennon [2020] EWHC 934 (QB) at [14] (Nicklin J).

The Claimant refers me to Berkoff v Burchill [1997] EMLR 139 at 151 where Neill LJ said that, while the meaning of a statement is determined objectively, by reference to the reaction of the ordinary reasonable reader and not by the intention of the publisher, “ the perceived intention of the publisher may colour the meaning ”. I accept that, of course, but I do not consider that it makes any real difference in the present case.

Koutsogiannis also sets out, at [16]-[17], the definitive approach to determining whether a statement is a statement of fact or an expression of opinion and I direct myself by reference to that statement of the law: essentially I am concerned again with the impression that the words would make on the reasonable reader.

A statement is defamatory at common law if it would tend to lower the claimant in the estimation of right-thinking people generally and would have a substantially adverse effect on the way that people would treat the claimant: Corbyn [9]. I am not presently concerned with the question of whether the publication of the statements complained of would surpass the higher threshold of “serious harm” introduced by section 1 of the Defamation Act 2013 .

In accordance with the practice that has developed since British Chiropractic Association v Singh [2010] EWCA Civ 350 , [2011] 1 WLR 133 (see [32], Lord Judge CJ), I have considered the three preliminary issues concurrently rather than sequentially, lest my resolution of one of the issues might artificially “stifle” my approach to the others.

“[…] any determination must be clear, unequivocal, and firmly tied to the purposes of rulings of this kind. These are to identify and spell out with precision one or more meanings or imputations about the claimant that meet the common law tests for what is defamatory and, where appropriate, to categorise the statement as factual or as an expression of opinion. Anything that falls short of meeting these criteria risks generating further disagreement and dispute.”

The Claimant sexually harassed the Defendant in the course of her classroom and face-to-face studies (23 September 2019-19 March 2020) by demanding that she enter into a sexual relationship with him;

The Claimant victimised the Defendant when she refused to have the alleged sexual relationship with him, by marking down her coursework and awarding lower than deserved marks for her [ specified modules I have omitted the module titles from the parties’ meanings on a precautionary basis because the Claimant contends that they are unique to the University and would tend to identify the parties.

The Claimant victimised the Defendant by withholding information from her in order to adversely affect her performance and by refusing to provide her a reference for her Legal Practice Course application (June 2020) after being asked to do so in writing, in an attempt to coerce her into meeting in private in order to make sexual advances;

The Claimant abused his office as a university lecturer by coercing the Defendant into a relationship against her wishes and awarded her improved marks for [ specified modules ] (27 April-17 July 2020) as a reward for the alleged relationship;

The Claimant abused his office by providing the Defendant with misleading information about her degree classification in order to manipulate her for his own benefit;

The Claimant discriminated against the Defendant by targeting and awarding her lower than deserved marks on account of her religion.

The Claimant used the threat of mark reduction to force the Defendant into a sexual relationship with him during her final two modules[ specified modules ] (27 April-17 July 2020) as a result of which she was given “fair marks” for her two final modules;

Subsequent to receiving the “fair marks” for her final modules, when the Defendant refused to engage in sex with him, the Claimant reduced the Defendant’s grade resulting in lowering her degree classification from a 2.1to a 2.2;

The Claimant victimised the Defendant by failing to disclose his alleged sexual interest in her to the University examination board and moderation team which resulted in the reduction of her marks for [ specified modules ] (23 September 2019-10 April 2020);

The Claimant sexually harassed the Defendant at a meeting within the University around the first week of October 2019 by making sexual advances at her, describing his drug use to her, giving her his telephone number and asking her to meet privately with him;

The Claimant subsequently victimised the Defendant with the result that her grades for [ specified module ] (11 Nov-20 Dec 2019) were reduced, on account of her refusal to meet privately with him for sex;

The Claimant discriminated against the Defendant by ignoring her emails seeking assistance for her assessments whilst providing guidance to his ‘favourite students’ one week in advance of other students.

The Claimant pleads reliance, for context, on various documents that were submitted with the Academic Appeal. He is entitled to do so (it is reasonable to assume that recipients of the appeal document would have read all these), though I do not consider that they make any difference on the issues I have to decide.

The Claimant’s case is that all the statements complained of amount to statements of fact, not expressions of opinion, and that they are defamatory of him at common law. He contends that they convey “ Chase level 1” meanings (after Chase v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1772 , [2003] EMLR 11 ), i.e. they allege actual misconduct by the Claimant, not merely that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that he engaged in misconduct or to investigate whether he did so.

The Defendant’s case

[…]

The Claimant abused his office as a university lecturer by exploring ( sic ) the power imbalance in coercing the Defendant into a relationship which she ordinarily would not have got into without the Claimant’s chains of advances and awarded her improved marks for [ specified modules ] (27 April -17 July 2020) as a reward for the alleged relationship;

The Claimant abused his office by providing the Defendant with misleading information about her degree classification and non-detriment policy in order to manipulate her for his own benefit;

The Claimant discriminated against the Defendant by commenting on, and attempting to pull up her hijab to see and feel her real haring during the classroom meeting. The Claimant awarded the Defendant lower than deserved marks in earlier modules when she was refusing to relate to him in the way he wanted.

The Claimant used the threat of mark reduction to force the Defendant into a sexual relationship with him during her final two modules as her result in [ specified modules ] showed improved marks compared to the earlier 4 modules which Claimant confirmed to the Defendant during their sexual relationship that it was improved because they were relating well at that time;

[…];

The Claimant victimised the Defendant by reduction of her marks for [ specified modules ] (23 September 2019-10 April 2020), with an unfair and vindictive view. The Claimant then failed to disclose his alleged sexual interest in her to the University examination board and moderation team;

The Claimant sexually harassed the Defendant at a meeting within the University around the first week of October 2019 by making sexual advances at her, telling he loved [ nationality Again, omitted on a precautionary basis as the Claimant contends that disclosure of the Defendant’s nationality would contribute to identifying the parties.

The Claimant subsequently victimised and discriminated against the Defendant upon refusal to co-operate with him initially with the result that her marks in the 4 earlier modules ( specified modules ]– 23 September 2019-10 April 2020) were given marks less than her work deserved on account of her refusal to meet privately or relate to the Claimant the way he had wanted (sexual relationship);

The Claimant discriminated against the Defendant by ignoring her emails seeking assistance for her assessments whilst providing guidance to his ‘favourite students’ in a much earlier time than herself.

Although not evidenced by the formulations the Defendant actually advances, she contends that the statements complained of fall short of Chase Level 1. Rather, she contends, her statements call for an investigation into the Claimant’s conduct instead of alleging guilt. In support of this contention she relies on the context of her communications – they were submitted to the University in order to instigate an investigation - and the role and characteristics of the publishees – trained University officers tasked with handling complaints in accordance with the University’s policies, such that they will have kept an open mind pending a full and fair investigation. She therefore characterises the reasonable reader of her communications as “informed, balanced and procedurally literate – not a naïve outsider”.

The libel TPI – decision and reasons

The Claimant sexually harassed and victimised the Defendant (his student) by refusing to address complaints that the Defendant had raised unless the Defendant was prepared to get close to him, and then failing to assist her with her studies, failing to respond to a request for an academic reference, and giving her lower marks than deserved, until she began to talk to him in the manner he desired;

By asking the Defendant to get close to him, the Claimant was improperly asking her to engage in a sexual relationship with him .

When the Defendant reluctantly responded to the Claimant’s advances, he misled her by falsely stating that it had been decided that she would be awarded a 2:1 degree. He did so in order to manipulate the Defendant for his own benefit;

The Claimant targeted the Defendant in class and discriminated against her because she wears a Hijab for religious reasons and because she refused to socialise with him.

As can be seen, I have formulated my own meanings which have elements of both parties’ meanings. The parties’ meanings struck me as including detail that was unnecessary for the purpose of articulating the defamatory sting, rendering them overlong and in some respects confusing. Based on my initial impressions (before reading the parties’ cases) I might have been inclined to state a meaning that was more serious or extensive in some respects, but I bear in mind Koutsogiannis principle (xiii) and the guidance in Yeo that I have set out above.

Although the Claimant makes much of the fact that recipients of this document were university staff with knowledge of the timing of various course assessments etc, I do not think that this has any real significance, so far as his case is concerned. The defamatory sting that I have sought to capture in my formulation above would have been readily apparent to anyone, with or without knowledge of specific university procedures and the examination timetable. Likewise, in contrast to the Claimant, I have not found it necessary to incorporate “abuse of office” into the meanings. Plainly, a lecturer who behaved in the manner alleged would be abusing their office, but that, it seems to me, will be something to consider at the “serious harm” stage. It does not need to be spelled out as part of the meaning.

The underlined meaning would strike the reasonable reader as an expression of opinion, not a statement of fact and, though I am not asked to determine the point, my view is that the Review Request sufficiently indicated the basis of this opinions, for the purposes of Defamation Act 2013 , s3(3) . The words that give rise to the allegation that the Claimant wanted a sexual relationship are “…he …suggested that I could not successfully challenge him unless ‘I get close to him’ in other words engage in sexual relationship with him ”. The reader can therefore see that this is the subjective interpretation the Defendant is placing on the words “get close”.

I considered whether the allegation that the Claimant’s harassing conduct was sexual in nature was also an expression of opinion. I reached the view that there is a clear factual allegation of sexual harassment in the statement, and that the only part of it that is presented as a matter of subjective evaluation (and hence, opinion) is the suggestion that, by asking the Defendant to become “close” to him, the Claimant was asking her to enter into a sexual relationship. Sexual harassment can occur, as the reasonable reader would recognise, in many ways falling short of actually proposing a sexual liaison. In my judgement, a reasonable reader would recognise that it was being alleged, as a fact, that the Claimant was harassing the Defendant on the basis of her sex. Only the suggestion that he was actually proposing a sexual relationship with her would strike the reasonable reader as the Defendant’s own subjective interpretation of what the Claimant was seeking.

I also considered whether the allegation that the Claimant was engaged in manipulating the Defendant for his own benefit might qualify as an expression of opinion. Statements about person’s inner motivations can often strike a reader as the writer’s own subjective inferences or conclusions from the person’s outwardly observable conduct. That is not how the allegation is presented in the Review Request, however ( “it turned out that all the information he gave me was to manipulate me for his personal benefit…” ). In my judgement it would strike the reader as an assertion of established fact that the Defendant has discovered, not a personal opinion.

The Academic Appeal

The Claimant forced the Defendant (his student) to enter into a relationship and to engage in sexual acts against her will by threatening to reduce her grades and marks and telling her that his decisions would be beyond challenge;

The Claimant nevertheless reduced the Defendant’s grades and marks because she refused his demands to have penetrative sex with him;

The Claimant failed to disclose his sexual interest in the Defendant and her refusal of his sexual demands to the rest of the exam board and moderation team (of which he was a member), such that his low marking prevailed and the Claimant achieved only a 2:2 degree instead of a 2:1;

The Claimant is thereby guilty of sexually harassing and victimising the Defendant.

Again, these meanings would have been conveyed to any reader of the document and do not depend on detailed knowledge of university procedures.

The statements in the Academic Appeal are, in my judgement, all allegations of fact, not expressions of opinion. The form invites the person completing it to identify facts and evidence that support their appeal, and that, in the eyes of the reasonable reader, is what the Defendant has done.

The malicious falsehood claim

The Claimant also brings a claim for malicious falsehood, founded on the same statements complained of.

There are significant differences between the torts of libel and malicious falsehood, one of them being that the “single meaning rule” applicable in libel does not apply in malicious falsehood. Instead, a claimant is entitled to advance any meaning which falls within the range of reasonable interpretations of the statement complained of: Ajinomoto Sweeteners Europe SAS v Asda Stores Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 609 , [2011] QB 497 ; Cruddas v Calvert [2013] EWHC 1427 (QB) , [2014] EMLR 4 at [56]-[69] (Tugendhat J).

The Claimant’s position statement invites me to determine that the meanings he has pleaded in the A/PC are at least “available” meanings for the purposes of a malicious falsehood claim, even if they may not be the single natural and ordinary meaning that falls to be applied to the statements for the purposes of a libel claim.

I have hesitated over whether it is really open to me to make a meaning determination in respect of the malicious falsehood claim. Master Dagnall’s order of 19 July 2024 directs a TPI on “meaning” without further qualification; but Collins Rice J’s Order of 17 September 2025 then limits submissions to the “single natural and ordinary meaning of the words complained of” (i.e. their meaning for libel purposes).

Despite these misgivings, I have decided that it is appropriate and fair to decide the issue of meaning in relation to malicious falsehood as well as libel. It falls within the scope of Master Dagnall’s original order and, although the Defendant has not expressly addressed it, she has not suggested that any of the Claimant’s pleaded meanings are incapable of being conveyed by the statements complained of (as opposed to just being wrong according to the libel test).

Although I have not adopted the Claimant’s meanings for the purposes of the libel claim, I accept that his pleaded meanings in respect of the statements complained of in the Review Request and the Academic Appeal are within the range of meanings that a reasonable recipient of these documents might attach to them. Accordingly, the malicious falsehood claim can go ahead on the basis of the meanings set out in the A/PC. Alternatively, if the Claimant now wishes to bring his malicious falsehood pleading in to line with my libel meanings, that would be permissible. It would certainly simplify matters.

Costs

Conclusion and next steps

The statements complained of bear the single natural and ordinary meanings that I have set out at paragraphs 33 and 40 above;

The underlined part of those meanings was an expression of opinion. The remainder were statements of fact;

The statements complained of, in the meanings I have found them to bear, were defamatory of the Claimant at common law;

For the purposes of his malicious falsehood claim, the Claimant may rely on the meanings he has pleaded in the A/PC if he wishes;

The costs of the TPI will be “costs in the case”

If either party considers that they may wish to appeal against these determinations, they should inform the Court prior to hand down of this judgment, so that I can take steps to preserve the Court’s jurisdiction to entertain an application for permission to appeal.

After so long in the doldrums, this case now needs to progress swiftly towards trial. When circulating this judgment in draft, I have also circulated a draft order setting a tight timetable for the necessary amendments to statements of case and thereafter a CMC to obtain trial directions. I have asked for the parties’ comments on these proposals.

Breach of legitimate expectation