“Attorney General cannot veto court orders on freedom of information disclosure”
The Guardian newspaper sought disclosure of Prince Charles's correspondence with government ministers under the Freedom of Information Act 2000. The Upper Tribunal ordered disclosure, but the Attorney General issued a certificate under section 53 FOIA vetoing the disclosure on grounds of constitutional principle and potential damage to Prince Charles's future role as King.
Whether the Attorney General can lawfully exercise the executive override power under section 53 FOIA to veto a judicial decision ordering disclosure of information.
The Attorney General's certificate was unlawful. The executive override power cannot be used to override a judicial decision on disclosure made by a tribunal.
This case established important limits on executive power and reinforced the principle that the executive cannot override judicial decisions, strengthening the separation of powers doctrine in UK constitutional law.
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OSCOLA Citation
R (Evans) v Attorney General [2015] UKSC 21, [2015] AC 1787
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