Facts
A stadium near Mildenhall in Suffolk had for decades been used for speedway racing, and later for stock car racing, and a separate track nearby was used for motocross. These activities had been given planning permission over the years, in some cases subject to conditions on noise and days of use. The Lawrences bought a house near the stadium and track, and found the noise intrusive. They sued the operators for private nuisance and sought an injunction limiting the noise.
Issue
Whether the noise from the activities was a nuisance in view of the planning permissions and the character of the locality; whether the claimants had no remedy because they had come to the nuisance; and whether the court should grant an injunction or award damages in lieu, and how the old authority on damages in lieu of an injunction should be applied.
Held
The activities were held to cause a nuisance, as the noise was beyond what neighbours could be expected to put up with in the locality as it was. Planning permission was not a defence, and the claimants had not forfeited their remedy by moving in later. The question of whether to order an injunction or award damages in lieu was sent back to the High Court, with guidance that the established criteria for refusing an injunction should not be applied rigidly.
Ratio
- Planning permission does not in itself authorise a nuisance or provide a defence, though it may be relevant to the character of the locality if it reflects a change of that character as a result of a strategic planning decision.
- It is not a defence to a claim in nuisance that the claimant came to the nuisance, since the question is whether the activity causes an unreasonable interference with the use of the claimant's land, and the fact that the claimant arrived after the activity began does not alter whether the interference is unreasonable.
The judgments
Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury (lead)
Gave the main judgment. Planning permission is not a licence to commit nuisance and will only change the character of a locality in particular circumstances, such as a strategic decision to allow a new use. Coming to the nuisance is not a defence. On remedy, a court should not treat the established four-part test for denying an injunction as a rigid rule; the decision to refuse an injunction should be made with regard to all the circumstances, including the public interest, and the court should keep an open mind about damages in lieu.
Lord Sumption (concurring)
Agreed that the activities were a nuisance and stressed that the defendants should not escape because they had used the land for a long time in a way that the planning authority accepted. He took a more cautious view about injunctions, considering that an injunction should not usually be granted where it would stop an activity that has a public benefit and the loss of amenity can be compensated by damages.
Lord Carnwath (concurring)
Agreed with the result and with the approach to planning permission, and doubted that the approach to damages in lieu of an injunction in the old authorities was consistent with modern ideas about the public interest in planning.
Key reasoning
- A planning authority considers the public interest and does not decide private rights between neighbours, so a permission cannot extinguish the right of a neighbour to be free of unreasonable interference unless there is a statutory provision that so provides.
- Whether an activity is a nuisance depends on the character of the locality, but an established use that causes noise at a level that would be a nuisance anywhere does not change what is reasonable, and a person who acquires nearby land is entitled to the benefit of the ordinary law.
- The remedy is discretionary, and the older cases on damages in lieu of an injunction, which required the claimant to satisfy a strict list of conditions, are guidelines, not a code, and the court must be allowed to consider the public interest and other relevant factors.
Obiter
- A comment that the existence of planning permission may be a relevant factor in the choice between an injunction and damages, and that a court should give weight to the planning authority's assessment of the public interest where that is relevant to the remedy.
Where it fits in the module
In Tort (FHS), on Private nuisance and trespass to land, Coventry is the principal modern authority on defences and remedies. It is read with Sturges v Bridgman (1879) 11 Ch D 852, Gillingham BC v Medway (Chatham) Dock Co Ltd [1993] QB 343, Watson v Croft Promosport Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 15, and Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co [1895] 1 Ch 287. Candidates should consider the tension between the private right to be free from nuisance and the public interest in planning decisions, whether a presumption in favour of injunctions can be justified, and how damages in lieu fit with the compensatory rationale of tort and with the protection of property rights.
Criticisms
- Denying planning permission any effect except in unusual cases makes it hard for operators and local authorities to rely on public planning decisions, and creates a risk of liability for activities that have been approved.
- Allowing the claimants to succeed although they moved in knowing of the activities gives little weight to the way the area developed, and prevents a business that was established earlier from using land in the way it was lawfully permitted to do.
- The refusal to lay down firm rules on injunctions makes the outcome of cases uncertain and makes it difficult for parties to settle, because they cannot tell whether a court will order the activity to stop.
- Allowing damages in lieu of an injunction could allow a defendant to buy the right to continue a nuisance, which has been criticised as a form of compulsory purchase of the claimant's rights.
Written with AI (claude-sonnet-5.5 (Claude Code writer)) on 1 November 2026, reviewed for errors by a second model (claude-sonnet-5.5 (Claude Code checker)). Read the case itself on Find Case Law. Spotted an error? Tell us.