House of Lords · Lord Goff, Lord Lloyd, Lord Hoffmann, Lord Hope and Lord Cooke; Lord Lloyd and Lord Cooke dissenting on the right to sue
Facts
Several hundred claimants lived in the Isle of Dogs in London. They sued the owners of the Canary Wharf tower, a very tall building, claiming that it interfered with their television reception. Some also complained of dust created during the construction of a road by a development corporation. Not all of the claimants had a proprietary interest in the homes where they lived; some were family members or licensees. Preliminary issues were tried on whether the interference with television reception was actionable in nuisance and whether those without an interest in land could sue.
History
The Court of Appeal held that a person with no proprietary interest, but who had a substantial link with the property, could sue in private nuisance, following its earlier decision in Khorasandjian v Bush. The matter went to the House of Lords.
Issue
Whether interference with television reception caused by the presence of a building is actionable in private nuisance; whether a claimant must have an interest in the land affected in order to sue in private nuisance; and how damages should be measured.
Held
The House held that interference with television reception by the mere presence of a building is not actionable in private nuisance, and that only a person with a right to the land affected, such as an owner or tenant in possession, can sue. The decision in Khorasandjian v Bush was overruled on this point.
Ratio
- Private nuisance is a tort against the enjoyment of land, so only a person with a right in the land, such as the freeholder, a tenant in possession or a licensee with exclusive possession, can sue; a mere licensee or family member cannot.
- The erection of a building which interferes with television reception is not actionable in nuisance, because there is no right to receive a television signal across neighbouring land and the law does not protect against interference caused by the presence of a building.
The judgments
Lord Goff of Chieveley (lead)
Held that nuisance is a tort directed against the claimant's land, and that to allow persons without an interest to sue would convert the tort into one protecting individual personal interests, which belonged to the law of negligence or harassment. Interference with television reception by a building was not a nuisance, and there was no basis for a right to a television signal.
Lord Hoffmann (concurring)
Agreed that nuisance protects land, and explained that damages for nuisance compensate for loss of amenity of the land, measured by diminution of its value, not for personal discomfort of each occupier. This avoids multiplying damages according to the number of occupants.
Lord Cooke of Thorndon (dissenting)
Would have allowed a person in occupation as a home with a substantial link to the property to sue, regarding the rule excluding family members from a remedy for a nuisance in the home as arbitrary and contrary to the purpose of the tort.
Lord Lloyd of Berwick (concurring)
Agreed with Lord Goff that interference with television reception by the presence of a building is not actionable in nuisance, but dissented on standing, taking the view that Khorasandjian v Bush was rightly decided and that an occupier of a home with a substantial link to it could sue.
Lord Hope of Craighead (concurring)
Agreed with Lord Goff that the claim for television interference failed and that a right in the land was needed to sue in private nuisance.
Key reasoning
- Nuisance is the infringement of rights in land, and the claimant must show that the interference affects a right that he has in respect of the land.
- The claim that a tall building interferes with television signals is analogous to a claim that it blocks a view, which the law does not protect, and there was no good reason to treat the signal differently.
- If persons without a proprietary interest could sue, the damages would multiply and the tort would move away from its basis in land use to personal injury and harassment, areas the law of negligence addresses.
Obiter
- Lord Hoffmann said that the remedy for nuisance by way of damages is for diminution in value of the land, which explains why the same nuisance affecting a house produces a single award, whatever the number of occupants.
Where it fits in the module
In the FHS topic on private nuisance and trespass to land, Hunter v Canary Wharf is the leading authority on standing and the nature of the tort, and in the remedies topic it shows the measure of damages for nuisance. It overruled Khorasandjian v Bush [1993] QB 727 on standing, so that harassment by telephone calls was no longer treated as nuisance and fell to be dealt with under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. The nature of private nuisance and the role of loss of amenity were revisited in Fearn v Tate Gallery [2023] UKSC 4. The tutorial question is whether tying nuisance to proprietary interests is sound or whether the tort should protect occupiers' amenities.
Criticisms
- The proprietary requirement excludes children, partners and lodgers who suffer the harm most directly, so that the tort fails to protect those who actually experience the nuisance.
- The decision treats damages as compensating for loss of value of the land, though nuisance is typically about the loss of enjoyment by persons, and this leaves nuisance uneasily placed between property and personal injury.
- The reasoning that a building cannot be a nuisance for television reception is formal and does not take account of the practical importance of reception to residential use.
- The ownership rule leaves gaps in the protection of persons from harassment, which are filled instead by statute.
Written with AI (claude-sonnet-5.5 (Claude Code writer)) on 1 November 2026, reviewed for errors by a second model (claude-sonnet-5.5 (Claude Code checker)). Read the case itself at [1997] AC 655. Spotted an error? Tell us.