House of Lords · Unanimous: Lord Hailsham LC, Lord Bridge of Harwich, Lord Brandon of Oakbrook, Lord Griffiths and Lord Mackay of Clashfern. Lord Hailsham gave the leading speech.
Facts
The appellants were members of a group dominated by an older man, Murray, and took part in violent killings which they said they carried out because he threatened them. The trial judges ruled that duress was not available as a defence to murder and the appellants were convicted.
History
The trial judges ruled that duress was not available to the appellants as a defence to murder and the Court of Appeal dismissed their appeals. The Court of Appeal certified a point of law and the appellants appealed to the House of Lords.
Issue
Whether duress is available as a defence to a charge of murder or attempted murder.
Held
Appeals dismissed. Duress is not a defence to murder, whether the defendant is the actual killer or a principal in the second degree. Lynch was overruled. Convictions upheld.
Ratio
- Duress is not a defence to murder, whether the defendant is the actual killer or a principal in the second degree.
The judgments
Lord Hailsham LC (lead)
Lord Hailsham held that duress cannot excuse the taking of an innocent life, as the law holds that a person ought rather to die than kill an innocent victim. He held that the defence was not available to a principal in the second degree to murder, and that Lynch should be overruled.
Lord Bridge (concurring)
Agreed that duress is excluded for murder and attempted murder on grounds of public policy. The moral choice to kill an innocent person cannot be justified by threats, and the law must not recognise a licence to kill under coercion.
Lord Griffiths (concurring)
Supported the exclusion of duress for murder and attempted murder. Emphasised that the law values the sanctity of innocent life above the defendant's survival under threat.
Key reasoning
- The sanctity of innocent human life is a fundamental principle of criminal law that outweighs the defendant's interest in self-preservation under threat.
- It would be arbitrary to distinguish between the person who actually kills and the person who takes part as a principal in the second degree, since both participate in the killing of an innocent person.
Where it fits in the module
Howe is central to Topic 6 (Complicity) because it defines the limits of the duress defence for both principals and secondary parties. It is frequently contrasted with Gotts (which extended the rule to attempted murder) and discussed alongside Hasan (which refined the test for duress). The case illustrates the policy tension between individual moral culpability and the protection of innocent life in the context of joint criminal enterprise.
Criticisms
- The absolute exclusion of duress for murder ignores the moral reality that a person acting under imminent threat of death may have no realistic choice, making the conviction of such a defendant as a murderer seem unjust.
- The rule creates an anomaly: duress is a defence to manslaughter but not to murder, even though the defendant's moral culpability may be identical in both cases.
- The 'reasonable firmness' standard is criticised as unrealistic when applied to threats of immediate death, effectively demanding heroism from ordinary individuals.
- The later extension of the rule to attempted murder in Gotts is criticised as harsh, since no life is taken, yet the defendant is liable to a possible life sentence.
Written with AI (nvidia/nemotron-3-ultra-550b-a55b) on 1 November 2026, reviewed for errors by a second model (claude-sonnet-5.5 (Claude Code reviewer)). Read the case itself at [1987] AC 417, [1987] Crim. L.R. 480. Spotted an error? Tell us.