Facts
The defendant, who had taken a large quantity of drugs and alcohol, became involved in a fight and assaulted people at a public house, and then assaulted police officers who came to deal with the matter. He relied on his state of intoxication as showing he did not have the mental element of the offences.
History
He was convicted of assault occasioning actual bodily harm and of assaults on police officers. The Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal, and the House of Lords heard his appeal on a certified point of law.
Issue
Whether self-induced intoxication by drink or drugs is a defence to charges of assault occasioning actual bodily harm and assault on a police officer, in that it prevented the defendant from forming the necessary mens rea.
Held
Appeal dismissed and the convictions stood. Voluntary intoxication cannot be relied on as a defence to a crime of basic intent.
Ratio
- Evidence of voluntary intoxication may be relevant to whether a defendant formed the specific intent required for a crime of specific intent, and if it prevents the formation of that intent he is not guilty of that offence.
- Self-induced intoxication is not a defence to a crime of basic intent, because becoming voluntarily intoxicated is itself a reckless course of conduct that supplies the mental element of such offences.
- This rule applies to drugs as well as alcohol, including the drugs taken by the defendant, which are of a kind that may be dangerous.
The judgments
Lord Elwyn-Jones LC (lead)
He held that the rule that voluntary intoxication is no defence to offences of basic intent was settled by long authority and was supported by considerations of public policy and the protection of the public.
Lord Simon of Glaisdale (concurring)
He explained the distinction between crimes of specific and basic intent in terms of whether the mental element goes beyond the actus reus, and reasoned that prior fault in becoming intoxicated supplies the necessary mens rea.
Key reasoning
- The distinction between specific and basic intent had a long history in the cases and was a practical means of applying the law to intoxicated offenders.
- A person who voluntarily takes drink or drugs knowing that they may make him aggressive or unpredictable is reckless, and that recklessness is sufficient mens rea for offences of basic intent.
- Policy considerations pointed in the same direction, since a rule that permitted intoxication to excuse violence would leave the public unprotected.
Where it fits in the module
In Topic 8 on defences, Majewski is the key case on how the law treats those who lack the capacity for mens rea through their own act. It raises the central tension between the principle that liability requires contemporaneous fault and the policy of protecting the public from violence committed under the influence of drink and drugs.
Criticisms
- The rule departs from the principle that mens rea must coincide with the actus reus, since the fault of getting intoxicated is treated as a substitute for the fault at the time of the offence.
- The distinction between specific and basic intent is unprincipled and difficult to apply, and produces odd results such as that a defendant may be acquitted of murder but convicted of manslaughter on the same facts.
- Imputing recklessness from the act of drinking means that a person who does not foresee any risk of harm from drinking is nevertheless treated as reckless, which is inconsistent with a subjective approach to fault.
- The rule is justified by policy, but policy is an uncertain basis for liability for serious crimes when the defendant lacked awareness of what he was doing.
Written with AI (claude-sonnet-5.5 (Claude Code writer)) on 1 November 2026, reviewed for errors by a second model (claude-sonnet-5.5 (Claude Code checker)). Read the case itself at [1977] AC 443, [1976] Crim. L.R. 374. Spotted an error? Tell us.