R v Antanas Jancevskis

The provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act apply to this offence. Under those provisions, where an allegation has been made that a sexual offence has been committed against a person, no matter relating to that person shall during that person's lifetime be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify that person as the victim of that offence. This prohibition applies unless waived or lifted in accordance with section 3 of the Act. For the avoidance of any doubt, we do not waive or lift the prohibition.

On 19 February 2025 in the Crown Court at Leicester before HHJ Mooncey, the appellant (who was then aged 35) was convicted of an offence of rape. On 20 March 2025, before the same judge, the appellant was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment. Various other ancillary orders were made which we do not need to deal with in any detail. The appellant now appeals against that sentence with leave of the Single Judge.

In briefest outline, he submits that the judge mischaracterised the offence of rape as a category 1A offence when it should have been treated as a category 2A offence. Had that happened, the appellant submits that a sentence in the region of 10 to 11 years should have been imposed.

On 17 April 2022 the victim (who we shall call "V") was invited to a barbecue quite close to her home which she and her flatmate joined at about 3.00 pm. The appellant was at the barbecue with his partner and child. There were other people there including the appellant's brother and another couple. V was drinking heavily and flirting with the appellant's brother. Later she was sick on the stairs and was taken home by her flatmate and the appellant's brother. That was at about 8.00 pm and V was left on the sofa or couch in her flat.

The appellant said he was going out to get more alcohol. He did not return and everyone tried to call him. The complainant V was asleep on the couch and woke to find someone touching her. She asked them to stop. She recognised the appellant from the barbecue as the man who was there with his wife and child. She started to shout in the hope that her housemate would hear her. The appellant immediately put his hands over her mouth. She said that she could not breathe and the appellant replied: "Then you shut up". He removed her trousers and underwear, he pushed her down with his chest and hands on her shoulders. She was crying. The appellant raped her. He stopped every so often to ask her whether she was crying. The complainant reached for her bag which contained her telephone and attempted to call the police. Call logs showed efforts at 11.38 pm and 11.41 pm. Whilst the appellant was raping her the complainant was saying: "Please stop. I don't want this." The appellant was demanding that she kiss him. He told her to stop crying and to "shut up". After he had ejaculated inside her, he helped the complainant put her trousers back on and then went to the toilet.

V ran to the front door but it was locked. She remembered that her bedroom window was open and ran out without any shoes. She ran to a house with a light on and the resident helped her call the police. The police attended and took the complainant to their car to try to locate the attacker. As they did so she saw her housemate who described the appellant. The appellant was then seen and arrested. In interview the appellant said that he had consensual sexual activity with the complainant in the bedroom of the address where the party was held. He denied that he had been to the complainant's home address.

When sentencing the appellant, the judge decided that it was not necessary to commission a pre-sentence report on the basis that counsel could cover all relevant matters in mitigation. We are satisfied that there is no need for us to commission a report, and we have not done so.

There was a victim impact statement from V, which she made shortly after testifying and which was dated just three days after the appellant was convicted. In it she explained how the rape had turned her life upside down. She had fought for 5 years to achieve her goal of becoming an ICU nurse and had achieved her ambition just 2 months before the rape. She felt compelled to leave her job and lost the career she had built-up over that time. She found herself without an income which made returning to her home country both an emotional and financial struggle. She had developed a severe anxiety state. She now distanced herself from everyone, family, friends and colleagues. The trauma affected both her psychological and her physical wellbeing. For months she could not sleep in her bed. She felt a compelling need to have additional protection which led her to get a large dog as her companion. When the original trial date was broken in February 2024 it was "like reopening a wound that had never fully healed." She had to face the waiting and the sense of injustice all over again. She found the experience of giving evidence, with the appellant seeking to undermine everything she said, to be traumatic; and now that she had testified instead of feeling relieved she felt trapped in a spiral of thoughts and regrets.

"For a while she was unable to sleep in her own bed. She became very anxious. She had to receive therapy… She will forever remember this traumatic experience that she has suffered. It will be a scar that she carries."

"The extreme nature of one or more category 2 factors or the extreme impact caused by a combination of category 2 factors may elevate to category 1."

Turning to culpability, the judge put the case in category A on the basis that there was a significant degree of planning evidenced by going to V's address (which he knew because he had been there earlier in the day to collect some chairs) knowing that she had been left there in a drunken state and alone. On this basis, the judge characterised the offence as falling within category 1A which meant that the starting point under the guideline was 15 years with a category range from 13 to 19 years.

The judge then turned to aggravating and mitigating features. As aggravating features, he identified ejaculation inside V and committing the offence while himself under the influence of alcohol. The judge expressly, and correctly, excluded from potential aggravating features the location of the offence, the fact that V was compelled to leave her home and that the appellant had targeted her when she was particularly vulnerable because they had been taken into account when deciding that the case fell within category 1A.

In mitigation, the judge identified that the appellant had no previous convictions and had caring responsibilities as the father of two children. Because of his lack of English, he is isolated in prison.

The appellant's submissions

In relation to the psychological effect on V it was known that she had a new partner who attended the trial and that she was expecting her first child, which should temper the Court's understanding of the continuing impact upon her.

The incident should not have been regarded as sustained. It was one act of rape rather than repeated episodes. Piecing together various sightings on CCTV suggests that the appellant's time in V's flat was somewhat less than suggested by the judge.

There was no violence or threat of violence beyond that inherent in the offence.

The applicable category 2 factors were (a) severe psychological harm; (b) uninvited entry into V's home and (c) V being particularly vulnerable . It is submitted that none of those factors were of an extreme nature and that there was no extreme impact caused by a combination of those factors.

There were no category A factors for culpability. There was no evidence to justify a finding that there had been a significant degree of planning. It was agreed that the appellant had left the barbecue to go and get more alcohol. The person identified as the appellant on CCTV made their way to the local Tesco’s which was the only place in the vicinity to sell alcohol. At the last moment they changed direction and headed off in the direction of V's home. The appellant climbed through a window but there was no way that he would have known in advance that the window would be open. This should properly be regarded as an opportunistic offence that did not involve significant planning within the meaning of the guideline.

Accordingly, this was a category 2B offence with a starting point of 8 years and a category range of 7 to 9 years. Alternatively, it was a category 1B offence, with a starting point of 12 years and a category range of 10 to 15 years. In either event, the sentence passed was based on a mischaracterisation and was manifestly excessive.

On any view this was a horrible and despicable crime. It is also right that the judge had the advantage of presiding over the trial, which allowed him to observe both the appellant and V in detail, and gave him an advantage over this Court when assessing the detailed facts of the offending and its impact on V.

We address first the judge's assessment of harm. There were multiple category 2 factors. It was and is common ground that there was uninvited entry into V's home and that she was particularly vulnerable due to her intoxication and being asleep when the appellant entered and started to assault her. Even with the tempering evidence that V now had found a partner who was supporting her, her victim impact statement fully justified the conclusion that she suffered severe psychological harm. The judge assessed that she was an impressive witness, and he clearly accepted that the impact of the offence included the loss of her career and the compelling need to leave her home and this country. The judge was entitled to take these features into account when considering the level of psychological harm inflicted by the appellant. He was scrupulous in avoiding double counting that impact when he came to considering aggravating and mitigating features as we have set out above. That said, there is some force in Ms Rose's submission that this offence did not involve a "sustained incident" within the meaning of the guideline. The horror doubtless seemed unending to V as it happened, but it is material to remember that the factor as it appears in the guideline is "prolonged detention/sustained incident". In our judgment, the current offence lacks the duration or persistence that is normally to be understood to be indicated by that guideline factor. However, we must then stand back and review the combination of factors that we agree are applicable. Having done so, the question arises whether that combination of factors justified the judge's decision to treat the offence as falling within category 1 for harm.

In our judgment, when considering whether the multiple factors justified or compelled him to elevate the case to category 1, the judge was entitled and right to focus on the impact of the rape on V's life, including in particular the loss of the career that she had worked so hard to establish, the loss of her home and her return to her home country. Even on the basis that she had now (some 3 years after the offence) managed to reach a somewhat better place, we consider that the judge was entitled to conclude that this case fell within category 1 for harm.

Turning to culpability, the only category A factor identified by the judge was a significant degree of planning. In our judgment, the criticisms of that finding are well made by Ms Rose. There is no evidence that the appellant set off from the barbecue with the intention of assaulting V. The fact that having reached the place from which he might purchase alcohol he changed tack and went to V's home and there found an open window does not readily fit the description "significant degree of planning".

We have therefore come to the conclusion that this offence should have been treated as falling within category 1B, with a starting point of 12 years and a category range from 10 to 15 years. In our judgment, the judge's assessment that the aggravating and mitigating features cancelled themselves out was generous given the limited weight afforded to previous good character when dealing with serious offending such as this. However, we do not consider that it was an assessment that he was not entitled to make. In the result therefore, we quash the sentence of 15 years imposed by the judge and substitute a sentence of 12 years. To that extent this appeal is allowed.