T v Director of Public Prosecutions

Facts

T was involved in an assault on a youth. In the course of the attack the victim lost consciousness for a short time. The victim did not suffer any lasting injury, but the loss of consciousness was relied on by the prosecution as the actual bodily harm.

Issue

Whether a momentary loss of consciousness, without more, is actual bodily harm within section 47 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861.

Held

The court held that a loss of consciousness, even if brief and transient, can constitute actual bodily harm, and the conviction was upheld.

Ratio

• Actual bodily harm includes any hurt or injury calculated to interfere with the health or comfort of the victim, and a loss of consciousness, though momentary, is capable of being such harm.

Key reasoning

• Bodily harm is not confined to injury to the skin, flesh and bones but includes harm to the nervous system and the brain, and an episode of lost consciousness is an interference with the proper functioning of the body that goes beyond the merely trifling.
• The earlier statements that harm must be more than transient and trifling were satisfied, because a loss of consciousness is not trifling even though brief.

Where it fits in the module

T v DPP is a useful case on the boundary between assault, battery and actual bodily harm in the offences against the person. It tests how far the statutory expression actual bodily harm extends and how the courts avoid defining it narrowly. It also raises the policy question whether the existing structure of sections 18, 20 and 47 gives proportionate gradations of liability.

Criticisms

• Treating a transient loss of consciousness as actual bodily harm risks extending a triable-either-way offence with a five-year maximum to conduct that leaves no lasting damage, blurring the gap between battery and section 47.
• The decision is difficult to reconcile with statements that harm must be more than transient and trifling, since the logic of the ruling makes the duration of the injury largely irrelevant.
• The reasoning relies on medical characterisation by the court rather than evidence of the victim's experience, leaving unclear how a defendant is meant to know what counts as harm.