Denton, R. v

Facts

The defendant was employed by the owner of a business, and the premises and machinery belonged to the employer. The employer asked the defendant to set fire to the premises so that a claim could be made on the insurance. The defendant did so and was charged with arson.

History

The defendant was convicted of arson by a jury in the Crown Court and appealed against conviction.

Issue

Whether a defendant who damages property with the consent of the owner commits criminal damage where the owner consents in order to defraud an insurer, given the lawful excuse in section 5(2)(a) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971.

Held

Appeal allowed and the conviction quashed. A person acting with the consent of the owner is not guilty of criminal damage, and the fraudulent purpose of the owner does not alter that.

Ratio

• Criminal damage requires damage to property belonging to another; where the owner himself consents to the damage, the defendant commits no offence under section 1(1) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971, whatever the motive of the owner.
• The owner would not himself have committed criminal damage by destroying his own property, and the same must be true of an agent who acts on his authority; any fraud on the insurer is a separate matter.

Key reasoning

• The statutory definition looks to property belonging to another, and the right of the owner to deal with his property as he wishes means that the owner cannot himself be guilty of criminal damage in respect of it.
• Since the defendant acted on the authority of the owner, the consent was a lawful excuse in the sense of section 5(2)(a), and there was no ground for importing a requirement of honest motive into the consent.
• The wrong, if any, lay in the fraud on the insurers, which could be dealt with by other offences of dishonesty rather than criminal damage.

Where it fits in the module

In the Property Offences topic the case is used to examine the boundaries of criminal damage and the lawful excuse of consent, and to ask how far the criminal law should treat consent as meaningful where it is given for an unlawful purpose. It contrasts with theft, where the dishonesty of the defendant is central.

Criticisms

• The reasoning treats the owner consent as complete even though it was given to further a crime, which sits uneasily with the general principle that consent is not effective if obtained or given for an illegal purpose.
• The case shows a gap in the criminal law: the person who burns the premises and the owner who procures the burning escape liability for criminal damage, leaving only fraud offences to deal with the danger to life and property.
• The case leaves the law uncertain about how far the motive of the owner matters, since in other areas of the criminal law a consent given as part of a criminal plan may be treated as ineffective, and the decision is not easily reconciled with that approach.