R v Richardson and Irwin

Facts

The defendants were students who had been drinking at a party. In what they said was horseplay, they lifted a friend and held him over the edge of a balcony, and he fell and suffered serious injuries.

History

They were convicted of inflicting grievous bodily harm contrary to s 20 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 after the judge told the jury that a belief in consent resulting from drink could not be considered. They appealed.

Issue

Whether a defendant who through voluntary intoxication mistakenly believes that the victim consents to what is done to him can rely on that belief in respect of an offence of basic intent.

Held

Appeal allowed and the convictions quashed. The jury should have been told that they could consider whether the defendants honestly believed that the victim consented, whether or not that belief was affected by drink.

Ratio

• Where consent is a defence to the offence, a defendant who honestly but mistakenly believes that the victim consents is not guilty, and that belief may be relied on even if the mistake was induced by voluntary intoxication.

Key reasoning

• The rule that voluntary intoxication is no answer to a basic intent offence concerns the mental element of the offence charged, and the question here was one of a defence based on belief in consent.
• The court relied on the reasoning in Jaggard v Dickinson [1981] QB 527, where a drunken belief as to a state of affairs was held relevant to the statutory defence of lawful excuse.
• The judge was wrong to tell the jury to ignore the effect of drink on the beliefs of the defendants about consent, and the convictions were unsafe.

Where it fits in the module

Topic 8 includes voluntary intoxication, with the rule in DPP v Majewski [1977] AC 443 that drink is no defence to basic intent offences. This case tests how far that rule extends to defences that rest on mistake, and puts the subject of consent alongside self-defence and duress. The debate is whether the law should treat a drunken defendant as sober for all purposes or whether defences should be available on the basis of honest belief.

Criticisms

• Allowing an intoxicated mistake to operate as a defence is inconsistent with the policy of the Majewski rule, which is to hold those who voluntarily lose control responsible for the consequences.
• The distinction between a mistake negating the mental element and a mistake supporting a defence is formalistic, since in each case the defendant escapes liability because of drink.
• The decision sits awkwardly with the treatment of drunken mistakes in self-defence, and the resulting law is inconsistent across defences involving mistaken belief.