R v Jones

Facts

The defendant had a grievance against the victim. Armed with a loaded shotgun, he got into the car of the victim and pointed the gun at him. The victim seized the gun and a struggle followed. The safety catch of the gun was still on at the time he pointed the weapon.

History

The defendant was convicted by a jury of attempted murder, among other counts. He appealed against the conviction for attempted murder, arguing that the judge should have withdrawn the issue from the jury because the acts he had done were no more than preparation.

Issue

Whether the acts of the defendant were more than merely preparatory to the commission of murder within section 1(1) of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 when he had not yet removed the safety catch or pulled the trigger, and the respective roles of judge and jury.

Held

Appeal dismissed. There was evidence on which the jury could find that the defendant had gone beyond mere preparation, and the judge had been right to leave the question to the jury.

Ratio

• Under section 1(1) of the 1981 Act the question whether an act is more than merely preparatory is for the jury, once the judge decides that there is evidence on which a jury could properly find that it was; the act need not be the last act the defendant needed to do.
• The defendant who has got into the car with a loaded gun, with the intention of killing, and pointed it at the victim, can be found to have begun the commission of the offence, even though there remained steps to take such as removing the safety catch and firing.

Key reasoning

• The 1981 Act replaced the common law tests such as the last act test and the proximity rule with a statutory formula, and the Act should be applied according to its words rather than the older tests.
• The court rejected the argument that the defendant had to be at the point of no return, and held that a jury was entitled to find that the offence had begun once he had the gun, the car and the victim together and had aimed it at him.
• The judge ruling that the case could go to the jury and the direction on the statutory phrase were correct, so that there was no ground for disturbing the verdict.

Where it fits in the module

In the Inchoate Liability topic the case is used to examine how the statutory formula of more than merely preparatory applies to cases of attempted murder, and to compare the older tests of proximity. It raises the question whether the law should wait for the last act and what role the jury has in drawing the line.

Criticisms

• The statutory phrase more than merely preparatory gives little guidance, so that the line between preparation and attempt is left to the jury and outcomes are unpredictable.
• Treating the act of pointing a loaded gun as the start of the offence moves the line of liability back to a point at which the defendant may still have desisted, which is arguably too early.
• Rejecting the older proximity tests without replacing them with any clear criterion leaves the law uncertain and gives the jury what is in effect a free decision on the point.