Facts
The defendant, Tabassum, approached women claiming to be conducting medical research and performed breast examinations on them. The women agreed believing the examinations were for legitimate medical purposes. In reality, the defendant's purpose was sexual gratification.
History
The defendant was convicted of indecent assault at trial. He appealed against conviction arguing that the women had consented to the act.
Issue
Whether consent to an act is vitiated when obtained by deception as to the purpose of the act, where the victim consents to a medical examination but the defendant's true purpose is sexual gratification.
Held
Appeal dismissed; convictions upheld.
Ratio
- Consent to touching given only because the victim believes it is for a medical purpose is not consent to indecent touching; where a defendant deceives the victim as to the nature and quality of the act, there is no true consent and the touching is an indecent assault.
Key reasoning
- The court distinguished Richardson, where consent was given despite a deception about the defendant's qualifications, from this case, where the women consented to touching only for a medical purpose and did not consent to the indecent touching that took place.
- The victims' consent was to a medical procedure; the defendant's act was fundamentally different in nature and purpose from that to which they agreed.
Where it fits in the module
Tabassum is distinguished from Richardson (1999), where deception about the defendant's qualifications did not vitiate consent, and it anticipates the statutory treatment of deception as to the nature or purpose of an act in section 76 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. It contrasts with later cases such as Dica (2004) and Konzani (2005) where consent to the risk of disease was examined, and it relates to the broader debate on when fraud vitiates consent in offences against the person.
Criticisms
- The distinction between deception as to nature/purpose and deception as to identity is difficult to apply in practice.
- The decision may extend the vitiation of consent too far, potentially criminalising conduct where the victim agreed to the physical act but was mistaken about the defendant's motive.
- It creates uncertainty about what constitutes 'purpose' versus 'motive' in the context of consent.
Written with AI (nvidia/nemotron-3-ultra-550b-a55b) on 1 November 2026, reviewed for errors by a second model (claude-sonnet-5.5 (Claude Code reviewer)). Read the case itself at [2000] 2 Cr App R 328, [2000] Crim LR 686. Spotted an error? Tell us.