Crown Court · Judge J (Mr Justice Judge) sitting at first instance
Facts
Slingsby and the deceased were engaged in consensual sexual activity which included vigorous digital penetration. Slingsby was wearing a signet ring, which cut the deceased internally. The wounds became infected and she died of septicaemia. There was no suggestion that Slingsby intended to cause injury or that he realised that his actions were likely to do so.
History
Slingsby was charged with manslaughter and tried at the Crown Court before a judge sitting with a jury. The judge ruled on the law as to unlawful act manslaughter, and Slingsby was acquitted.
Issue
Whether a death resulting from injuries inflicted accidentally during consensual sexual activity can amount to unlawful act manslaughter, and whether the activity could be an unlawful act because of the harm it inflicted.
Held
Slingsby was not guilty of manslaughter. The sexual acts were consensual and not an assault, and in the absence of any intention or foresight of harm they were not unlawful merely because they led to unforeseen injury.
Ratio
- Where the victim consents to the activity and the defendant neither intends nor foresees injury, the activity is not an unlawful act for the purposes of manslaughter, even if injury and death unexpectedly result.
Key reasoning
- Consensual sexual intercourse and related activity is not an assault, and so does not supply the unlawful act required for unlawful act manslaughter.
- The principle that consent is no defence to the infliction of actual bodily harm applies where harm is intended or at least foreseen as likely, but not where the injury is an accidental and unforeseen consequence of lawful activity.
Where it fits in the module
Slingsby belongs in the non-fatal offences topic because it explores how consent interacts with injury and with the structure of unlawful act manslaughter. It is a first-instance decision, but it illustrates the limits of the principle in Brown [1994] 1 AC 212, which concerned deliberately inflicted injury, and the distinction between intended and accidental harm. It also invites comparison with gross negligence manslaughter.
Criticisms
- As a Crown Court ruling it carries no binding weight, and its reasoning was not tested on appeal.
- Locating the scope of consent in the defendant's foresight of harm blends the issues of consent and mens rea and fails to explain why consent should cover an injury that no one anticipated.
- The case leaves open whether a defendant who was grossly negligent about the risk of injury, for example by wearing a ring during rough activity, might have been liable for gross negligence manslaughter.
Written with AI (claude-sonnet-5.5 (Claude Code writer)) on 1 November 2026, reviewed for errors by a second model (claude-sonnet-5.5 (Claude Code checker)). Read the case itself at [1995] Crim LR 570. Spotted an error? Tell us.