Facts
Clarke was a woman suffering from depression. She was seen in a supermarket putting items into her own bag and was charged with theft of goods of small value. She said that she had acted absent-mindedly because of her depression and had no intention of stealing.
History
At trial the judge ruled that her account of absent-mindedness amounted in law to a defence of insanity. Faced with that ruling she pleaded guilty. She appealed against conviction to the Court of Appeal.
Issue
Whether a defence that the defendant acted absent-mindedly because of depression and so lacked the intent to steal amounts to a defence of insanity under the McNaughton rules, or whether it is a denial of mens rea.
Held
Appeal allowed and the conviction quashed. The defence was not insanity, because absent-mindedness is not a defect of reason from disease of the mind, and the plea of guilty had been induced by an incorrect ruling.
Ratio
- The insanity rules apply only where the defendant suffers from a defect of reason caused by a disease of the mind, not merely a failure to use the powers of reasoning. A defendant who acts absent-mindedly or fails to concentrate, even through depression, does not have a defect of reason in that sense, and the defence is a denial of mens rea.
Key reasoning
- The rules require a defect of reason, which means a deprivation of the power of reasoning, and not simply failing to use the power to reason.
- A person who acts while absent-minded or confused has the power but fails to use it, so the condition lies outside the insanity rules, even if it is associated with a medical disorder.
- The defendant should have been allowed to argue that she lacked the intention to steal, and the effect of the wrong ruling was that she was prevented from putting a defence that might have succeeded.
Where it fits in the module
In the Incapacity and General Defences topic the case sets one limit on the defence of insanity and helps to show how the common law treats cases of impaired functioning. The key issues are the reach of the McNaughton rules, the difference between a defect of reason and a lack of concentration, and the treatment of mental disorder as a denial of mens rea or as a special verdict. Hennessy and the cases on internal and external factors should be read with it.
Criticisms
- The distinction between a failure to use reason and a lack of the power to reason is artificial and does not match the way mental illness operates.
- The case highlights the narrowness of the insanity rules and the unwillingness of the courts to bring cases of mild disorder within them, which is consistent with the stigma attached to the verdict but leaves the law unprincipled.
- The court preferred to protect the defendant from the harsh consequences of an insanity verdict, and it did so by reasoning about the meaning of defect of reason rather than by addressing whether the special verdict is appropriate.
Written with AI (claude-sonnet-5.5 (Claude Code writer)) on 1 November 2026, reviewed for errors by a second model (claude-sonnet-5.5 (Claude Code checker)). Read the case itself at [1972] 1 All ER 219, (1972) 56 Cr. App. R. 225. Spotted an error? Tell us.