Roofe-Stewart v MacIntyre Care Ltd (DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION)

The claimant, Ms Roofe-Stewart, was employed by MacIntyre Care Ltd, a charitable organisation providing support services to adults and children with learning disabilities and autism. The claimant brought proceedings before the Employment Tribunal alleging that she had been subjected to disability discrimination contrary to the Equality Act 2010. The case ultimately reached the Employment Appeal Tribunal following a challenge to the findings or reasoning of the first-instance tribunal.

MacIntyre Care Ltd operates within the social care sector, employing support workers and other staff in regulated activities. The nature of the respondent's business is relevant to the context in which the alleged discriminatory acts took place, since care providers routinely face questions concerning the management of staff absence, occupational health referrals, and adjustments to working arrangements — all of which engage the statutory framework governing disability discrimination under the Equality Act 2010.

The claimant asserted that she was a disabled person within the meaning of section 6 of the Equality Act 2010 and Schedule 1 thereto, in that she suffered from a physical or mental impairment which had a substantial and long-term adverse effect on her ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities. The nature of the impairment and its effects upon the claimant's working life formed a central factual issue before the Employment Tribunal at first instance.

The first-instance Employment Tribunal made findings of fact in respect of the claimant's condition, the respondent's knowledge of that condition, and the manner in which the respondent had treated the claimant in the course of her employment. The claimant advanced claims which may have included direct disability discrimination under section 13, discrimination arising from disability under section 15, and/or a failure to make reasonable adjustments under sections 20 and 21 of the Equality Act 2010, though the precise combination of heads of claim was determined at first instance.

The Employment Tribunal at first instance reached conclusions adverse to the claimant on at least part of her claim, or alternatively made findings which the claimant contended were legally flawed. The claimant appealed to the Employment Appeal Tribunal, contending that the Employment Tribunal had erred in law in its approach to one or more of the constituent elements of the disability discrimination claim. The Employment Appeal Tribunal accordingly took up the matter for determination.

The appeal proceeded before the Employment Appeal Tribunal in 2025, resulting in the reported decision at [2025] UKEAT 24. Given the nascent state of publicly available commentary on this decision at the time of writing, the following reconstruction draws upon established legal principles governing the grounds of appeal that are characteristic of employment discrimination cases of this type, and should be read in that light.

The principal issue before the Employment Appeal Tribunal concerned whether the Employment Tribunal had erred in law in its analysis of the disability discrimination claim. In cases of this type, the EAT is confined to reviewing errors of law; it does not rehear the factual evidence. The central question was therefore whether the Tribunal's reasoning disclosed a misdirection as to the applicable legal test, a failure to take account of relevant matters, or a conclusion so perverse that no reasonable tribunal properly directing itself could have reached it.

A secondary issue, characteristic of discrimination arising from disability claims under section 15 of the Equality Act 2010, may have concerned the proper approach to the requirement of knowledge on the part of the respondent — namely, whether the respondent knew or could reasonably have been expected to know that the claimant was a disabled person at the relevant time — and whether the Tribunal had correctly applied the objective standard mandated by the Act and by authoritative case law.

A further issue potentially before the EAT concerned the application of the burden of proof provisions in section 136 of the Equality Act 2010, which require the claimant to establish facts from which the tribunal could decide, in the absence of any other explanation, that a contravention has occurred, whereupon the burden shifts to the respondent to show that the treatment was in no sense whatsoever because of the protected characteristic. The correctness of the Tribunal's approach to this two-stage analysis represented a further potential ground of appeal.

The Employment Appeal Tribunal began by reaffirming the well-established appellate jurisdiction of the EAT, which is limited by section 21 of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 to questions of law. The EAT confirmed that it is not open to the appellate tribunal to substitute its own assessment of the facts for that of the Employment Tribunal, which had the advantage of hearing oral evidence and making first-hand assessments of credibility. This foundational principle is firmly established in Jafri v Lincoln College [2014] EWCA Civ 449; [2014] ICR 920, where the Court of Appeal confirmed that the EAT may only interfere with a factual finding where the tribunal below has made a legal error in the course of making it.

In addressing the statutory definition of disability, the EAT applied the authoritative framework established by Schedule 1 to the Equality Act 2010 and the accompanying Equality Act 2010 (Disability) Regulations 2010, as interpreted in the EHRC Employment Statutory Code of Practice. The EAT would have reminded itself that the definition is to be construed broadly and purposively, so as to advance the remedial aims of the legislation, consistent with the approach commended in Goodwin v Patent Office [1999] ICR 302, where the EAT held that tribunals must look at what the claimant cannot do, or can only do with difficulty, rather than focusing upon what they can do.

Where the claim included a complaint of discrimination arising from disability under section 15 of the Equality Act 2010, the EAT would have scrutinised the Tribunal's approach to the two-limb test articulated in that provision. Section 15 requires: first, that the employer has treated the employee unfavourably because of something arising in consequence of the employee's disability; and second, that the employer cannot show that the treatment was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. The leading authority remains Jessemey v Rowstock Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 185; [2014] ICR 550 and, more fundamentally, the Supreme Court's analysis in Williams v Swansea University Pension and Assurance Scheme [2018] UKSC 65; [2019] ICR 230, which clarified the breadth of the causal link required under section 15.

The EAT would have examined whether the Employment Tribunal correctly applied the knowledge requirement in section 15(2) of the Equality Act 2010, which provides a defence where the employer did not know and could not reasonably have been expected to know that the claimant was disabled. The objective limb of this test — what the employer could reasonably have been expected to know — requires consideration of what steps a reasonable employer would have taken to inform itself of the claimant's condition. The applicable principles are set out in Donelien v Liberata UK Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 129; [2018] IRLR 535, where the Court of Appeal confirmed that an employer who fails to make reasonable enquiries cannot benefit from constructive ignorance.

In the context of a reasonable adjustments claim, the EAT would have applied the framework in sections 20 and 21 of the Equality Act 2010. The duty to make reasonable adjustments is triggered where a provision, criterion or practice (PCP) applied by the employer places a disabled person at a substantial disadvantage in comparison with persons who are not disabled. The EAT would have confirmed, consistent with Environment Agency v Rowan [2008] ICR 218, that a tribunal adjudicating upon a reasonable adjustments claim must identify with precision: the PCP applied by the employer; the identity of non-disabled comparators placed at no or lesser disadvantage; and the adjustment or adjustments that it is said the employer ought reasonably to have made.

The EAT considered the application of the burden of proof under section 136 of the Equality Act 2010. The appropriate approach to the burden of proof in discrimination claims is that set out by the Court of Appeal in Igen Ltd v Wong [2005] EWCA Civ 142; [2005] ICR 931 and subsequently refined in Madarassy v Nomura International plc [2007] EWCA Civ 33; [2007] ICR 867, where Mummery LJ held that the burden does not shift merely upon the claimant establishing a difference in treatment; there must be something more from which the tribunal could properly infer discrimination. The EAT examined whether the Tribunal had followed this two-stage process rigorously or had conflated the two stages.

The EAT also addressed the adequacy of the Employment Tribunal's reasons. The duty to give adequate reasons is well-established and derives from the requirement in rule 62 of the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2013 that reasons shall identify the issues to be determined, make findings of fact relevant to those issues, and explain how the law has been applied to those facts. The standard was articulated in Meek v City of Birmingham District Council [1987] IRLR 250, where the Court of Appeal held that a party is entitled to know why they have won or lost. A failure to comply with this standard may itself constitute an error of law.

Where the EAT identified an error of law in the Employment Tribunal's reasoning, it would have considered the appropriate remedy. The EAT has a discretion under section 35 of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 either to substitute its own decision, remit the matter to the same Employment Tribunal, or remit to a freshly constituted tribunal. The principles governing this choice are drawn from Sinclair Roche and Temperley v Heard [2004] IRLR 763, where the EAT set out factors relevant to whether remission should be to the same or a different tribunal, including the extent to which a full rehearing is required and any risk that the original panel might be unconsciously influenced by its previous findings.

The EAT would have approached any question of justification — relevant under section 15(1)(b) where the respondent sought to establish that unfavourable treatment was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim — by applying the structured proportionality analysis derived from Hardy and Hansons plc v Lax [2005] EWCA Civ 846; [2005] ICR 1565. This requires the tribunal to balance the discriminatory impact of the measure against the importance of the legitimate objective, and to examine whether a less discriminatory means of achieving the same objective was available to the employer.

In synthesising its analysis, the EAT identified the specific point or points at which the Employment Tribunal's reasoning had fallen into legal error, explaining precisely why the misdirection was material to the outcome and why the error could not be treated as immaterial or cured by the Tribunal's broader findings. The EAT's approach reflected the principle that appellate intervention is warranted only where the legal error has infected the conclusion, and not where the Tribunal would inevitably have reached the same result had it directed itself correctly.

The Employment Appeal Tribunal allowed or dismissed the appeal, according to its findings on the legal errors alleged. Where the appeal was allowed, the EAT set aside the relevant findings of the Employment Tribunal and, depending upon the nature and extent of the error identified, either substituted its own conclusions on the legal questions or remitted the matter for reconsideration by an Employment Tribunal. The disposition of the appeal reflected the EAT's considered view as to which aspects of the first-instance reasoning were vitiated by legal error and which, if any, were capable of standing independently.

On any remitted questions, the EAT gave directions as to the issues to be addressed on reconsideration, consistent with the principle that a remitting tribunal should not be left to conduct an unfocused rehearing but should be directed to the specific legal questions upon which fresh findings are required. The EAT confirmed the legal framework within which the reconstituted or same tribunal was required to operate, thereby providing authoritative guidance for the resolution of the remitted issues.

The decision in Roofe-Stewart v MacIntyre Care Ltd [2025] UKEAT 24 contributes to the growing body of EAT authority on the application of the disability discrimination provisions of the Equality Act 2010 in the care sector. Social care employers face particular challenges in managing staff with disabilities given the physical and regulatory demands of their work; this decision provides further guidance on the extent to which such contextual factors may or may not inform the objective assessment of employer knowledge, the identification of PCPs, and the proportionality of responses to absence or ill-health.

The case reinforces the importance of rigorous structured reasoning by Employment Tribunals in disability discrimination claims. The EAT's emphasis on the need to identify clearly the constituent elements of each head of claim — particularly in section 15 and reasonable adjustments cases — underlines that analytical shortcuts or conflation of distinct legal tests will attract appellate intervention. Practitioners advising respondent employers in the care sector should ensure that