Education
Should Religious Schools Be Abolished?
LNAT Section B · Model essay
The essay prompt
It has been argued that the state should close down faith schools because no government should permit the institutional indoctrination of children. Discuss whether religious schools should be abolished.
The stance
On balance, state-funded religious schools should be abolished, because the same state cannot remain neutral, protect children's developing autonomy and hold communities together while privileging one faith inside the school it funds; but the case is for ending state sponsorship and faith-based admissions, not for criminalising private religious education, and it must be made on children's rights rather than hostility to belief.
Defining the terms
- Religious (faith) schools — Schools that embed a particular faith in their ethos, governance, admissions or worship, as distinct from secular schools that teach about religion comparatively. In England these are 'schools with a religious character' under the Education Acts.
- Abolished — No longer funded or designated by the state as part of the public system, and no longer permitted to select pupils or staff by faith; religion would be taught about, but worship and doctrine would move into the private or family sphere.
- Indoctrination ('brainwashing') — Teaching that presents contestable beliefs as unquestionable truths in a way that stunts a child's capacity to evaluate them, as opposed to critical, pluralistic religious education.
- State neutrality — The principle that public institutions should not endorse or privilege one worldview over others; impartiality between faiths and between faith and non-belief, not hostility to religion.
Assumptions to interrogate
- That permitting state faith schools is compatible with children's independent rights to autonomy, equality and freedom of belief, and not only with their parents' rights.
- That religion embedded in a school's ethos can in practice be taught critically rather than as settled truth a pupil is expected to adopt.
- That faith-based schooling does not, on the evidence, deepen social division.
- That abolition would not simply displace religious schooling into a less regulated private sector while breaching entrenched constitutional protections.
The case for
A neutral state cannot fund a school that privileges one faith
Public education is paid for by everyone and should belong to everyone. When the state funds, designates and inspects a school built around one religion, it stops being impartial between worldviews and signals that one faith deserves a special institutional place. Neutrality is not hostility to belief; it is refusing to put the machinery of the state behind any single creed. In England roughly a third of state-funded schools are faith schools, so this is not a marginal anomaly but the structure of the system.
Children have an independent right to form their own beliefs
A child is not simply the bearer of a parent's convictions. Article 14 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child protects the child's own freedom of thought, conscience and religion, exercised in line with their evolving capacities. A school whose ethos presents one faith as the framework of life, especially before children can critically assess it, risks foreclosing the choice the Convention is meant to keep open. Education should equip pupils to weigh worldviews, not hand them one pre-decided.
Sorting children by faith entrenches social division
Schools are where a society teaches children to live alongside difference. Where children are separated by religion from the age of four, the habit of seeing the other community as 'other' is built in early. Northern Ireland is the cautionary case: fewer than eight per cent of pupils attend integrated schools and over ninety per cent are educated effectively along community lines, decades after the Troubles. Shared, secular schooling is the surer foundation for a plural society than parallel systems that rarely meet.
Faith-based admissions ration a public good by belief
Oversubscribed faith schools may lawfully prioritise children of the faith, so two families paying the same taxes have unequal access to the same publicly funded school depending on whether they worship. The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has repeatedly criticised the UK for selective faith admissions. A public school place should turn on proximity or need, not on a baptism certificate or a vicar's reference. Exclusion of this kind has no place in a state system.
The case against
Parents have a recognised right to direct their children's education
Article 2 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR obliges the state to respect parents' wish to educate their children in line with their own religious and philosophical convictions, and Article 9 protects freedom of religion. Many parents value the moral framework and community a faith school provides. Abolishing state faith schools overrides a settled liberty, and a liberal state should hesitate before telling families their convictions may not shape where their children learn.
Faith schools can teach critically and are often high-performing and cohesive
The indoctrination charge can be a strawman. Many faith schools teach religion comparatively, score well academically, and consciously build bridges between communities rather than walls. The ECHR itself, in Lautsi v Italy (2011), treated a religious symbol in a state classroom as 'essentially passive' and within the state's margin of appreciation, recognising that a religious presence in schooling is not by itself coercive indoctrination.
Abolition can be constitutionally impossible and may worsen the problem
In some systems faith schooling is entrenched: in Adler v Ontario (1996) the Supreme Court of Canada held that public funding of Roman Catholic separate schools is protected by section 93 of the Constitution Act 1867 and shielded from Charter challenge. Abolition there would require a constitutional amendment. More broadly, banning state faith schools may simply push religious education into a private sector with far less oversight, making the feared indoctrination harder, not easier, to check.
The argument, step by step
- Define 'religious schools' and 'abolished' so the question is about state sponsorship and faith-selective admissions, not about banning private belief; frame it around children's rights, not hostility to religion.
- Establish the neutrality argument: a state that funds and badges a single-faith school is no longer impartial between worldviews, and faith schools are a third of the English system, not a fringe.
- Move from the state to the child: under UNCRC Article 14 children have their own developing right to belief, which a faith ethos can foreclose before they can assess it.
- Add the social dimension: dividing children by creed entrenches division, with Northern Ireland's near-total segregation as evidence, and faith admissions ration a public good by belief.
- Engage the strongest counters honestly: parents' Article 2 Protocol 1 rights, the fact many faith schools teach critically and cohere (Lautsi's 'passive' presence), and that abolition can be constitutionally barred (Adler) or merely displace the problem.
- Resolve by narrowing the claim: abolish state designation and faith-based selection, keep private religious teaching lawful, and ground the whole case in the child's autonomy and equal access.
The model plan
Thesis: state-funded faith schools should be abolished (end state designation + faith admissions), but not private religious teaching; argue on children's rights, not anti-religion. Intro (~90 words): steel-man faith schools (community, ethos, results), then pivot; define 'religious schools' and 'abolished'; thesis. Para 1 (FOR neutrality): a funded single-faith school = state taking sides; ~31% of English state schools are faith schools, so structural not fringe; neutrality = impartiality not hostility. Para 2 (FOR autonomy): UNCRC Art 14 = child's own evolving right to belief; ethos can foreclose choice before a child can weigh it; education should cultivate judgement. Para 3 (FOR cohesion + admissions): sorting by creed entrenches division - Northern Ireland <8% integrated, >90% segregated; faith admissions ration a public good by belief (UN CRC Committee criticised UK). Para 4 (AGAINST, honest): parents' Art 2 Protocol 1 + Art 9 ECHR; many faith schools teach critically and cohere (Lautsi 'passive symbol'); Adler v Ontario - s.93 entrenchment can bar abolition + ban may displace into unregulated private sector. Para 5 (resolution): narrow the claim - abolish designation + faith selection, keep private teaching; comparative line: France laicite (no state faith schools) vs Canada s.93 entrenchment vs ECHR margin of appreciation. Conclusion (~70 words): yes abolish state faith schools, on the child's right to neutrality, autonomy and equal access; concede the limit (private belief stays free). End every paragraph linking back to '...therefore the state should not run religious schools.'
The model essay
Faith schools are easy to caricature and harder to dismiss. Many offer a strong moral framework, a real sense of community and good results, and most parents who choose them are not trying to brainwash anyone. Any honest answer has to start there. But once 'religious schools' is taken to mean state-funded, state-designated schools that select pupils by faith, the case for abolishing them becomes strong, not because religion is dangerous, but because the same state cannot fund such a school and still keep its promises of neutrality, of protecting children's developing autonomy, and of equal access.
The first promise is neutrality. Public education is paid for by everyone and should belong to everyone, which means the state should not put its machinery behind any single creed. When it funds, badges and inspects a school built around one faith, it stops being impartial between worldviews. This is not a fringe issue: roughly a third of state-funded schools in England are faith schools, so the partiality is structural. Neutrality here is not hostility to belief but impartiality between beliefs, and that is precisely what a funded single-faith school cannot deliver. Therefore the state should not run religious schools.
The second promise is owed to the child rather than the parent. A child is not merely the carrier of a family's convictions. Article 14 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child protects the child's own freedom of thought, conscience and religion, exercised according to their evolving capacities. A school whose entire ethos presents one faith as the framework of life, taught to pupils too young to weigh it, risks closing the very choice the Convention exists to keep open. Education should hand children the tools to assess worldviews, not a single worldview pre-decided. Therefore the state should not embed one faith in a child's schooling.
The third promise is equal membership of a shared society. Schools are where children learn to live with difference, and sorting them by creed from the age of four builds the sense of the other community in early. Northern Ireland is the warning: fewer than eight per cent of pupils attend integrated schools and over ninety per cent are educated effectively along community lines, decades after the Troubles. The same logic taints faith-based admissions, where oversubscribed schools may prioritise children of the faith, so two families paying identical taxes have unequal access to the same public school. A state place should turn on need, not on a baptism certificate.
The strongest objections must be met, not waved away. Article 2 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR requires the state to respect parents' religious and philosophical convictions in education, and Article 9 protects freedom of religion. Many faith schools genuinely teach critically and build bridges; in Lautsi v Italy (2011) the Court treated a crucifix in a state classroom as an 'essentially passive' symbol within the state's margin of appreciation, a reminder that religious presence is not automatically indoctrination. And abolition is not always even possible: in Adler v Ontario (1996) the Supreme Court of Canada held that funding for Roman Catholic separate schools is entrenched by section 93 of the Constitution Act 1867 and beyond Charter challenge, so abolition there would need a constitutional amendment. A clumsy ban might also just push religious schooling into a private sector with less oversight.
These objections narrow the claim rather than defeat it. The argument is for ending state designation and faith-based selection, not for criminalising private religious teaching, which remains protected. Parents may still raise their children in a faith and pay for religious schooling; what they may not demand is that the state run and ration schools by creed on their behalf. France's secular system shows this is workable; Canada's entrenchment shows the obstacle is sometimes constitutional rather than principled. The child's right to a neutral education, to form beliefs freely and to enter any school equally points one way: the state should not be in the business of running religious schools, even as it leaves private faith and family belief entirely free.
Authorities worth knowing
Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 14
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), Art 14
States must respect the child's own right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, with parental direction exercised consistently with the child's evolving capacities; grounds the child-autonomy argument against an imposed school ethos.
Protocol 1, Article 2 ECHR (right to education)
Protocol 1, Art 2 to the European Convention on Human Rights
The state must respect parents' right to education in conformity with their religious and philosophical convictions, but the right is not absolute and the state must teach in an objective, critical and pluralistic manner without indoctrination.
Lautsi and others v Italy
App no 30814/06 (ECHR, Grand Chamber, 18 March 2011)
Requiring crucifixes in state classrooms did not breach Protocol 1, Article 2; the symbol was 'essentially passive' and the question fell within the state's margin of appreciation, showing the ECHR tolerates religious presence in state schooling.
Adler v Ontario
[1996] 3 SCR 609 (Supreme Court of Canada)
Public funding of Roman Catholic separate schools is protected by section 93 of the Constitution Act 1867 and immune from Charter challenge; entrenched faith schooling cannot be abolished without constitutional amendment.
Engel v Vitale
370 U.S. 421 (1962)
State sponsorship of even a voluntary, non-denominational prayer in public schools breached the Establishment Clause; the leading statement that the state must not promote religion in public education.
How the law frames it
United Kingdom
England maintains 'schools with a religious character', which make up roughly a third of state-funded schools and may lawfully use faith-based oversubscription criteria. Education and belief are governed by the Human Rights Act 1998, bringing in Article 9 ECHR and Protocol 1, Article 2. Parliament has not moved to abolish faith schools, but the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has repeatedly criticised faith-selective admissions, and campaigners argue the system sits uneasily with state neutrality.
Canada
Faith schooling is partly constitutionally entrenched. In Adler v Ontario (1996) the Supreme Court held that Ontario's funding of Roman Catholic separate schools is protected by section 93 of the Constitution Act 1867 and shielded from Charter challenge, while there is no constitutional right to funding for other religious schools. Abolition of the protected Catholic system would therefore require constitutional amendment, illustrating how history can lock faith schools into a public system.
ECHR
The Convention protects both freedom of religion (Article 9) and parents' right to educate in line with their convictions (Protocol 1, Article 2), but bars the state from pursuing indoctrination and requires objective, critical and pluralistic teaching. In Lautsi v Italy (2011) the Grand Chamber found a crucifix in state classrooms compatible with the Convention as a 'passive' symbol within the margin of appreciation, showing Strasbourg permits, rather than requires, religious presence in state schools.
Counter-arguments and how to defeat them
Counter. Parents have a right under Article 2 of Protocol 1 ECHR to have children educated in line with their convictions, so abolishing faith schools violates that right.
Rebuttal. The right is real but not absolute and is grafted onto the child's own right to education; it requires the state to respect convictions, not to fund and run faith-selective schools. Ending state designation while leaving private religious teaching lawful respects parents' beliefs without making the state an agent of one creed.
Counter. Many faith schools teach religion critically, perform well and actively foster cohesion, so 'institutional brainwashing' is a strawman.
Rebuttal. Conceded for the best schools, and the argument is deliberately not framed as anti-religion. But the case against state faith schools rests on neutrality, equal admissions and the child's developing autonomy, which a single-faith ethos compromises even when teaching is excellent and well-intentioned.
Counter. Faith schools can be a passive, non-coercive presence, as Lautsi v Italy accepted, so they do not indoctrinate.
Rebuttal. Lautsi concerned one symbol on a wall, not a school built entirely around a faith and selecting by it. A passive crucifix is a weak analogy for an ethos that shapes worship, admissions and curriculum; the deeper objection is state sponsorship and selection, not the mere visibility of religion.
Counter. Abolition is impossible where faith schooling is constitutionally entrenched, and may push religion into an unregulated private sector.
Rebuttal. Entrenchment, as in Adler, is a practical obstacle, not a reason the schools are justified; it shows why reform is hard, not why it is wrong. Displacement is a real risk, which is why the right policy ends state designation and faith admissions while keeping private religious schools regulated, not banned.
Conclusion
State-funded religious schools should be abolished, but the claim must be drawn precisely. The case is not that faith is harmful or that private religious education should be banned; it is that a neutral state cannot fund and run schools that privilege one creed, select pupils by belief, and embed a worldview in children before they can weigh it. Northern Ireland shows the cost in division; the UNCRC and the neutrality principle show the cost in children's rights. Abolishing state designation and faith-based admissions, while leaving family belief and private faith schooling free, honours both the parent's liberty and the child's, where the present system quietly favours one over the other.
Evidence you can cite
- Roughly a third (around 31%) of state-funded schools in England are faith schools, a proportion that has been broadly stable; about 37% of primary schools and 18% of secondary schools have a religious character.House of Commons Library, 'Faith schools: FAQs' (Briefing SN06972, 29 May 2024); DfE 'Schools, pupils and their characteristics' — source
- Fewer than 8% of pupils in Northern Ireland attend integrated schools, and over 90% are educated in schools that are effectively segregated along Protestant and Catholic community lines.Northern Ireland integrated education statistics, reported via RTE / Department of Education NI (2024) — source
- Article 14 UNCRC obliges States Parties to respect the right of the child to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, with parental direction consistent with the child's evolving capacities.UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 14 (OHCHR) — source
Further reading
- J.S. Mill, On Liberty (1859), ch. 3 on individuality and the development of autonomous judgement.
- House of Commons Library, 'Faith schools: FAQs' (Briefing SN06972, 29 May 2024).
- UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations on the UK (2016), on faith-selective admissions.
- Council of Europe, Guide on Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR (right to education).